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This dissertation essays to fill a gap that exists currently in 
postcolonial theory and criticism: that constituted by the dearth, if not 
total absence, of a psychological approach. Long before postcolonial 
studies became a discipline, Frantz Fanon declared that ―only a 
psychoanalytical interpretation of the black problem can lay bare the 
anomalies of affect that are responsible for the structure of the 
complex.‖ Fanon would later emerge as a canonical figure in the field, 
even spawning an academic cottage industry memorably dubbed 
―critical Fanonism.‖ But much of this criticism ignores the essence of 
Fanon‘s call for a sociodiagnostic, a psychoanalytic interpretive tool 
informed by social and economic realities. My intervention seeks to 
answer the question of what it would mean to read post-colonial 
history as the history of a trauma, of the subversive return of the 
repressed.  
Yet, to speak of psychic epiphenomena and social realism in one 
breath presents, admittedly, an apparent contradiction.  To show this 
problem as more apparent than real, I bring psychoanalysis into 
dialogue with philosophical realism. I look to the emergent theory of 
 post-positivist realism for a conception of reference that provides the 
referential link between ―traumatic‖ and ―ordinary‖ experience.  
In my readings of the primary texts that form this study, I show 
the link between the traumatic wound of (post)colonialism and the 
strange and often bizarre effects it produces even today. Thus, for 
instance, I expand our current understanding of the confounding 
drama of death and continuity in a colonized world recently voided of 
its will (Wole Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s Horseman), and of the 
debilitating symptoms of a repressed past that must be worked-
through in order to recover agency (Derek Walcott‘s Omeros). My 
exegesis serves as a critique of the tendency in postcolonial studies to 
privilege only the cultural-political mode of interpretation, thereby 
leaving a crucial dimension of the postcolonial predicament 
inadequately explored.  
If asked to restate the goal of this dissertation, I would, for want 
of a better term, say simply, ―Towards a psycho-social realist theory of 
the post-colonial narrative.‖  It is a close cousin of ―the political 
unconscious,‖ the closest that a materialist attempt at probing the 
repressed strata of postcolonial trauma has yet come. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The theme of ―return to the past‖ constitutes a key trope of 
postcolonial discourse. This theme is as established in the poetics of 
the decolonisation struggle that saw to the emergence of the 
postcolonial state as in the literary acts of self-representation that 
flourished alongside that struggle. For colonialism,1 as no lesser 
authorities than Amilcar Cabral and Frantz Fanon pointed out quite 
early on, is a totalitarian practice not content only to conquer, rule 
and exploit the colonised. It has, also, to eradicate the past of its 
victims the better to ensure its hold on their present and future. In the 
essay, ―On National Culture,‖ Frantz Fanon described the imperialist 
need for obliterating the past of the colonised thus: ―Perhaps we have 
not sufficiently demonstrated that colonialism is not content simply to 
impose its rule upon the present and future of the dominated country. 
Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and 
emptying the native‘s brain of all form and content. By a kind of 
perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and 
distorts, disfigures, and destroys it. This work of devaluing pre-
colonial history takes on a dialectical significance today.‖2 Cabral, for 
his part, put the matter this way:  ―Certainly imperialist domination 
calls for cultural oppression and attempts either directly or indirectly 
                                       
1 Perhaps this explanation is unnecessary but I should like to say that for the 
purposes of this dissertation, I have adopted the broader meaning of colonialism as a 
forcible subjugation and domination of lands and peoples beginning with the trans-
Atlantic slave trade. 
2 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: 
Grove Press, 1963), 210. 
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to do away with the most important elements of the culture of the 
subject people.‖3 If culture, as Cabral defines it, is ―the vigorous 
manifestation on the ideological or idealist plane of the physical and 
historical reality of the society that is dominated … simultaneously the 
fruit of a people‘s history and a determinant of history‖4 then it is even 
more apparent why the imperialist practice of colonialism would want 
to eradicate the past wherein the culture of the colonized has its 
deepest roots. 
And it is similarly understandable why the colonised invariably 
launches the struggle for self-determination, for ―identity and dignity,‖ 
by first returning to that same devalued past. But to what past does or 
can the colonised, and, for that matter, the postolonial subject, return 
in her effort to restore the ―broken connection‖ and attain healing? 
What would it mean if we read postcolonial history as not merely the 
verifiable record of imperialist atrocities but also as a history of the 
resultant trauma to the psyche of the colonised? In which case, we are 
confronted by non-empirical, mental processes lodged in the murky 
recesses of the unconscious? While postcolonial literary and cultural 
theory has produced an astonishing body of work that explores the 
politico-cultural dimension of postcoloniality, it has, regrettably, 
lagged sorely behind in the psychological sphere. This fact, I dare say, 
constitutes something of a scandal, given the sophistication of the 
cultural production that followed the emergence of postcolonialism as 
                                       
3 Amilcar Cabral, ―Identity and Dignity in the Context of the National Liberation 
Struggle,‖ in Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral, ed. Africa 
Information Service (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 60. 
4 Amilcar Cabral, Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral, 41. 
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a discipline.5 Moreover, Fanon, the single pre-discipline figure with the 
widest influence on postcolonial theory, not only located his work in 
the intersection of a revolutionary anti-imperialist poetics and a 
revisionist psychoanalysis but—the doctor he was—also daringly 
prescribed the psychoanalytic procedure for tackling what he called 
the ―black problem.‖ As he memorably put it, ―only a psychoanalytical 
interpretation of the black problem can lay bare the anomalies of affect 
that are responsible for the structure of the complex.‖6 Let us bring 
Fanon up to date and for his ―black problem‖ say the postcolonial 
―condition‖ or ―predicament‖—meaning by it everything that still 
makes the formerly colonised regions of the world, Africa in particular, 
hewers of wood and drawers of water for the former colonisers. 
But if Fanon was the pre-disciplinary advocate of the 
psychological approach for the interpretation of postcolonial writing, 
not so Edouard Glissant, fellow Martinican and also an influential 
figure in the field as writer and bona fide member of the academy. 
According to the critic, Carine Mardorossian, Glissant is perhaps the 
lone figure in whose work the psychoanalytical ―legacy‖ of Fanon ―can 
be traced.‖7 Unfortunately, Glissant‘s work is only partially available in 
English—a factor that many a critic, Mardorossian inclusive, often 
laments—but from what is available it is clear that he, like Fanon, sees 
                                       
5 Although the point does not require elaboration, it seems fairly indisputable that 
this will be the period starting with the formation of the Africa Literature Association 
(ALA) in 1975, followed by the founding of Research in African Literatures as the 
learned journal for the field, and the publication of Edward Said‘s landmark work, 
Orientalism, in 1978. 
6 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: 
Grove Press, 1967), 10. 
7 See Carine Mardorossian, ―From Fanon to Glissant: A Martinican Genealogy.‖ Small 
Axe, Number 30 (vol. 13, no. 3), October 2009, 12-24. 
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the need for a psychoanalytic approach to postcolonial narratives as a 
clear imperative. At the risk of repetition much later, it is worth 
quoting him here even now: 
 
Would it be ridiculous to consider our lived history as a steadily 
advancing neurosis? To see the Slave Trade as a traumatic 
shock, our relocation (in the new land) as a repressive phase, 
slavery as the period of latency, ―emancipation‖ in 1848 as 
reactivation, our everyday fantasies as symptoms, and even our 
horror of ―returning to those things of the past‖ as a possible 
manifestation of the neurotic‘s fear of his past? Would it not be 
useful and revealing to investigate such a parallel? What is 
repressed in our history persuades us, furthermore, that this is 
more than an intellectual game.8 
 
In this dissertation, I align myself with both Fanon and Glissant. I 
employ the framework of a comparative ―Third World‖ discourse that 
draws from philosophical realism9 and psychoanalysis to examine the 
                                       
8 Edouard Glissant, Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays, trans. J. Michael Dash 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1989), 65-66. 
9 I have in mind the anti-positivist notion of epistemological holism evinced by such 
philosophers as W. V. O. Quine, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Thomas Kuhn, among 
others, as well as its development in semiotics by such figures as Hilary Putnam, 
Mikhail Bakhtin, C. S. Peirce and Richard Boyd, to the effect that scientific 
knowledge is theory-dependent, contingent, and subject to review. Realists accept 
the essential postmodern notion of constructivism, but not the leap to radical 
indeterminacy. To the realist, objective knowledge is possible through an open-ended 
process that does not assume transcendental and error-free inquiry but that 
subjects self-interest and error to constant scrutiny, evaluating knowledge claims 
according to the degree of their correspondence to causal features of the world. But 
see Chapter Three below, especially pages 126-28, for a further elaboration of this 
view with particular reference to the use post-positivist realists make of it in 
interpreting the category of experience, and for my purposes here, traumatic 
experience. 
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ways in which postcolonial narratives seek to recuperate identities 
battered and buried beneath imperialist encrustations. Informed by 
the ―sociodiagnostic‖ protocol that Fanon proposed, my project focuses 
on the impact of the traumas of slavery and colonialism on modes of 
self-understanding and healing in the black world as shown in the 
exemplary texts from Africa and the African diasporas of North 
America and the Caribbean I have chosen for my analysis. The 
dominant discourse within which my project intervenes is the anti-
identitarian current of the postmodernist/poststructuralist theories 
that are so influential in the academy, no less so in postcolonial 
studies. Although taken together the various deconstructive 
tendencies within this school have profoundly deepened our 
understanding of the structure of power and identity formation, the 
logic of their methodologies tends to lead, nevertheless, to a dismissal 
tout court of social identities as mere constructs of dubious epistemic 
and cultural relevance, especially in the epoch of globalisation. Their 
proponents posit a post-identitarianism in which hybridity and 
cosmopolitanism are the privileged modes of social identification.  
My dissertation draws from the countering current of the 
theories I align myself with, or performs variable readings within the 
hermeneutic tradition of the self-same deconstructionist protocol, to 
argue instead for the re-constructive role that identities play in social 
struggles. Identities, I claim, have historical and theoretical salience, 
what Manuel Castells, for instance, calls ―the power of identity.‖10 
                                       
10 See Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, Vol. II of The Information Age: Economy, 
Society and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). 
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Social identities, I assert, are both constructed and real, because while 
they are indeed culturally produced they nonetheless refer outward to 
constitutive features of the lived world, thereby providing vital 
languages for self-realization and material agency critical to 
progressive social change. With specific reference to the psychic 
impact on the (post)colonial subject of the historical traumas that 
shatter the very identities—for one always occupies and experiences 
several identities simultaneously—that must be retrieved and healed, I 
have used psychoanalysis as a tool of interpretation, one which far 
from occluding the social referents of the traumatic wound inexorably 
leads the careful reader there. Every narrative of trauma, I argue, 
points us to its historical cause. Because my exegesis necessarily 
embraces the category of experience, I show in my readings of both 
primary and secondary texts how alternative conceptions of cultural 
identity challenge the view that traumatic experience is not experience 
or that experience in general lacks cognitive value. I contest the 
shibboleth that all experience is mediated by language to the point of 
indeterminacy and defend the epistemic status of individual and 
collective experience as critical to any cultural struggle for capacity-
building and political change.  
In Chapter One, I lay out the theoretical fulcrum of my project. 
Entitled ―‘Into the Zone of Occult Instability: Frantz Fanon, Post-
Colonial Trauma and Identity,‖ I argue the need for postcolonial theory 
and criticism to return to the other Fanon—the doctor whose practice 
as a psychiatrist afforded him the vantage of close observation and 
treatment of the mental maladies of colonialism. And who, 
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consequently, was led to make his famous prescription. In doing so, I 
insist that the postcolonial critic is not limited to the baldly stated 
choice of either following the Fanon defined mostly by a narrow 
reading of The Wretched of the Earth as the prophet of revolutionary 
violence on the one hand, and on the other the psychoanalyst of Black 
Skin, White Masks allegedly tainted by a petit-bourgeois stink that 
fouls the air for self-respecting commentators. In this introductory 
chapter, I try to show the benefit of taking Fanon‘s call seriously and 
demonstrate it in the ensuing chapters where I examine the primary 
texts of this study.  
In Chapter Two, ―Identity or Death! The Trauma of Life and 
Continuity in Wole Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s Horseman,‖ I focus 
on the psychological dimension of the life-and-death struggle of the 
colonised to compel respect for the self-sufficiency of their culture. I 
deploy death here in the literal and symbolic senses that Orlando 
Patterson so powerfully shows in his path-breaking work, Slavery and 
Social Death.11 The literal deaths of Soyinka‘s dual protagonists—
Elesin and his self-important son, Olunde—portend the symbolic 
death of a community caught in the ―abyss of disintegration.‖ I 
examine the psycho-social impact of this crisis and consider its 
―anomalies of affect‖ by drawing on the Freudian notions of 
Angstbereitschaft or readiness to feel anxiety,12 latency, and 
                                       
11 See Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
12 This is the English translation of the original German, angstbereitschaft, in the 
acclaimed translation by James Strachey et al in The Standard Edition (SE). I have, 
however, consulted primarily two works in which Freud uses this term as culled in 
The Freud Reader edited by Peter Gay, based on SE. See Sigmund Freud, ―Lecture 
XXXII: Anxiety and Instinctual Life‖ in The Freud Reader, Peter Gay, ed. (New York: 
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transference, and Robert Jay Lifton‘s concept of ―broken connection‖ 
and life continuity. I claim that the stunning impact of colonialism, a 
shattering and cataclysmic event, significantly determines the 
response of the Yoruba world which insists against the evidence on 
acting as if its autonomy were still intact, resulting in the tragic 
consequences that Soyinka so memorably depicts. This particular 
aspect of the structure of trauma—latency or belatedness, often 
resulting from a lack of preparedness for anxiety—I argue, best 
explains the paradox of Elesin‘s so-called failure of will. I also examine 
the transferential dynamics that Soyinka betrays in writing Horseman 
in England, right inside the belly of the colonial whale, a factor I claim 
throws light on his contentious claim that the colonial factor is a mere 
catalytic incident to the events he dramatises.  This, I also argue, 
helps explain the contradiction that attends Soyinka‘s dogged 
insistence on honour as the central theme of the play.  
At this juncture, I crave the indulgence to pause and say once 
more that the view of colonialism as a shattering historical trauma 
cannot be overemphasised. I have tried to give a brief explanation of 
this claim with specific reference to Horseman above. But perhaps the 
point is weighty enough to permit a preliminary explanation by way of 
reference to a work that is not discussed here: Chinua Achebe‘s classic 
novel, aptly entitled Things Fall Apart. This brief excursus will further 
                                                                                                              
W. W. Norton, 1989), 774-783 at 774, and ―Beyond the Pleasure Principle,‖ The 
Freud Reader, 594-627, at 609-10. But see also ―Anxiety and Instinctual Life‖ in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 22, 
trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1955), 81-111, and ―Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle,‖ SE, vol.18, 27-32.  
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clarify the claim, given that so much rests on it in the 
conceptualisation and elucidation of my thesis. Moreover, the novel 
shares several structural similarities with the play13 and even the 
briefest comparison will do. Achebe‘s very title speaks to the notion of 
the shattering of a previously existing cosmological frame and the 
knowledge system it subtends:  things, literally and metaphorically, 
fall apart. In Things Fall Apart as in Horseman, the Igbo world 
synedochically portrayed in Umuofia is symbolised by vigour: we are 
introduced to both worlds through lyrical descriptions of Okonkwo‘s 
wrestling prowess as demonstrated in the ―fiercest‖ fight since 
Umuofia was founded14 and of Elesin as ―a man of enormous vitality‖ 
singing and dancing with ―that infectious enjoyment of life which 
accompanies all his actions.‖15 Individual vitality connotes communal 
vigour underwritten by political and juridical autonomy, cultural self-
sufficiency and an independent will. By the end of both narratives, 
however, vigour and self-sufficiency have been vitiated with tragic 
consequences to social cohesion. Okonkwo, as Elesin, is unable to 
understand the thwarting of his will—though in Okonkwo‘s case it is 
the will of his kinsmen that seems thwarted, this nonetheless results 
in the effective determination of his own seemingly imperturbable will, 
however intact he otherwise deems it. ―What is it that has happened to 
our people? Why have they lost the power to fight?‖ Okonkwo, exiled 
                                       
13 Indeed, a psychoanalytic reading of these two classic works—each the magnum 
opus of either writer—merits a separate essay, if not an extensive book-length 
treatment, and I may well take it up at some point in the future. 
14 Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart (New York: Anchor Books, 1994), 3. 
15 Wole Soyinka, Death and the King’s Horseman, Norton Critical Edition (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 2003), 5. 
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from his father‘s to his mother‘s land for an inadvertent crime against 
the earth, listlessly asks his friend Obierika, the one who Achebe tells 
us thought deeply about things. As Obierika narrates one tale of woe 
after another in the wake of the colonial government‘s overthrow of the 
old order, the sense of a shattered world becomes clearer. Then the 
report turns to a land dispute which Okonkwo, together with the other 
eight masked elders of Umuofia, would have adjudicated before the 
advent of colonialism. ―What has happened to that piece of land in 
dispute?‖ Okonkwo asks. To which Obierika replies, ―The white man‘s 
court has decided that it should belong to Nnama‘s family, who had 
given money to the white man‘s messengers and interpreter.‖ When 
Okonkwo responds with the obvious question, ―Does the white man 
understand our custom about land?‖ Obierika makes the following 
profound statement that testifies to the precise manner colonialism 
wrenched the Igbo world from its axis and thereby shattered its frame 
of reference, its horizon of meaning: 
 
How can he understand our custom about land? How can he 
when he does not speak our tongue? But he says that our 
customs are bad; and our own brothers who have taken up his 
religion also say that our customs are bad. How do you think we 
can fight when our own brothers have turned against us? The 
white man is very clever. He came quietly and peaceably with his 
religion. We were amused at his foolishness and allowed him to 
stay. Now he has won our brothers, and our clan can no longer 
act like one. He has put a knife on the things that held us 
together and we have fallen apart. 
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Achebe‘s precise diction, almost clinically anti-sceptic, skirts a psycho-
social diagnostic. It is true that colonialism put a knife on the things 
that held the colonised together and they fell apart. And we can add 
that the neo-colonial knife is even sharper and cuts much deeper. But 
such plainly empirical observation of the phenomenon as Obierika 
displays, while crucial to the social consciousness needed by any 
strategy of resistance, does not fully account for all its catastrophic 
dimensions. For instance, Obierika‘s philosophical bent of mind does 
not even begin to apprehend the oedipal sources of Okonkwo‘s 
tragedy, a struggle captured by the personal trauma of Okonkwo 
constituted by the fear of failure, of being like his ―worthless‖ father, 
Unoka.16 Nor does he recognise that same father-son death-dialectic 
as what drives Okonkwo‘s son, Nwoye, to the colonial religion and 
makes him turn his back on his own people, including his father. Even 
more significantly, Obierika‘s counsel fails to prevent his great and 
dear friend from the abomination of suicide. All that it avails him and 
                                       
16 On this point, I am happy to note that Biodun Jeyifo comes very close, via a 
differing protocol, to the kind of psychological reading that the psychoanalytic would 
more readily yield in his essay, ―Okonkwo and his Mother: Things Fall Apart and 
Issues of Gender in the Constitution of African Postcolonial Discourse,‖ Callaloo, vol. 
16. No. 4 (Autumn, 1993), 847-858. As with Adebayo Williams‘s ―Ritual and the 
Political Unconscious: The Case of Death and the King’s Horseman,‖ Research in 
African Literatures 24.1 (Spring 1993), which I discuss in this chapter, however, 
Jeyifo is able to come this close because of the implicit Marxist-drawn concept of the 
political unconscious, expostulated by Frederic Jameson, which owes much of its 
power to psychoanalysis. For, remarkably, although Jeyifo cites Fanon, it is not 
Black Skin, White Masks but arguably his most politically-charged essay, ―The 
Pitfalls of National Consciousness‖ in The Wretched of the Earth. I should quickly say 
that I do not imply that Jeyifo ought to have turned to the psychoanalytic Fanon, nor 
that his very insightful essay loses anything on that score. I do suggest, however, 
that these indirect ways of reaching the psychological show that its terrain remains 
under-theorised in post-colonial literary criticism and that this lapse would be more 
directly dealt with through a reading that privileges the psychoanalytical paradigm. 
xxiii 
 
the community is impotent rage at the District Commissioner when 
faced with the ignoble death of his friend: ―That man‖—pointing to 
Okonkwo‘s body dangling from a tree—―was one of the greatest men in 
Umuofia. You drove him to kill himself; and now he will be buried like 
a dog.‖17 If the psychoanalytic subsumes the socio-political and refers 
us inexorably to lived experience, then it also points us in the way we 
should go in examining the lingering effects of colonial domination in 
the postcolony. 
To return to the summary of this project: a two-fold ambition 
lies behind Chapter Three, ―Experience as the Best Teacher: Trauma, 
Reference and Realism in Toni Morrison‘s Beloved .‖ In this chapter, I 
argue that the novel‘s trope of wilful amnesia is actually more 
historically determined than being a conscious act of agency—as its 
protagonists, Sethe and Paul D, would have the reader believe. Here I 
affirm experience as an objective category of knowledge by focusing on 
trauma as its avowed limit case. I read Beloved as a narrative of 
historical trauma to counter the claim that trauma lacks experiental or 
epistemic dimensions. Drawing instead on the realist social 
communication theory of language, especially the view of reference as 
epistemologically verifiable, I defend trauma as a legitimate but 
intransigent form of experience with cognitive salience. The aim of this 
performance is to expand the horizon of agency to the day-to-day field 
of the social to which every trauma refers us. Additionally, I present 
the outline of an adequate theory of reference that would achieve the 
aim that well-meaning deconstructionists, taking Cathy Caruth as my 
                                       
17 Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart, 175-76 and 208. 
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example, set themselves but fail to achieve due to the limitations of 
their theory. For it is true, indeed, that ―language can give us access to 
history.‖ The implicit goal here is to exhume the buried or repressed 
trauma of slavery as a form of colonialism by linking it to its meaning-
making referents in the social world, thus creating the material 
condition for a proper burying of the past through its 
acknowledgement and working-through.  
In chapter four, entitled ―Till the Word and the Wound Fit‖: 
History, Memory, and Healing of the Post-Colonial Body-Politic in 
Derek Walcott‘s Omeros,‖ I focus on healing at the individual and 
collective levels through the prisms provided by the concepts of acting-
out and working-through. What does it mean to ―work through‖ a 
traumatic experience, and what role does the past play in it? In 
particular, what does Walcott mean by avowing that the traumatic 
wound of the West Indies emblematised by the Middle Passage, 
physically embodied in Philoctete and psychically in Major Plunkett, 
can be healed only after a coming-to-terms with the very history that 
inflicted it? And does this notion, as well as Walcott‘s complex poetics 
of identity, which insists on a specifically New World understanding 
that is neither wholly beholden to an idyllic African image of grandeur 
nor an abject West Indian slave image, subvert identity and national 
belonging in favour of some indeterminate idea of hybridity and in-
betweenness? In short, can there be any such thing as ―a free-floating 
wound‖ of history? I argue against the tendency to read Walcott 
―postmodernly‖ as one critic notes even while proceeding to do exactly 
what she abjures. Reading some of the more vexing moments of 
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Walcott‘s ambivalence on the subject of identity as an index of trauma, 
I examine the manner in which Omeros depicts identity at the open 
horizon of self-recreation, with the subject as agent of collective 
healing. I pay attention to the gendering of healing agency in this epic 
poem, especially the way in which women stand as figures of ancestral 
memory and for the medical cum sacerdotal and socio-political healing 
that ―closes‖ the wound of history.  
My primary texts, by pure coincidence, span the major literary 
genres of drama, fiction and poetry. I say ―pure coincidence‖ because I 
was led to them by the problem I set out to examine—establishing the 
case for trauma as a valid mode of experience, and, so, a critical 
determinant of social identity—and not the other way round. 
Admittedly, I was pointed in this direction by demurrals to the post-
positivist realist reading of Beloved as too ―epistemocentric.‖ What, it 
was posed as a challenge, would happen to the realist‘s core claim 
when confronted by limit or aporetic cases of experience, such as 
depicted by trauma, which are bound to thwart a realist reading? I 
wished to revisit Beloved to attempt an answer. But having defined the 
black world as my field of study, Horseman and Omeros naturally drew 
my attention, being narratives that grapple with the trauma of 
(post)colonialism as well as the ensuing struggle to recuperate 
shattered identities. What then unites these three texts and renders 
them more amenable to the psychoanalytic paradigm is the fact that 
an elucidation of the mechanism of historical trauma, including its 
trans-generational transmission, and, so, the psychic state of the post-
colonial state and subject, constitutes their plots. By another 
xxvi 
 
happenstance, these three narratives inscribe a race-wide 
consciousness that sees clearly beyond the local circumstances of 
their setting in time and place. In this, I have not found the formal 
constraints of genre to significantly alter the manner of apprehending 
and working-through the trauma of (post)colonialism. Indeed, it is the 
case that the three authors of my primary texts, who are celebrated for 
their masterful deployment of language—no surprise that Soyinka and 
Walcott are respectively poet and playwright as well—blur the 
assumed genre boundaries and return us in each case to the old 
definition of poetry. Indeed, each of my three texts emblematises 
language as figure. 
The underlying logic of this dissertation is this: identities are a 
matter of life-and-death to those whose cultures are threatened by 
(social) death under imperial domination—whether in the form of 
chattel slavery, or colonial and neo-colonial exploitation under the sign 
of globalisation. Without an acknowledgement of the trauma of 
colonialism and its inherited effects (as well as new causes which 
repeat the old), literal and social death become the defining 
predicament of the postcolonial subject. The argument thus moves 
from this bleak prospect of denial or repression (literal and social 
death), to acknowledgement (awakening self-consciousness and the 
possibility of healing) and the working-through of postcolonial trauma 
(the reconstitution, or I should say, reconstruction, of identity, agency 
and self-determination).  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTO ―THE ZONE OF OCCULT INSTABILITY‖: FRANTZ FANON, POST-
COLONIAL TRAUMA AND IDENTITY 
 
If the eighties were the decade of Frantz Fanon‘s emergence as a 
―global theorist‖ amenable to any theoretical postulations on the 
postcolonial condition and the universality of oppression, as Henry 
Louis Gates suggests in his essay, ―Critical Fanonism,‖1 then it is no 
coincidence that I should have encountered Fanon for the first time in 
that fortuitous epoch. Precisely in 1987, as a sophomore in law at the 
University of Benin in Nigeria. As part of my initiation into the 
Cultural Awareness Club—a radical campus group actively involved in 
the national student movement and successor to its banned 
predecessor, the League of Patriotic Students—I was given a list of 
books that were compulsory reading for every new member. Fanon‘s 
The Wretched of the Earth was among the top five on the list, the 
others being Karl Marx and Frederick Engels‘s The Communist 
Manifesto,  Walter Rodney‘s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 
Engels‘s The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, and 
Paul Frère‘s Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Somehow, I never got round 
to reading the last. Boasting no previous familiarity with ―theory‖ other 
than what I had gleaned from the newspapers, especially the views of 
the Nigerian and African writers towards which my budding love of 
                                       
1 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ―Critical Fanonism,‖ Critical Inquiry 17 (Spring 1991), 457-
470. 
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poetry and writing had inclined me, I found this moment a truly 
epochal one. Moreover, as fate would have it, I entered the university 
at the very time when resistance to military dictatorship that had 
resulted in the proscription of national and local student union activity 
had taken on the spirit of defiance. Such that while still insisting on 
its ban on the National Association of Nigerian Students, the military 
regime of the day had nevertheless come to concede the resumption of 
local student union activity. At my university, agitations had forced 
the administration, after several ruses, to allow an election.  
As it happened, however, most of the old members of the 
Cultural Awareness Club under its old name had been banned from 
participating in student union elections. Not deeming it a worthy battle 
fighting for their unbanning before we could have our union back, it 
was decided that we would field candidates principally for the position 
of Secretary-General but also for any other position for which we had 
enough bodies from among the new members. I was persuaded, 
against my protests of not being ready so soon to take up a position of 
leadership in the highly political and risky business of student 
unionism in a neo-colonial outpost, to run for the office of Secretary-
General. Lacking the resources that other individuals and campus 
interest groups seemed to have in abundance, we began to campaign 
rather late and managed to put out posters and leaflets with just two 
days before the election. But this is where I ―appropriated‖ the 
revolutionary Fanon of The Wretched of the Earth and Toward the 
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African Revolution, the one unsoiled by the ―petit-bourgeois stink‖2 
Cedric Robinson believes taints the first work, Black Skin, White 
Masks, a book I would not even read until a full fifteen years later. The 
only distinguishing feature of a hurriedly produced campaign poster 
were Fanon‘s famous words: ―Each generation must out of relative 
obscurity discover its mission, fulfil it, or betray it.‖ Two other 
Fanonian staples made up the handbill: ―Every onlooker is either a 
traitor or a coward,‖3 and ―The future will have no pity for those men 
who, possessing the exceptional privilege of being able to speak words 
of truth to their oppressors, have taken refuge in an attitude of 
passivity, of mute indifference, and sometimes of cold complicity.‖4 I 
won the election, with the revolutionary Fanon enough, it seemed, to 
rally the student voters to our side.  
But in returning to the Fanon of Black Skin, White Masks, I 
choose a text in which (post)colonial trauma and the crisis of identity 
it produces are highlighted. Would it be right to conclude, then, that I 
have abandoned the revolutionary Fanon? And are there really two 
Fanons—the one revolutionary and the other compromised by class 
ideology and by political immaturity, as Robinson implies?  In what 
other ways, other than in appropriating Fanon as the high priest of 
revolutionary violence and The Wretched of the Earth as the handbook 
of revolution, can we make him speak to the lingering and complex 
                                       
2 See Cedric Robinson, ―The Appropriation of Frantz Fanon,‖ Race & Class 35, 1:79-
91 at 82. 
3 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: 
Grove Press, 1963), 206, and Toward the African Revolution, trans. Haakon Chevalier 
(New York: Grove Press, 1964), 199.   
4 Frantz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution, 117. 
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questions of the postcolonial predicament? Of course, in invoking 
Fanon for the urgent needs of a student body battling an 
unconscionable military dictatorship, I was far from the discursive 
appropriations of him that Gates and Robinson deplore and from 
which Tony Martin felt called upon to ―rescue‖ him as early as 1970.5 
Nevertheless, in this dissertation, it is the Fanon of Black Skin, 
White Masks, whom I discovered a full decade and a half later, that I 
have been more eager to summon. And in this chapter, I focus on the 
formidable obstacles constituted by colonial trauma to an accurate 
consciousness of self. This necessarily involves an exploration of the 
psychological dimension of postcolonial identity struggles. 
Consequently, I find it possible to both accept Gates‘s caution on the 
dangers of deploying Fanon in vacuo and to insist on the colonial 
paradigm which he thinks ought to be abandoned. I argue that the 
psychological, whatever the level of significance the critic might be 
pleased to allow it, is crucial to any struggle aimed at the total 
liberation of the colonised. It follows that I also dispute Robinson‘s 
claim that Fanon was purportedly led by his animus towards 
negritude into ―prioritizing the derivative and psychological,‖6 a claim 
that cannot withstand proper scrutiny. As all careful critics rightly 
point out, Gates among them, Fanon set for himself the task of 
creating ―a new identity‖ at the ―intersection of colonial and 
psychoanalytic discourse,‖ a view I will return to below. Thus, while 
Fanon may have very boldly asserted that ―only a psychoanalytical 
                                       
5 See Toni Martin, ―Rescuing Fanon from the Critics,‖ African Studies Review 13, 3: 
381-99. 
6 Cedric Robinson, ―The Appropriation of Frantz Fanon,‖ 80. 
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interpretation of the black problem can lay bare the anomalies of affect 
that are responsible for the structure of the complex,‖ he was 
nonetheless quick to circumscribe that approach within the dynamic 
of the socio-political realities of colonialism, thus adumbrating the role 
of an adequate theory of reference.  
My title—in particular, the words ―trauma‖ and ―instability‖—
announce the reason why I should find Black Skin, White Masks more 
relevant to my immediate need: that of showing how the psychological, 
which Fanon used interchangeably with the psychoanalytical, is vital 
to the project of reconstituting postcolonial identity. A trauma, simply 
defined, is injury to the body or mind, caused by an act or event so 
violent or cataclysmic in its impact that it shatters the existing frame 
of reference, thereby defying ready understanding.7  If, as Fanon and 
Glissant suggest, colonialism constitutes a traumatic event, what then 
is the extent and nature of the damage it caused to the mind of the 
colonised, and so to self-perception? And how might that ―wound of 
history‖ be healed? That immeasurable damage was done to the 
psyche of the (post)colonial subject is gospel truth to the 
psychoanalytic and historico-materialist critic alike. Thus, when Ngugi 
wa Thiong‘o speaks of the urgent need of ―decolonising the mind,‖8 he 
describes the same project as Fanon and Glissant. But psychoanalysis 
makes things clearer, so to speak, by focussing on the mind; more 
particularly, that realm of the mind called the unconscious where the 
                                       
7 See below and the ensuing chapters for definitions and elaborations of the term. 
8 See Ngugi wa Thiong‘o, Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African 
Literature (Oxford and Portsmouth: James Currey/Heinemann, 1986). 
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repressed experience of colonial dispossession lurks. As Freud shows, 
and I discuss below in Chapter Two, a traumatic event stuns the 
mind‘s capacity to process and assign external stimuli to the 
appropriate mental regions, thus letting the unmediated experience 
direct entrance into the unconscious. Consequently, the traumatic 
event returns by way of compulsive acts that repeat or mime the 
original event in the mind‘s belated effort to master it.  
But this is repetition without understanding where an accurate 
knowledge of what happened is needed. In this state, the postcolonial 
subject, and quite often the community to which she belongs, lacks a 
wholesome sense of self and suffers what is commonly described as an 
identity crisis. It is a crisis exercabated by the ―helplessness‖ of the 
colonised under the sway of a seemingly irresistible ideological and 
political apparatus of colonial power, leading her to debilitating self-
doubt. In short, the trauma of colonialism creates, according to Robert 
Jay Lifton, a ―radically altered‖ sense of self, even a ―second self‖ 
different from the determined and ―traumatized self‖9 which 
supposedly recalls the original, pre-traumatic one. But because the 
colonised, in this traumatic state, cannot come to an accurate self-
understanding, instability dogs her every effort to recapture the old 
self or to reconstitute a new one from the ―ashes‖ of the traumatised 
one. Since this is inevitably a psychic conflict, psychoanalysis presents 
us the interpretive tool with the sharpest cutting edge for digging into 
the mental scape wherein it plays itself out primarily. Thus, for 
                                       
9 See Cathy Caruth, ―An Interview with Robert Jay Lifton‖ in Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 128-
147, at 137. 
7 
 
instance—and to give just one example here—I show in Chapter Two, 
where I discuss Wole Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s Horseman, how 
the peculiar insights of psychoanalysis clarify the exact nature of the 
struggle to recover a divided will that Elesin, as indeed the entire Oyo 
kingdom, suffers. Psychoanalysis becomes, in this instance, the 
discursive practice that bests shows us how to recognise and work-
through the lingering effects of colonial trauma in the psyche of the 
postcolonial subject, even when—or, especially because—the radically 
altered sense of self and society that ensues from it is actively denied.  
In order to show the way in which psychoanalysis, as revised by 
Fanon for the (post)colonial context, is relevant to the project of 
healing the imperial wound of history and reclaiming identity, I will 
first highlight the discursive appropriations of Fanon, revealing in the 
process the slow but gradual recognition of the vitality of the 
psychoanalytic work to the completion of the decolonisation project. 
Since Gates and Robinson represent two differing ideological 
approaches to Fanon, I will discuss their essays in some detail the 
better to specify the point at which I engage Fanon for a sychoanalytic 
approach to the primary texts that form my study. The range of 
unlikely places where Gates finds that Fanon is unhesitatingly drafted 
into battle is indeed fascinating. From British romanticism and the 
interdisciplinary practices of the new historicism to re-readings of the 
Renaissance, it has been possible, Gates informs us, to call Fanon to 
duty in the service of ―a grand, unified theory of oppression.‖ While the 
insurrectionary force of Fanon‘s theory and its resultant universal 
appeal may be a source of pride to many who labour in the salt mines 
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of minority and ethnic studies, something of academia‘s internal 
colony, it comes however with the inescapable price of popularity or 
the chic factor. Fanon, Gates charges, is too often adopted ―as both 
totem and text,‖ as a global theorist in vacuo denied ―his own historical 
particularity‖ inescapably marked by his personal crisis of identity. 
Surprisingly, though, it is not the ―outside‖ appropriations that Gates 
is most troubled by10 but those launched by Fanon‘s legitimate 
(post)colonial heirs: 
 
If Said made of Fanon an advocate of post-modern counter-
narratives of liberation; if JanMohamed made of Fanon a 
Manichaean theorist of colonialism as absolute negation; and if 
Bhabha cloned, from Fanon‘s theoria, another Third World post-
structuralist, Parry‘s Fanon ... turns out to confirm her own 
rather optimistic vision of literature and social action.11 
 
Gates declares an ―extremely limited‖ goal of providing a prelude to a 
reading of Fanon through contemporary colonial discourse theory, and 
with the benefit of his own readings of several of today‘s most 
influential postcolonial theorists, attempts to show us the pitfalls of an 
uncritical fanonism. Or, more specifically, the propensity to succumb 
to ―the imperial agenda of global theory‖ and, consequently, to 
―elevate‖ Fanon  above his localities of discourse, thereby disregarding 
the lesson of his disclaimer that he was irreducibly a man of his time, 
                                       
10 I do not mean by this that he may not indeed have similar or even stronger 
objections to their appropriations, only that in this essay he does not cite their 
misappropriations or misreadings but reserves his critique for Fanon‘s fellow 
postcolonial theorists.  
11 Henry Louis Gates, ―Critical Fanonism, 465; subsequent reference within the text. 
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and certainly not a visionary of the world to come. Gates regrets that 
in the context of the fraught colonial binarism of self/other which 
Fanon devoted his short but prodigiously fruitful life to explaining and 
transcending, ―we‘ve seldom admitted how disruptive the 
psychoanalytic model can be, elaborating a productive relation 
between oppressed and oppressor—productive of each as speaking 
subjects.‖ The fault, Gates believes, lies in a tendency by postcolonial 
critics to conduct their enquiry entirely within ―the colonial paradigm,‖ 
hence his urgent call that we move beyond ―the colonial paradigm,‖ 
convinced as he is that while it has proved valuable in foregrounding 
issues of power and position‖ it nonetheless has reached its limit and 
so it ―may be time to question its ascendance in literary and cultural 
studies‖ (457 et seq). 
Robinson, on the other hand, thinks that Gates is as guilty of 
misappropriating Fanon as any of his immediate targets, and, even 
worse, of being an ―anti-Fanonist.‖  Robinson considers Gates to be 
closer to Spivak and Bhabha, card-carrying members of the 
poststructuralist and deconstructionist school of discourse whose 
project is necessarily ―laced with aporias and disjunctures‖ (466) than 
Said, JanMohamed and Parry who according to him represent what 
Fanon embodied, which is ―the sustained attempt to locate and 
subsequently advertise a fixed and stable site of radical liberationist 
criticism and creativity.‖12 For a moment, it would seem Robinson and 
Gates believe in the same thing: reinscribing the specificity of time and 
place from which Fanon did his difficult work of interpreting the 
                                       
12 Cedric Robinson, ―The Appropriation of Frantz Fanon,‖ 88.  
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troubling colonised-coloniser relationship. But since Gates‘s own post-
structuralist sympathies lead him towards the aporetic, it would seem 
that he desires Fanon‘s specificity only to repudiate it by emphasising 
those inchoate moments in his biography and theory that subvert 
particularity.  So Gates states as follows: 
 
My claim is that what Jacques Derrida calls writing, Spivak, in a 
brilliant reversal, has renamed colonial discourse. So it is no 
accident that the two terms share precisely the same 
functionality. The Derridian mot, that there is nothing outside 
the text, is reprised as the argument that there is nothing 
outside (the discourse of) colonialism. And it leads, as well, to 
the argument that this very discourse must be read as 
heterogeneous to itself, as laced with the aporias and 
disjunctures that any deconstructive reading must elicit and 
engage. (466) 
 
If an awareness of what a deconstructive reading does to his larger 
claim of establishing Fanon‘s historical particularity, of ―rehistoricizing 
Fanon,‖ obliges Gates to call for the abandonment of the colonial 
paradigm, it is only so as to make it easier for us to admit just ―how 
disruptive the psychoanalytic model can be,‖ especially how well it 
marks ―the exceptional instability‖ of Fanon‘s rhetoric. In short, to 
acknowledge Fanon as ―a battlefield in himself,‖ with all the terrifying 
vagaries, the grave uncertainties, that this metaphor evokes. It is no 
surprise, therefore, that Gates then goes on to propose ―theoretical 
reflections [that] must be as provisional, reactive, and local as the texts 
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we reflect upon.‖ But surprisingly, Gates concludes that heeding his 
call will lead to the ―recognition that we, too, just as much as Fanon, 
may be fated to rehearse the agonisms of a culture that may never 
earn the title of postcolonial‖ (470). Two things strike the reader here: 
Gates‘s recommendation that we approach Fanon, in essence, as a 
text, and that we abandon the colonial paradigm even when, according 
to him, we are for all intents and purposes still firmly entrenched 
within the colonial and may very well never transcend it. What 
explains this contradiction—or ambivalence, to use a milder word? In 
disagreeing with Gates‘s proposition here, my problem is not with the 
assertion that all knowledge claims, within or outside of discourse, are 
provisional or contingent being always subject to review, but that 
Gates seems to assume that the only discursive formation alive to the 
complexity or heterogeneity of issues of power and position in the 
postcolony is the poststructuralist or deconstructionist one. Or, that 
any theorist working within the colonial paradigm is bound to end up 
with the sort of unsophisticated Manichaeism that leads him to seek 
an immediate exit from ―the ‗disciplinary enclave‘ of anti-imperialist 
discourse‖ (469). For Gates, it seems, the only option available to 
anyone who must recognise the density of the colonised-coloniser 
relationship, which constitutes the productive site of Fanon‘s oeuvre, 
is total rejection of the constricting colonial discourse paradigm in 
favour of an interpretive method hinged on indeterminacy—on aporia 
and disjuncture. But that we can achieve Gates‘s avowed aim of 
reclaiming Fanon‘s (post)colonial identity without making of him an 
eternally open text, even when adopting the psychoanalytic approach, 
12 
 
is by and large the burden of this work as I hope to show in the rest of 
this introduction and in the subsequent chapters. 
What is clear from the foregoing is that the slippery position 
Gates assumes in this essay appears to be the result of his wish to 
follow the Derridian prescript of privileging textal analysis—since, after 
all, there is nothing outside the text. This renders Gates vulnerable to 
the accusation that he wishes to ―preserve and consume Fanon all in 
the same moment.‖13 For his part, Robinson appears too polemical 
and seems overly keen to relegate the psychological mode of 
interrogating the postcolonial quandary to the secondary in a way that 
creates a false dichotomy and disregards the significance Fanon 
attached to it. Robinson does not subordinate the psychological for the 
same reason that Gates elevates it—because it constitutes a disruptive 
model and so poses an effective antidote to a binary identity politics 
that ignores the ―productive relation between oppressed and oppressor 
... as speaking subjects.‖14 Yet it is not clear that ―the mature Fanon 
turned away from psychoanalysis and its preoccupation with sexuality 
as the explanatory paradigm for the ‗Black problem‘‖ as Robinson 
claims. Nor that the psychoanalytic approach is averse to the project of 
inscribing ―the fixed and stable site of radical liberationist criticism 
and creativity,‖ whatever this means. For we may ask, are there ever 
any such fixed and unchanging points of intellectual engagement and 
can we insist on them without seeming to wax nostalgic about the 
good old days of essentialist discourse? On the contrary, it is possible 
                                       
13 Cedric Robinson, ―The Appropriation of Frantz Fanon,‖ 87, 88. 
14 Henry Louis Gates, ―Critical Fanonism,‖ 470. 
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to assert that far from turning away from psychoanalysis, Fanon‘s 
entire work began and ended on that note: starting with Black Skin, 
White Masks and ending tellingly with ―Colonial Wars and Mental 
Disorders,‖ the closing chapter of The Wretched of the Earth in which 
he examines various manifestations, during the ―period of successful 
colonization,‖ of the ―regular and important mental pathology which is 
the direct product of oppression.‖15 Any reader not turned off by the 
―petit-bourgeois stink‖ of the psychoanalytic will find its traces 
scattered all over the work in-between. Indeed, Fanon‘s remark that 
perhaps his closing chapter of The Wretched would be found ―ill-timed 
and singularly out of place‖ but that ―we can do nothing about that‖ 
(249) ought to caution against the inclination to make the 
psychological subservient to the political in his theory. Fanon can be 
this disdainful in anticipating such criticism because he sees clearly 
that colonialism does not merely ―depersonalize‖ the colonised 
individual but also that the ―depersonalization is equally felt in the 
collective sphere, on the level of social structures.‖ Consequently, ―the 
colonized people find that they are reduced to a body of individuals 
who only find cohesion when in the presence of the colonizing nation.‖  
Gates rightly points out that Fanon set himself the task of creating ―a 
new identity‖ at the ―intersection of colonial and psychoanalytic 
discourse.‖ In other words, at the point where the subjugated 
internalises colonialism‘s historico-racial schema, as Fanon himself 
explained it: 
                                       
15 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 251; subsequent reference within the 
text. 
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In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the 
development of his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is 
solely a negating activity. It is a third-person consciousness. ... 
Below the corporeal schema I had sketched a historico-racial 
schema. The elements that I used had been provided for me not 
by ―residual sensations and perceptions primarily of a tactile, 
vestibular, kinaesthetic, and visual character,‖ but by the other, 
the white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details, 
anecdotes, stories.16 
 
Fanonian psychoanalysis, derived from Lacan and Marx, is practicable 
only to the extent that ―the social aspect of human reality‖ remains 
essential.17 Thus, he locates the efficacy of his approach within the 
social realism of colonialism:  ―The analysis I am undertaking is 
psychological. In spite of this it is apparent to me that the effective 
disalienation of the black man entails an immediate recognition of the 
social and economic realities.‖ As Fanon was at pains to point out, a 
focus on the individual is not to the exclusion or expense of the social, 
but, on the contrary, can only be meaningful symptomatically. If there 
is an inferiority complex, he insisted, ―it is the outcome of a double 
process‖ that is ―primarily, economic‖ and ―subsequently, the 
internalization ... or, better, the epidermalization ... of this inferiority.‖ 
                                       
16 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 110-11; subsequent reference within the 
text. 
17 Francoise Verges discusses this dynamic of madness and freedom as it informed 
Fanon‘s theory and practice of psychoanalysis in her essay, ―Chains of Madness, 
Chains of Freedom: Fanon and Freedom‖ in The Fact of Blackness: Frantz Fanon and 
Visual Representation (Seattle: Bay Press, 1996), 47-75. The quotations, cited by 
Fanon in his medical school thesis at Lyon, are taken from the essay at page 50. 
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Fanon even ventures to proffer a synthesis of the two processes, a 
―solution‖ for his goal of total understanding‖ of this overdetermining 
reality of colonialism: 
 
―Freud insisted that the individual factor be taken into account 
through psychoanalysis. He substituted for a phylogenetic 
theory the ontogenetic perspective. It will be seen that the black 
man‘s alienation is not an individual question. Beside phylogeny 
and ontogeny stands sociogeny. ... let us say that this is a 
question of a sociodiagnostic.‖18 
 
In claiming that Fanon was misled by his animus towards negritude 
into ―prioritising the derivative and psychological,‖19 Robinson either 
mistakes or overstates the way sexual desire figures in Fanon‘s 
discussion of the problem of the woman of color and the white man 
and of the man of color and the white woman. In both cases, Fanon is 
more concerned with a struggle for recognition and reciprocity, with 
the quest of the colonised for equal humanity with the coloniser, than 
with sexual neurosis as classical psychoanalysis would have it. Locked 
in a world of ―reciprocal exclusivity‖ justified by the racial (il)logic of 
colonialism, the ensuing material conditions of existence produce the 
psychic state—or the ―nervous condition‖20 as Jean-Paul Satre 
memorably puts it in his often-cited preface to The Wretched of the 
Earth—that culminates in the form of acting-out, if you will, Fanon 
names as (revolutionary) violence.  But it is a measure of Fanon‘s 
                                       
18 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 11. 
19 Cedric Robinson, ―The Appropriation of Frantz Fanon,‖ 80. 
20 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 20. 
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adroit melding of the psychological and the political that he paints a 
compelling graphic picture of the separate and unequal worlds of the 
coloniser and the colonised only to underscore it with the psychic 
states of their respective inhabitants: 
 
The look that the native turns on the settler‘s town is a look of 
lust, a look of envy; it expresses his dreams of possession—all 
manner of possession: to sit at the settler‘s table, to sleep with 
his wife if possible. The colonized man is an envious man. And 
this the settler knows very well; when their glances meet he 
ascertains bitterly, always on the defensive, ―They want to take 
our place. It is true, for there is no native who does not dream at 
least once a day of setting himself up in the settler‘s place. (39) 
 
If The Wretched of the Earth is the revolutionary handbook, ―the Bible 
of decolonization‖ as Stuart Hall dubs it,21 Fanon nevertheless always 
finds room in it for the psychoanalytical in his search for the sources 
of the colonised person‘s affective disorders.22 According to Homi 
                                       
21 Quoted by Homi Bhabha in his Foreword to Richard Philcox‘s translation of The 
Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004 ), xvi. Bhabha cites an interview 
with Stuart Hall in the film, Frantz Fanon: White Skin, Black Masks, dir. Isaac Julien 
(UK: Arts Council of England, 1996). 
22 Having arrived at the conclusion that the psychoanalytic is not only present in all 
of Fanon‘s work but that, in fact, it also frames his entire work in the literal sense of 
marking its beginning and end as already noted, I was pleasantly surprised to 
stumble on Barbara Goff and Michael Simpson‘s recent work, Crossroads in the 
Black Aegean: Oedipus, Antigone, and Dramas of the African Diaspora (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) in which they boldly assert that ―the psychoanalytic 
apparatus persists in The Wretched of the Earth.‖ Because they base their claim 
primarily on the passage that I discuss above on the material and psychological 
bifurcation of the colonized space, I will quote them at some length: 
―[T]he psychoanalytic apparatus persists in The Wretched of the Earth and 
nowhere more so than in this formulation of the segregated colonial city: 
The look that the native turns on the settler‘s town is a look of lust, a 
look of envy; it expresses his dreams of possession—all manner of 
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Bhabha, this demography of the colonial city reflects Fanon‘s view of 
―the psychic structure of the colonial relation.‖23 Indeed, it requires 
little scrutiny to find that sexual desire in Fanon is itself a veil, a 
mask, beneath which lurks the agitated quest of the colonised for 
liberation as a precondition for recognition. So Fanon‘s own answer to 
his question, ―What does the black man [and woman] want?‖ is, 
simply, that ―The black man wants to be like the white man. For the 
black man there is only one destiny. And it is white. Long ago the 
black man admitted the unarguable superiority of the white man, and 
all his efforts are aimed at achieving a white existence.‖ And with this 
awareness comes dreams of possession, all manner of possession, 
including but not limited to sleeping with the coloniser‘s wife—with a 
white woman—if possible. This picture, of course, gets more 
complicated with the desire of the white woman or man to ―sleep‖ with 
the black person, but that is a matter that does not concern us here. 
What is crucial is that Fanon is fully aware that the image of the Negro 
which the colonised struggles to destroy—as indeed the image of the 
white man that he or she craves for recognition—is a construct, a false 
                                                                                                              
possession: to sit at the settler‘s table, to sleep with his wife if 
possible. The colonized man is an envious man. And this the settler 
knows very well; when their glances meet he ascertains bitterly, 
always on the defensive, ―They want to take our place. It is true, for 
there is no native who does not d22ream at least once a day of setting 
himself up in the settler‘s place. (98) 
Commenting on this passage, they say as follows: ―The oedipal dynamics in this 
scene are quite evident: the colonial subject seeks to possess his object of desire by 
occupying the position that the colonizer uses to possess that same object and which 
he denies to the colonial subject precisely by occupying himself. The partial pun 
between ‗setting‘ and ‗settler‘ in the last sentence says it all.‖ 
23 Homi Bhabha, ―Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition‖ in 
Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, eds., Patrick Williams and 
Laura Chrisman (New York; Columbia University Press, 1994), 120. 
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object: ―The Negro is not. Any more than the white man.‖24 This is 
identity politics as it first plays out in all of its turbulence in the 
psyche, priming the colonised subject for the inevitable confrontation 
with a world that seeks to completely overdetermine him or her from 
without, and expressed by Fanon in one of his most poignant 
moments thus: ―Because it is a systematic negation of the other 
person and a furious determination to deny the other person all 
attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to 
ask themselves the question constantly: ‗In reality, who am I?‘‖25 
This gender neutral passage is one of the few moments when 
Fanon avoids his problematic deployment of the universal ―black man‖ 
for the colonised, and how remarkable it is! It is once again a pointer 
to what Fanon means when he insists on psychoanalysis ―even though 
Freud and Adler and the cosmic Jung did not think of the Negro in all 
their investigations.‖ The specific nature of the trauma of the 
colonised, characterised not by the desire of the son for the mother 
and the father‘s threat of castration—to follow the classical 
psychoanalytic paradigm—but by the self-abnegating effect of racism 
and political domination lie at the heart of Fanon‘s controversial claim, 
―Like it or not, the Oedipus complex is far from coming into being 
                                       
24 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 228, 231. 
25 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 250. This sense of a fragmented self, of a 
negating depersonalization, as a consequence of colonialism‘s racial-epidermal 
scheme is what Sethe pleads in mitigation of her crime of infanticide before the 
―returned‖ daughter, Beloved, in the context of slavery, an earlier form of 
colonialism: ―That anybody white could take your whole self for anything that came 
to mind. Not just work, kill, or maim you, but dirty you. Dirty you so bad you 
couldn‘t like yourself anymore. Dirty you so bad you forgot who you were and 
couldn‘t think it up.‖ See Morrison, Beloved (New York: Vintage, 2004), 295 and 
Chapter 3 below where I discuss the social referentiality of historical trauma. 
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among Negroes.‖26 As a prelude to this declaration, Fanon states just 
as emphatically—―this is a most important point,‖ he says—that a 
―normal Negro child, having grown up within a normal family, will 
become abnormal on the slightest contact with the white world‖ (143). 
The point is not whether or not Fanon is right, and arguments have 
been advanced to show he is not,27 but that his translation of a 
preoccupation by psychoanalysis with sexual difference into racial 
difference in the colonial context is possible only because he is after 
different fish: disalienation as part and parcel of the decolonization of 
the nation towards the full realisation of full humanity by the 
colonised. For Fanon, disalienation or the struggle for self-
determination, is a sine qua non of freedom. ―Before it can adopt a 
positive voice,‖ he maintains, ―freedom requires an effort at 
                                       
26 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 151-52. 
27 Hortense J. Spillers discusses the book, Oedipe Africain (Paris: Éditions 
L‘Harmattan, 1984), by Marie-Cécile and Edmond Ortigues which I cite below in 
Chapter 1 to such an end in her essay, ―‘All the Things You Could Be Now, If 
Sigmund Freud‘s Wife Was Your Mother‘: Psychoanalysis and Race‖ in her Black, 
White, and in Color (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 376-427. 
Unfortunately, Oedipe Africain is yet to be available in English and I relied wholly on 
Spillers‘s working translations to the effect that the Oedipus complex, which Fanon 
claims is absent from the Negro world, may in fact be well and alive in Africa, for 
instance, with the necessary substitutions for the father-figure and his law within its 
well-known extended family system. Similarly, regarding Fanon‘s claim that a normal 
black child who grows up within a normal family becomes abnormal only on contact 
with the white world, Françoise Vegès has cited evidence, from a Martinican no less, 
of the limits of this attempt to oppose a healthy black family to an alienating white 
society. See her ―Creole Skin, Black Mask: Fanon and Disavowal,‖ Critical Inquiry 23 
(Spring 1997) 578-595, at 583-85. Several feminist critics have subjected Fanon to 
rigorous cross-examination on his substitution of racial difference for sexual 
difference, and their gender approach has enriched our understanding of Fanon‘s 
problematic portrayal of the woman. See Gwen Bergner, ―Who Is that Masked 
Woman? Or, The Role of Gender in Fanon‘s Black Skin, White Masks,‖ PMLA 110, 1: 
75-88 and ―Politics and Pathologies: On the Subject of Race in Psychoanalysis‖ in 
Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives, ed. Anthony C. Alessandrini (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 219-234; and E. Ann Kaplan‘s ―Fanon, Trauma and Cinema,‖ also 
in Frantz Fanon, Critical Perspectives, 146-157.  
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disalienation.‖28 As Clare Counihan points out in her essay, ―Reading 
the Figure of Woman in African Literature: Psychoanalysis, Difference, 
and Desire,‖ this psychoanalytic imperative towards a political goal 
may not have been as ―fully articulated‖ in Black Skin, White Masks as 
in either The Wretched of the Earth  or A Dying Colonialism. Yet, it is 
hardly mistakable on close inspection. According to Counihan, the 
move that Fanon makes here is not to be seen as ―just a transliteration 
of terms and language, swapping one word for another so that the 
difference of race is like the difference of sex.‖ Rather, Counihan 
claims, Fanon‘s translation ―fundamentally replaces sexual difference 
with racial difference so that sexual difference disappears into and 
from racial difference, and racial difference becomes the primary (sole) 
mode of difference.‖29 For the same reason, Fanon‘s appropriation of 
the psychoanalytic trope of castration departs from its primary 
signification: 
 
For Fanon, castration is not about ―the penis‖ as the penis. As 
his simultaneous disavowal and rewriting of the Oedipus 
complex indicates, ―the Oedipus complex is far from coming into 
being among Negroes.‖ ... Fanon refuses any agency or efficacy 
to the primal scene, the moment of sexual identification and 
differentiation. Instead, ―when the Negro makes contact with the 
white world, a certain sensitizing action takes place,‖ and the 
recognition of racial difference supplants the original Oedipal 
confrontation. ... In the same vein, Fanon rereads the mirror 
                                       
28 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 231. 
29 Clare Counihan, ―Reading the Figure of Woman in African Literature: 
Psychoanalysis, Difference, and Desire,‖ Research in African Literatures 38.2 (2007), 
161-180, at 165.  
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stage: ―when one has grasped the mechanism described by 
Lacan ... one can have little further doubt that the real Other for 
the white man is and will continue to be the black man. And 
conversely.‖  ... Gone are the Law and the Name of the Father. 
(166) 
 
For their part, Barbara Goff and Michael Simpson see what Fanon 
disavows as merely a ―perverted‖ or ―arrested‖ Oedipus complex, a 
view that they proffer in their reading, within the colonial paradigm, of 
Sophocles‘s Oedipus Rex in the light of the historic use Freud made of 
that classical story and of its adaptation by the Nigerian playwright, 
Ola Rotimi, in The Gods Are Not to Blame. A perverted Oedipus 
complex because in their understanding of Fanon,  
 
To be a colonial subject ... is not only to be constituted by the 
Oedipus complex, in the way that psychoanalysis claims that 
absolutely everybody must be, but it is also to be trapped within 
that complex, to be unable to ‗progress‘ through it and to emerge 
from it, by means of identification and introjection, into full 
subjecthood. The colonial subject is constituted and arrested as 
a child, albeit a useful and fearsome one.  
 
In The Gods Are Not to Blame, according to Goff and Simpson, Rotimi‘s 
adaptation of the ―psychoanalytically charged Greek play‖ whose 
setting presupposes a colonial context between Athens and Thebes 
reimagines that conflict in a way that affirms the ―equation between 
the [perverted] Oedipus complex and the colonial relation.‖ There is, 
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according to them, the necessary implication of a ―regression within 
the psychoanalytic model, in so far as Odewale ... does not suffer from 
the Oedipus complex but instead acts out his murderous desire and 
his amorous desire.‖ Whether or not we agree that this equation is 
specifically mobilised in Rotimi‘s play, Goff and Simpson argue, certain 
parallels with Fanon‘s diagnosis can be traced. In particular, they see 
a corroboration of Fanon‘s thesis of the absent Oedipus complex ―not 
by dramatizing its importation but by demonstrating its circumvention 
in what becomes, allegorically, the project of decolonization.‖  The 
result, they maintain, is that Fanon‘s thesis is ―developed beyond its 
own remit‖ as the consequent result of eliminating the colonizer 
becomes consistent with Fanon‘s assertion that ―the colonial subject 
once trapped and traumatized within an oedipal colonization, can only 
be cured through the catharsis of revolutionary violence.‖30 
 Either way of understanding Fanon‘s disavowal or 
reformulation of the Oedipus complex, as Counihan on the one hand, 
and Goff and Michael on the other, suggest, compels us to question 
any suggestion of a relegation of the psychoanalytical in Fanon‘s 
theory. It becomes possible to conclude, then, that Robinson‘s critique 
is strongest only when he specifically targets the sort of ―self-
referential‖ academic debates of colonial discourse that seek to turn 
Fanon into a mere text. As well as when he rails against the tendency 
of that discursive practice to revel in ―a literature of psycho-sexual 
complicity between the colonised and the colonisers, which spatially 
                                       
30 Barbara Goff and Michael Simpson, Crossroads in the Black Aegean: Oedipus, 
Antigone, and Dramas of the African Diaspora (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 99-100. 
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and temporally domesticates all social theory, and whose mechanics 
recognise no voice more authentic than their own.‖31 But it need not 
be stated that the aims of academics, ensconced in the ivory tower and 
expounding the destabilising power of the sign and all signifying 
practices, are necessarily different from those of Fanon, a 
revolutionary who writes from a war front in the imperial periphery for 
whom ―psychiatry had a political goal,‖ and who never lost sight of the 
fused trajectory of individual and political rights—of the fact that 
―individual alienation and political alienation are ... the product of 
social, political, and cultural conditions that must be transformed.‖32 
For Fanon, madness and the various manifestations of Negro 
psychopathology constitute an obstacle to total liberation and freedom, 
hence his life-long commitment to the psychoanalytic approach. And it 
is when read psycho-socially that we may feel the need to join Diana 
Fuss in pointing to the obvious fact that the psychiatric hospital of 
Blida-Joinville was for Fanon ―a site of active resistance to the violence 
of the colonialist enterprise.‖33 
I should reiterate that my overall concern here is not whether 
Fanon‘s preoccupation with the psychoanalytical dimension of the 
struggle by the colonised to reclaim her identity is secondary—though 
from all I have said so far it isn‘t and it seems clear Fanon had a 
dialectical process in mind—and so to that extent a diversion from the 
primary battle waged on the socio-economic front. I am rather 
                                       
31 Cedric Robinson, ―The Appropriation of Frantz Fanon,‖ 88. 
32 François Vergès, ―Chains of Madness, Chains of Colonialism: Fanon and Freedom‖ 
in The Fact of Blackness, 62 and 49 respectively. 
33 Diana Fuss, ―Interior Colonies: Frantz Fanon and the Politics of Identification,‖ 
Diacritics 24. 2-3 (Summer-Autumn 1994): 20-42, at 36. 
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concerned to argue that the psychic dimension of postcoloniality, 
whatever significance we might wish to allot to it, remains crucial to 
any struggle for the total liberation of the colonised.  For the same 
reason, it matters little if at all for my purposes whether or not Gates 
is right that ―the ‗disciplinary enclave‘ of anti-imperialist discourse, 
with which he associates the colonial paradigm, has ―proved a last 
bastion‖ of global theory, and that therefore there is a need now to 
abandon it for a more aleatory system, such as psychoanalysis 
promises. For the postcolonial subject, I believe, the (neo-)colonial 
paradigm frames every discourse of recuperation and self-fashioning, 
the excesses of global theorists notwithstanding. We are, I think, far 
from having exhausted the issues of power and position, despite the 
interpellative address of globalisation to every nook and cranny of a 
plainly unequal world. Classical colonialism and today‘s global neo-
colonialism urge us never to lose sight of the morphed mechanisms of 
power and position—demands, I would venture, that we persist in 
―foregrounding‖ that dynamic rather than ―question its ascendance in 
literary and cultural studies.‖34 The successful attempt at such a 
project must necessarily retain a global discursive vision to be an 
effective ―answering dialectic,‖ as Aijaz Ahmad argues in a slightly 
different but related context,35 and Fanon who famously insists that it 
                                       
34 Henry Louis Gates, ―Critical Fanonism,‖ 469. 
35 See Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (New York: Verso, 1992), 
316-17. Ahmad makes this claim while arguing against the ―three worlds‖ 
categorisation of the world and for one ―hierarchically structured‖ world. The 
answering dialectic to such a world‘s ―broader and transnational sweep,‖ he asserts, 
―must also be global and universalist in character.‖ Ahmad gives a Fanonian 
explanation for his suggestion. To the extent, he argues, that ―contemporary 
imperialism‘s political system takes the form of a hierarchically structured system of 
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is ―at the heart of national consciousness that international 
consciousness lives and grows‖ is merely being consistent in locating 
                                                                                                              
nation-states, it is only by organizing their struggles within the political space of 
their own nation-states with the revolutionary transformation of that particular 
nation-state as the immediate practical objective, that the revolutionary forces of any 
given country can effectively struggle against the imperialism they face concretely in 
their own lives.‖ Although Gates makes an effort to be nuanced, he nevertheless 
appears to be more invested in the poststructuralist shibboleth of local struggles as 
articulated by Michel Foucault, for instance, than he manages to persuade otherwise 
when he concludes his essay thus: 
―Do we still need global, imperial [my emphasis] theory—in this case, a grand 
unified theory of oppression; or, indeed, even the whole universalizing model 
of Theory that it presupposes, a model of total theory that quests for finality 
and an exclusive lien on the last word? It‘s no longer any scandal that our 
own theoretical reflections must be as provisional, reactive, and local as the 
texts we reflect upon.‖  
As I have mentioned above, theory need not be imperialist in its claims in order to be 
of universal application—universal in terms of its reference or ultimate horizon of 
meaning. Gates echoes Foucault‘s argument in ―Truth and Power‖ where he proposes 
local struggles or intellectual specificity as the model of struggle while at the same 
time appearing not to be disavowing universalism. I take as an instance Foucault‘s 
response to a question on the usefulness of his preoccupation with the unmasking of 
power ―to everyday political struggles,‖ and the implications of his advocacy of local 
and specific confrontation with power for the intellectual who must, as a result, 
cease to function ―as the bringer of truth.‖ Foucault proposes the idea of ―the 
―specific‖ intellectual as opposed to the ―universal‖ intellectual,‖ though he also adds, 
curiously, that ―we are now at a point where the function of the specific intellectual 
needs to be reconsidered.‖ Quickly, however, he says that this function is only to be 
―Reconsidered but not abandoned, despite the nostalgia of some of the great 
‗universal‘ intellectuals and the desire for a new philosophy, a new world-view.‖ 
Foucault, as Gates, keeps the door of internationalism, or universalism if you will, 
open by maintaining that what is to be taken into account in the intellectual is not 
―the bearer of universal values‖ but ―the person occupying a specific position‖ who by 
such specificity is ―linked, in a society like ours, to the general functioning of an 
apparatus of truth.‖ Foucault then defines one strand of the intellectual‘s specificity 
as that ―of the politics of truth in our societies,‖ not failing to add that ―it is with this 
last factor that his [the specific intellectual‘s] position can take on a general 
significance and that his local, specific struggle can have effects and implications 
which are not simply professional or sectoral.‖ See Michel Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, Colin Gordon, 
ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 126-132. 
26 
 
his theory of radical decolonisation at the intersection of anti-
imperialism and psychoanalysis. As Diana Fuss points out, this choice 
gave Fanon ―a vocabulary and an intellectual framework in which to 
diagnose and treat not only the psychological disorders produced in 
individuals by the violence of colonial domination but also the neurotic 
structure of [post]colonialism itself.‖36 It is, indeed, the entire edifice of 
colonialism itself, as universal as the phenomenon was and remains 
now under the sign of neo-colonial globalisation, that Fanon subjects 
to scrutiny. The result is that Fanon‘s work is unambiguously situated 
within the historical and political frame defined by imperialism—or, to 
follow Stuart Hall, ―framed throughout by the dichotomous and 
manichean structure of racism as a binary system of representation 
and power.‖37 The scope of this project necessarily involves ambiguity 
and ambivalence, paradox and profound complexities that belie the 
schematic binarism which never goes beyond the surface of Fanon‘s 
radical critique of not only colonialism but also the post-independence 
nation-state. Thus, when Gates goes on to mention the ―exceptional 
instability of Fanon‘s own rhetoric,‖ he is pointing to what Fuss has 
described as the ―critical faultlines‖ upon which Fanon based his 
work—that is, precisely in ―the linkages and fissures, the 
contradictions and coimplications, the translations and 
transformations of the theory-politics relation.‖38 These are the fruitful 
contradictions and complexities that anyone willing to embrace them, 
                                       
36 Diana Fuss, ―Interior Colonies: Frantz Fanon and the Politics of Identification,‖ 20. 
My square brackets. 
37 Stuart Hall, ―The After-Life of Frantz Fanon: Why Fanon? Why Now? Why Black 
Skin, White Masks?‖ in The Fact of Blackness, 18. 
38 Diana Fuss, ―Interior Colonies: Frantz Fanon and the Politics of Identification,‖ 39. 
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as Gates himself seems to admit, will recognise as ―fated to rehearse 
the agonisms of a culture that may never earn the title of 
postcolonial.‖39 In other words, that is bound to the colonial paradigm 
as its ideological and discursive sponsor. In the address Fanon 
delivered to the second Congress of Black Writers and Artists‖ in 1959, 
later published as ―On National Culture‖ in The Wretched of the Earth, 
he made the following trenchant remark as part of his critique of 
Negritude or a romanticised idea of the past to which the colonized 
returns in search of a so-called authentic being: 
 
It is not enough to try to get back to the people in that past out 
of which they have already emerged; rather we must join them 
in that fluctuating movement which they are just giving a shape 
to, and which, as soon as it has started, will be the signal for 
everything to be called into question. Let there be no mistake 
about it; it is to this zone of occult instability where the people 
dwell that we must come; and it is there that our souls are 
crystallized and that our perceptions and our lives are 
transfused with light.40 
 
By the phrase, ―occult instability,‖ Fanon adroitly merges the 
psychological and political trajectories of his revolutionary anti-
colonial poetics. I equate this zone, where Fanon believes the 
oppressed people dwell and their souls are crystallised, where we must 
come to do any meaningful work of reconstituting the fragmented 
                                       
39 Henry Louis Gates, ―Critical Fanonism,‖ 469 and 460; emphasis original. 
40 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 227. 
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subject and of national liberation, with the realm of post-colonial 
trauma. All the dictionary meanings of ―occult‖ evoke the impact of a 
catastrophic historical event to the psyche of its victims, the subject of 
Black Skin, White Masks. The occult, if we must spell it out, suggests 
not only the supernatural but also that which is not easily 
apprehended or understood—indeed, that which is concealed or 
occluded from us under normal modes of enquiry. 
In returning to Fanon for a psychoanalytical exploration of the 
(post)colonial problem, therefore, I ask myself the same questions that 
several of his most sensitive readers have asked, among them Stuart 
Hall and Homi Bhabha. Questions, I believe, that are inevitably 
spurred by another question, posed by Fanon no less, when he says 
that the colonised subject is always compelled to doubt the reality of 
his or her existence. In other words, it proceeds from an 
acknowledgement of the fact that the extreme experience of trauma 
creates a ―radically altered‖ sense of self. The struggle of the 
postcolonial subject to recover her identity is, then, quite literally, a 
struggle to reconcile the fragments of a divided and alienated self. But 
it is not a struggle to recover an intact identity of the pre-traumatised 
self. Rather, it is reminiscent of that fraught struggle to merge the ―two 
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings‖ which, as W. E. B. Du 
Bois memorably puts it, constitute ―two warring ideals‖41 in the body 
of the colonised subject. It is precisely what Lifton sees as the task of 
reintegrating the traumatised self into the pre-traumatised one, itself 
                                       
41 See W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, Norton Critical Edition, eds. Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr., and Terri Hume Oliver (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 11.  
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―a form of doubling in the traumatised person.‖42 And this is where 
psychoanalysis, as Fanon so presciently foresaw, becomes the cultural 
theorists and critic‘s best ally for the project of reclaiming postcolonial 
identities still under siege even now. Hall asks, ―Why Fanon? Why 
Now? Why Black Skin, White Masks?‖ And Bhabha who, perhaps more 
than any other postcolonial theorist, has done the most to launch the 
avalanche of discursive interest in Fanon43 poses several rhetorical 
questions in a similar vein as Hall: ―Why invoke Frantz Fanon today, 
quite out of historical context? Why invoke Fanon when the ardour of 
emancipatory discourse has seemingly yielded to the fervent, ferocious 
pleas for the ‗end of history‘, the end of struggle? Why invoke Fanon 
who spoke most pertinently and passionately at that historical 
moment when, as he argued, it was a question of the Third world 
starting a new history of Man?‖44 Hall presents, I think, a compelling 
argument for remembering and returning to the psychoanalytic Fanon, 
who also was always the unwaveringly political Fanon.  Indeed all the 
renewed interest in Fanon, especially its passion and intensity, seems 
to be almost wholly around the first work he produced at the slender 
age of twenty-six. Hall believes that this has something to do with the 
―over-determined return of the repressed.‖ And if the return of the 
                                       
42 Cathy Caruth, ―An Interview with Robert Jay Lifton‖ in Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory, 137. 
43 As even a glance at the index to The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge 
Classics, 2004) will show, Fanon is the Third World discursive deity that presides 
over that often-cited contribution to postcolonial theory, a view that would be 
corroborated by two important essays not collected in that volume: ―Remembering 
Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition‖ in Colonial Discourse and 
Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, 112-123 and ―Day by Day … with Frantz Fanon‖ in 
The Fact of Blackness, 186-205. 
44 Homi Bhabha, ―Day by Day … with Frantz Fanon‖ in The Fact of Blackness, 188. 
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repressed presents the trauma victim the opportunity to grapple with 
her ordeal, to confront at last, the demons that have shattered her 
sense of self and reality, then it was about time, I say, we turned to 
Black Skin, White Masks and ―Colonial Wars and Mental Disorders.‖ 
For how many postcolonial wars—from Biafra and Liberia to Somalia 
and Rwanda, Congo and Sierra Leone to Angola and Sudan—have 
been fought by the ―independent‖ nations hurriedly cobbled together 
and thrust upon the people by the departing colonisers? Hall distils 
several other reasons from the contributors to the retrospective work, 
The Fact of Blackness, why this turn is needed, but I would like to 
quote him in support of the view that I express at the beginning: that 
in doing so we look for the ―true,‖ authentic, revolutionary or allegedly 
―mature‖ Fanon to our peril: 
 
Rather than trying to recapture the ―true‖ Fanon, we must try to 
engage the after-life of Frantz Fanon – that which Jacques 
Derrida would call, following his recent essay on Marx, his 
―spectral effect‖ ... in ways that do not simply restore the past in 
a cycle of the eternal return, but which will bring the enigma of 
Fanon, as Benjamin said of history, flashing up before us at a 
moment of danger. ―The colonial man who writes for his people,‖ 
– that is, of course, colonial man and woman, an elision in 
Fanon which is as characteristic as it is untimely – ―ought to use 
the past with the intention  of opening the future,‖ Fanon 
observed, ―an invitation to an action and a basis of hope.45 
 
                                       
45 Stuart Hall, ―The After-Life of Frantz Fanon: Why Fanon? Why Now? Why Black 
Skin, White Masks?‖ in The Fact of Blackness, 13-37; all quotations at 14. 
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Bhabha is in agreement with Hall on the futility of searching for the 
―mythical‖ Fanon, a figure who can ―either be revered as the prophetic 
spirit of Third World Liberation or reviled as an exterminating angel, 
the inspiration to violence.‖ Bhabha thinks that Fanon ―speaks most 
effectively from the uncertain interstices of historical change ... the 
area of ambivalence between race and sexuality; out of an unresolved 
contradiction between culture and class; from deep within the struggle 
of psychic representation and social reality.‖46 I am most in agreement 
with Bhabha, however, on the reason that he pays the least attention 
to in his sustained effort at making Fanon speak to our times but 
which is expressed in that phrase, ―deep within the struggle of psychic 
representation and social reality.‖ For although Bhabha rightly 
deplores the ―piety‖ that subtends the search for the authentic Fanon, 
he launches a different and no less objectionable search of his own 
aptly described by Gates as a ―coaxing devotion‖ aimed at ―cloning‖ 
one more Third World poststructuralist from Fanon‘s theory; arduous 
labour that causes him to ―regret aloud those moments in Fanon that 
cannot be reconciled to the post-structuralist critique of identity.‖47  
Gates is not alone in expressing discontent about the 
problematic aspects of Bhabha‘s otherwise impressive work of 
reinterpreting and thereby reinserting Fanon back into the heart of 
postcolonial discourse. In the essay, ―Cultural Criticism in Wole 
Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s Horseman,‖ Olakunle George, while 
adopting Bhabha‘s notions of hybridity and ambivalence for his 
                                       
46 Homi Bhabha, ―Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition‖ in 
Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory, 113. 
47 Henry Louis Gates, ―Critical Fanonism,‖ 460.  
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analysis is nonetheless very critical of Bhabha‘s tendency to mistake 
theoretical for political goals. Bhabha‘s deployment of a critical 
vocabulary that is primarily psychoanalytical but which has a 
particular ―fondness for the rhythm of words‖ leads him ―squarely onto 
the level of the socio-political,‖ George asserts. Consequently, there is 
in Bhabha a ―conflation of the psychic terrain with the socio-political, 
even as his own premises would seem to suggest that such a 
conflation is conceptually problematic.‖ Too often, George says, 
following Robert Young, Bhabha ―celebrates the subversive 
indeterminacies of psychic processes‖—which, I hasten to add, may be 
manifestations of historical traumas that are yet to be worked-out and 
so in their acting-out forms—as if they ―translate into politico-
historical upheavals.‖ In other words, Bhabha‘s formulation of 
―mimicry as menace to the colonialist psyche‖ is theoretically lofted to 
the level of ―a specifically ‗revolutionary‘ insurgency.‖48 A clear source 
of this problem of blurring the terrains of the psychological and the 
socio-political is no doubt Bhabha‘s investment in the 
poststructuralist reification of the instability of the sign and meaning, 
the shibboleth of linguistic theories of literature and culture that follow 
the Saussurean line.49 Bhabha‘s poststructuralism obliges him to be 
                                       
48 Olakunle George, ―Cultural Criticism in Wole Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s 
Horseman,‖ Representations, No. 67 (Summer, 1999), 67-91, at 80. 
49 Needless to say, I am referring to the all-important place that the Swiss linguist, 
Ferdinand de Saussure, occupies in the emergence of post-structuralism and the 
centrality of Derrida‘s deconstruction to that framework. Saussure‘s expostulation of 
a system whereby meaning can be made in language only by a differential relation of 
one sound or phoneme to another—putting it in the most general way—was 
famously elaborated by Derrida as différance, a term that Jonathan Culler asserts, 
―determines and subverts every theory of meaning.‖ As a discursive formation, then, 
such literary or social theories beholden to the Saussurean school of thought 
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content to assign his main discursive categories of paradox, 
contradiction, ambivalence and hybridity to the linguistic register 
where the instability of the sign allegedly reigns supreme like an 
implacable god. As a result, Bhabha tends to read for ―moments of 
linguistic self-contradiction.‖ The political project, the teleology, 
powering this manner of reading is that ―textuality defeats mastery 
and totalization,‖50 and not surprisingly, Bhabha claims—in that 
passage from ―Remembering Fanon‖ already cited above—that one of 
the reasons why we must turn to Fanon now is because he is ―the 
purveyor of the transgressive and transitional truth.‖51 Thus, at too 
many enthusiastic moments, George points out, Bhabha ―substitutes 
lyricism for persuasion.‖ Commenting on Bhabha‘s use of lines from 
two Bombay poets to support his claim about the radical otherness of 
the postcolonial text, George notes ―little substantive genealogy or 
discursive pedigree,‖ such that Bhabha seems to summon postcolonial 
texts ―to fill a slot in his discourse that the particular context of the 
argument demands.‖ Bhabha‘s primary interest, George believes, is 
                                                                                                              
valourise the instability of signs and meanings. From this premise, they go on to 
propound the inability of any system of signification to explain reality. The result is a 
radical epistemological scepticism that is content with the ability to uncover in any 
given text a non-hierarchical plurality of meanings, none of which is more or less 
accurate. More often than not, this leads to a tendency to equate the achieved 
subversion of hierarchy and the order of conventional truths and meanings, or 
normativity, through a deconstructive reading with a political victory. I have relied on 
Jonathan Culler‘s On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1982) for the account I have given of Saussure‘s influence 
on the post-structuralist movement; in particular, Chapter Two, entitled simply, 
―Deconstruction.‖ 
50 Olakunle George, ―Cultural Criticism in Wole Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s 
Horseman,‖ Representations, 69-70. 
51 Homi Bhabha, ―Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition‖ in 
Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, 113. 
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―the contest of theories within Anglo-American cultural criticism,‖ a 
factor that leads him to make the postcolonial text enter the field 
merely ―as a passive witness ... a hired hitman.‖ This, George argues, 
has the unhappy result of making Bhabha‘s theory stand at several 
critical moments as ―the index of an unthematized tension.‖ To avoid 
this limitation, George proposes what I would call, for want of a better 
term, the commonsense approach: taking postcolonial texts ―on their 
own terms ... in the fullness of their own contents and tensions,‖ 
thereby letting them ―speak to critical theory‖ rather than the other 
way round. This way, postcolonial texts become historicised as 
cultural artifices made by humans in specific social conditions ―to 
make sense of history, to get a handle on their insecurities in 
modernity.‖  
To the extent it is true that Bhabha, Fanon‘s most energetic 
interpreter in contemporary postcolonial theory, conflates the psychic 
and the socio-political, one might argue that this is not a bad thing if 
the intention is an attempt to ―bring together‖ or ―fuse‖ the two realms 
of cause and effect for a better understanding of postcolonial trauma. 
This correctly grasped but unexplained relation between the two 
dimensions of the colonial experience constitutes, I think, what George 
identifies as an unthematized tension and a limitation of Bhabha‘s 
theory. But George himself shies away from taking up the gauntlet of a 
psychological exploration of this problem. ―It is not my intention,‖ he 
says, ―to open the debate as to whether or not psychoanalysis can lay 
claim to being a theory of society.‖ George abdicates this role because 
he believes that the ―differential social relations‖ of postcolonial 
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subjects which explain their ―paradoxes of identity‖ can be specified 
―only on the terrain of a materialist consideration‖ (80). In my reading 
of Horseman—as well as my other primary texts, Morrison‘s Beloved 
and Walcott‘s Omeros—however, I show that George cannot be 
absolutely right on this point. I use the word ―absolutely‖ advisedly for 
a reason that becomes clear below. In my analyses, I show differential 
social relations even within a regime of the same oppression through a 
psychological reading of these works along the lines of the 
sociodiagnostic model of psychoanalysis that Fanon advocates. George 
implies that the task of exploring how the psychoanalytic can also be 
materialist—which is how it can give a good account of the social—is 
unnecessary, thereby unwittingly aligning himself with Robinson‘s 
polemical view that the psychological is discursively subservient to the 
political. But what this does is to leave the psychic dimension of the 
postcolonial predicament, which unquestionably has the power of 
―overdetermining‖ the subject‘s agential capacity, well alone in the 
discursive unconscious or repressed of theory. Yet we cannot hope to 
re-launch the arrested struggle of decolonisation with subjects who 
remain victims, to varying degrees, of the post-traumatic stress 
syndrome arising from the colossal betrayal of independence. It is fair 
to say that most African countries today are in a state of total war, 
civil or economic—or, at the very least, in a state of permanent 
emergency. The sheer number of actual shooting wars that have raged 
on the continent since the Biafran war in Nigeria just six years after 
independence to the current battlefront in Darfur-Sudan is mind-
boggling. But whether hot or cold—though the economic wars have 
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never seemed to cool—they have inflicted and continue to inflict 
massive traumas that repeat the unhealed psychic wounds of 
colonialism. Fanon tenders compelling evidence of how subversive of 
identity and political agency ―the atmosphere of war‖ can be by 
compiling clinical details of victims traumatised by the Algerian war of 
liberation in the closing chapter of The Wretched of the Earth. As 
Fanon shows, even the colonisers were themselves traumatised and if 
we substitute the home-grown despots, so-called leaders of the 
beleaguered post-colonial nations, for the erstwhile colonisers, then we 
see even more clearly why total disalienation enjoins on the 
postcolonial critic the psychological imperative. For, as insightful as 
George is in his essay, his unwillingness to pursue this line of enquiry 
marks his own limitation to the extent that the critique of Bhabha he 
mounts does not engage him at the most crucial nexus of his 
reinterpretation of Fanon: the psychoanalytical. Yet, that this is vital to 
any goal of surpassing Bhabha‘s theory52 or transcending the kind of 
―schematic‖ Marxist-materialist criticism that George critiqued is 
indicated by the marked—because repeated—presence of the word 
―trauma‖ in his essay.53 
 Let me be clear. A great deal has been gained and can still be 
gained from the sort of sophisticated historico-materialist approach to 
the postcolonial text that George urges, but it seems to me that at this 
juncture postcolonial theory stands to gain even more by delving into 
                                       
52 Olakunle George, ―Cultural Criticism in Wole Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s 
Horseman,‖ Representations, 80. 
53 I note at least three instances of this word, excluding other possible cognates or 
connotations. See pages 68, 87 and 88.  
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the occult zone of the trauma of colonialism and slavery for the project 
of illuminating and helping to resolve the unthematised tension that 
lurks there. As my argument in this dissertation shows, any claim that 
the materialist plane alone is enough to explain and exhaust the 
postcolonial debacle is comparable at some level to the sort of 
simplistic counter-posing of Black Skin, White Masks to The Wretched 
of the Earth that I noted earlier. As Hall warns, an account of racism 
as the sustaining ideology of colonialism—that is, of the historico-
racial schema—―which has no purchase on the inner landscape and 
the unconscious mechanisms of its effects is, at best, only half the 
story.‖54 George‘s unwillingness to keen his insightful eye on the other 
half of the problem of postcolonial literary self-representation also 
ends up, then, under-serving his specific goal of re-examining 
Soyinka‘s acclaimed magnum opus for the theoretical relevance it has 
for contemporary theory and criticism. Ultimately, George‘s dogmatic 
insistence on ―the terrain of the materialist‖ from the outset leads him 
to an unintended renunciation of that stance when he admits at the 
end of his essay that the kind of attention the play requires is one that 
honours the ―multiple levels‖ at which it ―thrashes out the problems 
that constitute its object.‖ Between the initial claim and the later 
admission lies the repression, in effect, of other modes of examining 
the problem of postcolonial modernity. It would seem George believes 
that the psychoanalytic does not constitute one of the multiple levels 
of discourse he rightly sees as indispensable for an exhaustive reading 
of the postcolonial text. But if Horseman, as he aptly observes, ―invites 
                                       
54 Stuart Hall, ―The After-life of Frantz Fanon‖ in The Fact of Blackness, 17. 
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us further into itself and rewards us there,‖55 my contention is that 
this mindscape, this interior setting of the play—akin to the inside 
place that Beloved imperiously summons Paul D to touch in 
Morrison‘s eponymously named novel— is constituted by the trauma 
of individual and collective experience of colonialism and its aftermath. 
Soyinka dramatises this trauma at the cataclysmic moment of contact 
between the indigenous community or nation and the coloniser.  That 
the play obliges us to step, without staying our feet like Elesin, into 
the psychic gulf of transition and disintegration for the primary mode 
of laying hold of its ―truth‖ seems even more evident in the light of 
Soyinka‘s famous essay, ―The Fourth Stage,‖ which I have also drawn 
upon in my discussion. My claim is that the awful foreboding so 
palpably expressed by Soyinka about a world wrenched from its true 
course and smashed against alien boulders, leaving its inhabitants 
floundering in an ominous void, aptly names postcolonial trauma as 
the chthonic realm deep within which the play‘s driving impetus is 
located.  Consequently, the terrain for advancing our analysis and 
understanding of Horseman, as many a postcolonial text, must, 
therefore, be widened to give central place to the psychoanalytic 
paradigm as I hope to have done specifically in Chapter Two, and with 
regard to my other primary texts, below. 
Needless to say, the task of elucidating the psychic dimension of 
the postcolonial condition is, to put it mildly, a difficult one. For if 
trauma by definition is a cataclysmic event that shatters the individual 
                                       
55 Olakunle George, ―Cultural Criticism in Wole Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s 
Horseman,‖ 88-89. 
39 
 
or collective‘s prior frame of reference,56 how can we specify the social 
referents of traumatic experience—what Cathy Caruth calls the ―locus 
of referentiality?‖57 Ultimately, the problem of reference emerges as the 
unresolved tension of theoretical formulations that seek to relate the 
trauma of colonialism to the social reality of lived experience in the 
postcolony. And because of the formidable problems posed to the critic 
who attempts this task, the tendency exists to stay within the 
―empiricist‖ frame provided by materialist criticism. We can, after all, 
identify the social location of the postcolonial subject with relative 
accuracy, but how can we even begin to unveil the unconscious 
mechanisms that can determine agency from that social location, and, 
further, explain the referential link between psyche and society? Yet 
the truth is that a psychoanalytic procedure inexorably refers us to the 
exterior world of experience, a space in the postcolony riddled by the 
original and trans-generational traumas of colonialism. But it does so 
while also keeping us focussed on the interior world of the 
traumatised. In other words, a psychoanalytic interpretation of the 
postcolonial problem is invariably a Janus-face methodology that 
compels us to look both inwards and outwards at one and the same 
time, and this seems to me the only way to keep both the wood and 
the trees, together with the goblins that dwell therein, simultaneously 
                                       
56 Freud gives the definition of trauma from the psychoanalytic perspective in Moses 
and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: Vintage, 1955) that informs its 
current use. There, he likens trauma to the experience of the victim of a catastrophic 
train collision and also elaborates the concept of latency or belatedness. See also 
Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History, 3-4, and Caruth, 
―Introduction‖ in Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995), 151-157. 
57 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 6. 
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in view. Indeed, Fanon‘s description of this traumatic experience as 
―the fact of blackness‖ proves again the genius of his radical insight 
into the dynamic of individual-cum-collective consciousness and its 
historical determinant. After all, nothing presumably bespeaks 
objectivity, the truth of experience in a lived or worldly way, more than 
facts. To speak of a particular psyche, private or communal, and the 
trauma-inducing facts that cause it to apprehend and respond to 
social stimuli in ways that are often confounding and determinant of 
an enabling agency is to acknowledge that our work of social analysis, 
of interpreting the world, can hardly be done on the materialist or any 
one discursive plane alone.  
That said, however, it is possible to claim that the 
psychoanalytic paradigm, in particular, Fanon‘s sociodiagnostic model 
of it, has a special advantage and appeal in that it is also a rigidly 
materialist framework. Thus, if I have followed a mostly psychological 
line of analysis, it is because I agree with Harold Bloom when, in 
defence of Freud, he says that to be a good psychoanalyst is to be ―a 
good materialist,‖58 and it goes without saying that to be a good 
materialist is to be a good realist. This claim, on one level, would seem 
self-evident since the postcolonial subject is always mind-and-matter, 
so to speak, in every concrete historical situation that acts upon him 
or her and which in turn impels him or her to action. The return to the 
psychological becomes, to my mind, a more powerful argument for 
relocating the postcolonial subject to the heart of the quest for agency 
                                       
58 Harold Bloom, ―Freud: Frontier Concepts, Jewishness, and Interpretation‖ in 
Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 113. 
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and self-fashioning in the wake of colonialism‘s denial, or radical 
fragmentation, of a self-constituting agency to the colonised. This is 
the all-important question of will, Soyinka‘s self-apprehension, that is 
at the heart of the conflict he so powerfully dramatises in Horseman. 
But the goal of reclaiming identities battered by colonialism, of re-
establishing connections to broken communal epistemologies, and of 
reconstituting agency cannot be fully realised without taking up that 
very task that the postcolonial critic often shies away from: pursuing 
the nature and varying forms of the postcolonial subject‘s psychic 
alienation and aggression, including, but not limited to, self-loathing 
and self-doubt, madness, gratuitous violence, power lust, mind-
boggling treasury looting59 and ―fratricidal combats‖ whose barbarity 
mime and exceed the bestialities of ―war‖—what constitutes, in short, 
the riddling ―neurotic structure of [post]colonialism itself,‖ as Fuss 
                                       
59 This might appear to be a suspicious entry on this list, but the recent call by Mrs 
Farida Waziri, a retired police commissioner and chairperson of the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria, a body saddled with the losing battle of 
checking official corruption, to the effect that public office holders should be 
subjected to psychiatric tests to determine their suitability for office—in other words, 
to ascertain if they would not loot the treasury—justifies its inclusion. In a keynote 
address she gave to a workshop on transparency and accountability in public office, 
Waziri said as follows:  
―Having dealt with many corruption cases, I am inclined to suggest that 
public officers should be subjected to some form of psychiatric evaluation to 
determine their suitability for public office. The extent of aggrandizement and 
gluttonous accumulation of wealth that I have observed suggest to me that 
some people are mentally and psychologically unsuitable for public office. We 
have observed people amassing public wealth to a point suggesting 'madness' 
or some form of obsessive-compulsive psychiatric disorder.‖ 
See, ―EFCC Wants Psychiatric Tests for Politicians,‖ Daily Champion, 29 September 
2009. It should be pointed out that this is not a novel call, as Soyinka, one of the 
authors discussed here, has long urged a psychiatric evaluation of African leaders on 
account of their marked depravity bordering on the neurotic, including the mindless 
pillaging of their nations‘ treasuries, a theme he has indirectly treated in several of 
his other plays, among them Madmen and Specialists (1970),  Opera Wonyosi (1977), 
A Play of Giants (1984), and more recently, King Baabu (2002). 
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names it. At the very least, we must acknowledge that the historical 
trauma caused by the fact of colonialism—or, if you insist, ―the fact of 
blackness‖ and so of being marked as a colonial subject—created a 
radically altered sense of self for the colonised and causes the 
postcolonial subject even now to pose to him- or herself, consciously 
or unconsciously, the question, ―In reality, who am I?‖  
The factual, lived world of the anomalies of affect caused by 
post-colonial trauma is where Bhabha, following Fanon, enjoins us to 
go in search of answers to the postcolonial predicament. In ―Day by 
Day ... with Fanon,‖ Bhabha, dismisses several rhetorical questions 
that may be raised to query the relevance of invoking Fanon today and 
denounces the ―piety‖ that informs them on the ground that they miss 
the significance of the quotidian in Fanon‘s theoretical framework. 
Because Bhabha makes his claim with copious citations from Fanon, I 
will quote the passage at some length:   
 
Such piety misses the subtlety and the power of Fanon‘s 
rhetorical emphasis on the singularity of the day-to-day – the 
diurnal measure – in both struggle and survival. In Spontaneity: 
Its Strength and Weakness, the understated phrase ‗the struggle 
continues‘, offers an elusive attempt to distinguish between what 
he calls ‗the historical law‘, and his sense of the performance of 
the politics of the day-to-day: ‗the struggle for national liberation 
does not consist in spanning the gap at one stride: the drama 
has to be played out in all of its difficulty everyday ... Day after 
day goes by.‘ ... It is this historical temporality that I would call 
the emergency of the (insurgent) everyday  ... the temporality of 
everyday emergency is that it represents the agency of 
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insurgency and constitutes a counter-force to historical 
exemplarity (sic). The temporality of the day-to-day is what 
Fanon calls the ‗knowledge of the practice of action‘.60 
 
This is not a novel thesis since Fanon is emphatic in linking the 
effectiveness of the psychoanalytic effort to disalienate the black 
subject to ―an immediate recognition of social and economic realities.‖ 
In other words, the historical day-to-day occurrences that work under 
a regime of colonialism (and neo-colonialism) to fix the inferiority and 
dependence of the colonised as, in Fanon‘s words, ―a chemical solution 
is fixed by a dye.‖61 Bhabha‘s gloss on this everyday space that 
harbours the sources of postcolonial trauma and where its effects are 
acted-out helps to underscore the hard realism of Fanon‘s 
psychoanalysis adapted to the colonial context. This is the site of the 
daily regurgitation and accretion of ―a thousand details, anecdotes and 
stories‖ that construct the racial epidermal schema as of the daily 
lessons of struggle that slowly unveil to consciousness the ―partial, 
limited and unstable‖ colonial truths that turn them into material 
forces of domination. Bringing the colonized to full consciousness or 
maturity in the process of the struggle for liberation requires nothing 
short of a ―force of intellect‖ that ―reveals unexpected facets ... brings 
out new meanings and pinpoints contradictions‖ camouflaged by the 
purported facts of blackness. What, in effect, constitutes ―knowledge of 
the practice of action.‖ A major argument of this dissertation is that 
                                       
60 Homi Bhabha, ―Day by Day … With Fanon‖ in The Fact of Blackness, 188; italics 
and brackets original. 
61 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 109. 
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the political unconscious created by the repressed trauma of 
colonialism stands as a formidable obstacle to the postcolonial 
subject‘s will and agency. What true knowledge of the practice of 
action can we expect then if the psychological is given short shrift 
either because of a certain atavistic fear, even by ―those inside the 
movement,‖ as Fanon notes, ―who tend to think that shades of 
meaning constitute dangers and drive wedges into the solid block of 
popular opinion‖62 or by social theories which suggest that the battle 
can be engaged and won entirely on one front? If we note how oddly 
remarkable it is that the sociodiagnostic psychoanalysis that Fanon 
insists upon as a revolutionary imperative has until the fresh 
awakening to Black Skin, White Masks been literally ignored, one 
wonders if this lacuna is not attributable to the anxiety which he aptly 
recognised. After all, the psychoanalytic approach can promise only 
―shades of meaning,‖ partially illumined insights into impulses hidden 
deep in the unconscious. Whatever the reason may be, it is clear that 
this place where alienation and ambivalence are tied into a tight 
psychic knot is one ―many ‗right-on‘ critics are determined to avoid,‖63 
as Hall points out. Or as Dambudzo Marechera, that enfant terrible of 
African literature who died an untimely and tragic death in 1987, 
wondered: ―How can Africa write as if that Black Frenchman, Frantz 
Fanon, never existed—I refer to the Fanon of Black Skin,White 
                                       
62 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 146-47. 
63 Stuart Hall, ―The After Life of Frantz Fanon‖ in The Fact of Blackness, 35. 
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Masks.‖64 Marechera was speaking of writers, but he might very well 
have had the critics in mind. 
 But the postcolonial critic cannot put this task off any longer. 
There is a way to draw out of Fanon that knowledge of the practice of 
action informed by the everyday of today and ―lay hold of the violence 
which is changing direction‖65 just as the sources of the trauma that 
drive it morph, often unrecognisably, posing afresh the difficult 
problem of how to work out the relation between psyche and society, 
the unconscious dimension of repressed traumatic experiences and 
their historical causes. But this is where the return to Black Skin, 
White Masks is most helpful to postcolonial theory. For Hall, the 
psychoanalytic Fanon is necessary for subverting ―the structures of 
‗othering‘ in language and representation, image, sound and 
discourse.‖ With the example of the strategic use of Fanon by minority 
artists and thinkers whose work focuses on the technologies and 
structures of race, representation and a radical identity politics, Hall 
finds that this Fanon is crucial to any strategy aimed at overturning 
―the mechanisms of fixed racial signification‖ and turning them 
against themselves ―in order to begin to constitute new subjectivities, 
new positions of enunciation and identification, without which the 
                                       
64 Dambudzo Marechera, ―The African Writer‘s Experience of European Literature,‖ 
Zambezia (1987), xiv, (ii), 99-105, at 100. As this journal may be a bit obscure, it 
might be useful to refer to the editor‘s note which explains that this was one of two 
talks—the other being ―Soyinka, Dostoevsky: The Writer on Trial for his Time‖—given 
by Marechera in Harare on 15 and 29 October 1986, roughly a year before his death 
on 18 August 1987, as part of a series of lectures organized by the Zimbabwe 
German Society, the Alliance Française, and the British Council. 
65 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 58. 
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most ‗revolutionary‘ moments of national liberation quickly slide into 
their post-colonial reverse gear.‖66 But in doing so we are also 
confronted with what Hall has called the enigma of Fanon, that 
element which presents him as transfixed by the rigid binary of 
white/black, coloniser/colonised, self/other at the same time that he 
is lusciously open to ―the linkages and fissures, the contradictions and 
coimplications, the translations and transformations‖ which the day-
to-day of colonial experience and struggle make bare. Two quick and 
obvious indications of Fanon‘s complexity can be mentioned here. How 
often, for instance, do those critics whose essentialist inclinations 
cause them to apotheosise the ―revolutionary‖ Fanon note the ―shaded 
meaning‖ of this demurral in The Wretched of the Earth:   
 
The settler is not simply the man who must be killed. Many 
members of the mass of colonialists reveal themselves to be 
much, much nearer to the national struggle than certain sons of 
the nation. The barriers of blood and race-prejudice are broken 
down on both sides. In the same way, not every Negro or Moslem 
is issued automatically a hallmark of genuineness; and the gun 
or the knife is not inevitably reached for when a settler makes 
his appearance.67  
 
The second moment, again randomly chosen, which displays Fanon‘s 
open celebration of contradiction is his ―Letter to the Resident 
Minister‖ of Algeria by which he resigned in protest from his post as 
                                       
66 Stuart Hall, ―The After-life of Frantz Fanon‖ in The Fact of Blackness, 19-20. 
67 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 146. 
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resident psychiatrist at the Blida-Joinville hospital in 1956. We must 
remember that the hospital was more than a doctor‘s clinic for Fanon, 
constituting as it did for him a revolutionary front in itself—the place 
where he was more directly in touch with the wounded and 
traumatised victims of the war of liberation, white and black. He had, 
then, to have the most compelling political reason to resign from his 
work there, which is why it is truly remarkable that he justifies his 
action by citing the important role of the psychoanalytic, of psychiatric 
medicine, for reconciling the alienated colonial subject to herself and 
her environment:  
 
Madness is one of the means man has of losing his freedom. 
And I can say, on the basis of what I have been able to observe 
from this point of vantage, that the degree of alienation of the 
inhabitants of this country appears to me frightening. 
If psychiatry is the medical technique that aims to enable man 
no longer to be a stranger to his environment, I owe it to myself to 
affirm that the Arab, permanently an alien in his own country, 
lives in a state of absolute depersonalization.‖68 
 
Diana Fuss and Stuart Hall are in agreement that Fanon‘s location of 
his discursive and political work of decolonisation in this crucial nexus 
of the psychopathology of colonialism is as prescient as it is radical. 
According to Hall, this constitutes the novelty, originality and 
timeliness of Fanon. This note of timeliness leads inevitably to the 
question of how to read and apply Fanon‘s theory today, especially in 
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the light of its many avowals and disavowals, the fissures and 
slippages that mark his attempt to grapple with the unconscious 
structure of racism and colonialism. I do not pretend to have found the 
definitive answer to this question and set myself a much narrower 
task: taking seriously Fanon‘s insistence on a sociodiagnostic 
approach for a ―psychoanalytical interpretation‖ of the postcolonial 
problem in my primary texts. Implicit in such an approach, which, I 
hasten to add, must be mediated by a realist theory of reference, is the 
political question of how to end the pathological condition imposed by 
colonialism on the colonised subject. If, as Hall observes, the whole 
thrust of Bhabha‘s theory is the placid acceptance of ―a politics of 
subversion which lives with ambivalence, without trying to transcend 
or sublate it,‖ the aim for me is Fanonian in the true sense of 
liberation, which demands transcendence and sublation. Bhabha‘s 
discursive stance is, as Hall explains it, a political consequence of ―a 
Lacanian theoretical position, where ambivalence is a necessary part 
of the script.‖ As Hall notes, however, it is the ambivalence that 
―kills‖69—in the literal and symbolic senses—and I endeavour to show 
this in my analyses, as indeed the fates of Elesin and the Yoruba 
nation, Sethe and Paul D, Philoctete, Major Plunkett and Ma Kilman 
illustrate. In this, I am also guided by Fuss‘s realist reading of the 
Fanonian project: that ―the political is located within the psychical as 
a powerful shaping force,‖ and vice versa. Or, put another way—with a 
turn on Lacan‘s well-known notion that the unconscious is structured 
like a language—that ―the psychical operates precisely as a political 
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formation,‖ a discovery that Fuss sees as one of Fanon‘s ―most 
important contribution to political thought.‖ For Fanon, Fuss 
concludes, gives us a politics—an interpretative paradigm—that does 
not ―oppose the psychical but fundamentally presupposes it.‖70 
If this is the case, then it is clear why Bhabha‘s or any other 
post-structuralist or deconstructivist approach fails to go beyond 
ambivalence and indeterminacy and ends up content to substitute 
―the subversion which lives with ambivalence‖ for an adequate political 
goal, often achieved through a mostly linguistic parsing of the 
postcolonial text. To make colonial trauma together with the 
compulsion to repeat in the face of newly inflicted wounds in the 
postcolonial nation refer outwards to its historical sources, the critic 
must be armed with an adequate theory of linguistic reference. For the 
tendency that Hall and George observe with regard to Bhabba is not 
limited to the Third World poststructuralist, as my discussion in 
Chapter Three of Cathy Caruth‘s effort to develop such a theory in 
―The Falling Body and the Impact of Reference‖ shows. Caruth falls 
short of her goal of disavowing, through the work of Paul de Man, the 
inclination by linguistically oriented theorists of literature to deny the 
role of reference in the text and thereby denying ―the possibility that 
language can give us access to history.‖71 But if the locus of 
referentiality of historical trauma is the social world of lived 
experience, it becomes necessary to defend the cognitive value of 
experience, and beyond that, of trauma as a latent, or belated but 
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nonetheless ultimately cognisable—through a dynamic process of 
acting-out and working-through, of coming to terms with, the 
trauma—category of experience. Together, these terms—traumatic 
experience, belatedness or latency, acting-out and working-through, 
reference and realism—provide the nodes of my application of the 
psychoanalytic paradigm to my analysis and defence of postcolonial 
identity below. Subsumed under ―acting-out and working-through‖ is 
the notion of healing of the postcolonial body-politic that the title of 
this dissertation suggests.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
IDENTITY OR DEATH! THE TRAUMA OF LIFE AND CONTINUITY IN 
WOLE SOYINKA‘S DEATH AND THE KING’S HORSEMAN 
 
It is not by coincidence that Freud‘s name insinuates itself into a 
discussion of Soyinka; there is a deeper connection between the two 
thinkers‘ shared concern with the topography of reason, something 
that needs further investigation. Suffice it to say, for the time being, 
that in a Freudian context Soyinka can be said to be recuperating the 
hidden and even repressed structures underlying postcolonial 
modernity and letting them speak their language of pure alterity in 
order to reveal the existing concepts of order and structure as 
pragmatic resolutions of fundamentally unrelieved tensions of thought 
and being. 
— Mpalive-Hangson Msiska1 
 
The confrontation in Death and the King’s Horseman ... between Elesin 
and Pilkings, goes beyond a simple matching of good against evil, even 
beyond the contending logic of two cultural philosophies, and is meant 
to probe deeper into the metaphysical traumas of a society in 
transition, as well as the role of the committed individual in such rites 
of passage. 
— Femi Osofisan2 
 
                                       
1 Mpalive-Hangson Msiska, Postcolonial Identity in Wole Soyinka (Amsterdam-New 
York: Editions Rodopi, 2007), 20. 
2 Femi Osofisan, ―Wole Soyinka and the Living Dramatist: A Playwright‘s Encounter 
with the Drama of Wole Soyinka, in Wole Soyinka: Freedom and Complexity, ed. 
Biodun Jeyifo (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001), 172-186, at 183.  
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The very title of Wole Soyinka‘s most celebrated play foregrounds a 
wrenching psychological drama. Death, the end of life on the 
existential plane or of material being, has transfixed humans with its 
unblinking gaze from the origins of time, so much so that death has 
even been posited as the purpose of life itself. Yet, in all the great 
amount of critical commentary that Horseman has generated, little or 
nothing of substance has addressed the psychological dimensions of 
the riveting spectacle of the duel with death that the play presents. 
That this is the case amounts to something of a surprise given the 
early example of Frantz Fanon, a seminal figure in the constitution of 
postcolonial studies as a discipline, in undertaking to uncover ―the 
anomalies of affect‖ resulting from the quest by imperialism for 
political and cultural domination of the colonized. In ―The Negro and 
Psychopathology‖ where Fanon revises Freud in order to apply the 
fundamental premise of psychoanalysis to the African setting of the 
―man of color,‖ he avers that a ―normal Negro child, having grown up 
within a normal family, will become abnormal on the slightest contact 
with the white world.‖3 For the child, we need only substitute the 
adult, the native, the black man or the Negro, and for the family 
ethno-national community4 to make this observation of direct 
                                       
3 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: 
Grove Press, 1967), 141-209, at 143.   
4 As Hortense Spillers‘s reading of a little-known work—unavailable in English even, 
save for her working translations—has indicated, however, the family may still retain 
much of its primary conceptual place in psychoanalysis with appropriate symbolic 
substitutions to take care of the notorious African extended family system. Spillers 
comments on Marie-Cécile and Edmond Ortigues‘s Oedipe Africain (Paris: Éditions 
L‘Harmattan, 1984) in ―‘All the Things You Could Be Now, If Sigmund Freud‘s Wife 
Was Your Mother‘: Psychoanalysis and Race‖ in her Black, White, and in Color 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 376-427. 
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relevance to the task of literary-cum-social analysis, as Fanon in fact 
does in Black Skin, White Masks. But Fanon‘s interest in this 
dimension of the fact of (post)colonialism did not begin with Black 
Skin; he had adumbrated it even in his most political and best known 
work, The Wretched of the Earth, where he devotes a chapter to 
―Colonial Wars and Mental Disorders.‖ And we might add that it is the 
work that provided Jean Paul-Satre the occasion for that insightful 
remark, ―The status of ‗native‘ is a nervous condition introduced and 
maintained by the settler among colonized people with their consent.‖5 
We may debate the extent of complicity of the colonized in bringing 
about (post)colonial neurosis, but that is outside the purview of this 
chapter whose focus is what Msiska in my first epigraph describes as 
―the topography of reason‖ as determined by the ―repressed structures 
of postcolonial modernity.‖ For my purposes, I restate this as the 
opaque dimension of knowing and not knowing and its impact on will 
or agential capacity, a goal I believe can be pursued with any success 
by excavating the realm of the unconscious together with the poetics of 
―pure alterity‖ that it compels in Soyinka‘s Horseman. 
In the epoch of cross-disciplinarity, a disregard for the psychic 
dimension of the postcolonial condition tends to suggest that the 
literature of self-representation in the postcolony has nothing in 
common with the psychoanalytic aim of seeking to unravel the 
complex, often unfathomable, relations between experience and 
knowledge, knowing and not knowing. It may well be that I have not 
looked closely or widely enough, but in all that I have seen the 
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psychological aspect of the death trauma Horseman so stunningly lays 
bare is acknowledged, so to speak, only in passing. As my two 
epigraphs show, the tendency is to give a glancing nod to this level of 
signification, often by noting the traumatic history that inspires the 
play, and quickly move on to the seemingly more pressing questions of 
political and cultural criticism or, for those who come to it from the 
purview of linguistically-oriented theories of literature, its dazzling yet 
paradoxical deployment of language together with its confounding 
implications for a postcolonial identity politics. As far as I can tell, only 
Adebayo Williams in the essay, ―Ritual and the Political Unconscious: 
The case of Death and the King’s Horseman,‖ comes closest to an 
actual examination of the traumatic dimension of the play‘s conflict. 
And Williams is so auspiciously brought to the edge of the 
psychological by the inherent logic of his analytical prism: Frederic 
Jameson‘s Marxian-drawn concept of the political unconscious, which 
itself is indebted to the psychoanalytic notions of repression and the 
collective unconscious. Indeed Williams invokes Freud and Carl Jung 
in making the intertextual argument for his analytic framework: ―The 
idea of a political unconscious as a corollary for the collective 
consciousness is not a new one. Its hazy outlines can be glimpsed in 
the works of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung. In fact, Freud‘s concept of 
repression (i.e., the specific mechanism by means of which individuals 
and societies alike suppress hostile and intolerable truths as a 
strategy for containing or postponing confrontations with reality) 
actually foreshadows the theory of the political unconscious.‖6 
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Although Williams does not pursue the psychoanalytic implications of 
his rubric, he makes substantial use of the key notion of repression 
and repeatedly underscores the ―psychic‖ or ―psychological‖ 
dimensions of the play‘s conflict, its ―trauma of death.‖ By far, 
however, ideology-critique constitutes the bulk of the responses that 
have so far advanced our understanding of what Henry Louis Gates 
describes as the play‘s ―semantics of death.‖7 This seems, for the large 
part, to be a direct function of both the historical circumstances 
surrounding the writing of the play itself and the ideological frame set 
for its reception by Soyinka himself as evidenced by the now famous 
―Author‘s Note‖ that prefaces it.  At this point, I should point out that I 
do not by any means wish to suggest the psychological as more 
deserving of attention than any other critical yardstick, nor to imply a 
scale of evaluative priorities!  It merely strikes me as remarkable that, 
despite its obvious suggestiveness, this mode of engaging Horseman 
should have remained unexplored this late into the exegetical 
enterprise that the work has spawned. If it is true that Soyinka‘s high-
culture avant-gardism and the alleged ―difficulty‖ and ―complexity‖ of 
his work mean that much work remains to be done to make his 
astounding body of work yield even more of its bounties, then every 
critical tool ought to be brought to the task. What follows then is 
offered in the spirit of that collective endeavour. 
Soyinka emphatically locates the semantic essence of Horseman 
in the metaphysical ―abyss of transition‖ evoked by the Yoruba concept 
                                                                                                              
King’s Horseman,‖ Research in African Literatures 24.1 (Spring 1993): 67-79, at 69. 
7 See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ―Being, the Will, and the Semantics of Death,‖ in Wole 
Soyinka: Freedom and Complexity, 62-76. 
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of the cosmos as constituted by the realms of the living, the dead and 
the unborn, with the abyss of transition as the numinous transitional 
passage that links all three realms. Soyinka has called this realm of 
transition the Fourth Stage in his well-known essay of that title.8 In 
his effort to dramatise the intricacies of this fourth stage as part of his 
avowed project of ―race retrieval,‖ Soyinka peremptorily relegates the 
colonial factor in the play to the status of ―a catalytic incident, merely.‖ 
But this has been strenuously contested, with Kwame Anthony Appiah 
going as far as calling the claim ―disingenuous.‖9 Furthermore, 
Soyinka‘s portrayal of Elesin Oba‘s failure to commit ritual suicide to 
accompany his dead king to the world of the ancestors as due to a 
failure of will has also been the subject of some of the more interesting 
contestations. But in so privileging will, Soyinka merely presents a 
dramatic elaboration of the defining characteristic of his patron muse, 
Ogun—an iron-cast will to action. But as Biodun Jeyifo has charged, 
the result is an ―over-valorization‖10 of will and volition as the 
determinant sources of being. Together, play and preface as well as 
Soyinka‘s theoretical formulation of the essence of Yoruba tragic 
drama point to questions that require further exploration. Such as: 
what is the proper relation between will as a mythopoeic construct and 
will as a lived human quality? Is it conceivable in the African world of 
Soyinka‘s mythopoesis that will, however perceived, is susceptible to 
                                       
8 See Wole Soyinka, ―The Fourth Stage: Through the Mysteries of Ogun to the Origins 
of Yoruba Tragedy,‖ in Myth, Literature and the African World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), 140-160. 
9 Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 78. 
10 See Biodun Jeyifo, Wole Soyinka: Politics, Poetics and Postcolonialism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), in particular at 80 and 286. 
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determination—that it can be objectively paralysed, to use a word that 
he allows—by totally incomprehensible and disabling circumstances, 
as in moments of historical trauma? If so, how much cachet is to be 
allowed Soyinka‘s equally vaunted notion of honour which 
presupposes knowledge of a clear choice between right and wrong 
course of action, that is, moral agency, if we grant that some historical 
moments may be so catastrophic as to temporarily shatter the existing 
frame of knowledge, thereby stunning the mind, arresting the will to 
action and complicating the ethical code? In such moments, how is 
inaction to be understood? Or, put another way, should action be 
reified into an end in itself so that any action, even if blind and 
counter-productive, is always to be preferred to inaction? What does it 
mean for reader or audience that Soyinka‘s radical myth-making and 
his insistence on the metaphysical as the only plane wherein 
Horseman‘s ritual meaning can be extracted leads to the elision of 
brutal socio-political realities, resulting in a necessary repression of 
the non-endogenous source of conflict located in the colonial factor 
that nevertheless looms large in the play? And, following from any and 
all of these questions, is there another plausible explanation for 
Elesin‘s failure of will other than what the text ostensibly presents us—
a personal weakness arising from the tragic flaw of hubris and 
hedonism? 
These questions taken in clusters or together largely form the 
heuristic frame for my discussion. I intend to focus on the peculiar 
dynamics of what Soyinka, in one of several polemical responses to his 
early orthodox Marxist interlocutors, rightly saw as the human resort 
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―to the strangest devices‖ for nullifying death, ―the desire to ‗put off 
Death,‘ ‗to come to terms with Death,‘ to ‗communalize‘ Death so as to 
make it more bearable for the individual, ‗to humour Death.‖11 I 
propose to use the psychoanalytic concept of trauma for a depth-
psychology analysis of Horseman by locating Elesin‘s tragedy in the 
lacuna between knowing and not knowing with which historical 
traumas confront the victim, individual and communal. The struggle of 
the colonised to compel respect for the self-sufficiency of their culture 
being a matter of life and death both literally and symbolically, the 
great battle to put off death necessarily takes place first and foremost 
in the individual‘s mind as shaped by its perception and processing of 
social stimuli. This makes it imperative, according to the view I am 
proposing, to read the play against the loud strictures of its author, to 
wit, that the colonial aspect, or rather, the historical factor, is not a 
mere catalytic incident but the very fulcrum on which the play turns. 
In returning to this old controversy, I should like to add to Appiah‘s—
and after him, Adebayo Williams, Tejumola Olaniyan and Olakunle 
George‘s persuasive arguments12—the observation that a catalyst, if I 
remember my secondary school chemistry teacher‘s lesson well, is a 
substance that facilitates a reaction without taking part in, nor 
affecting the outcome of, the chemical process. If this is true, then 
                                       
11 Wole Soyinka, ―Who is Afraid of Elesin Oba,‖ in Art, Dialogue and Outrage: Essays 
on Literature and Culture, ed. Biodun Jeyifo (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 62-81, at 
77. 
12 See Adebayo Williams, ―Ritual and the Political Unconscious‖; Tejumola Olaniyan, 
―Wole Soyinka: ‗Race Retrieval‘ and Cultural Self-Apprehension‖ in his Scars of 
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American, and Caribbean Drama (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 43-66; 
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surely neither a first nor second reading of Horseman would see the 
colonial factor as playing that inert role in the reactive process it set 
off. Furthermore, in examining the psycho-social impact of the 
traumatic encounter between the hitherto autochthonous and self-
directed Oyo kingdom on the one hand, and colonialism on the other, I 
consider the anomalies of affect and the death-denying devices 
resorted to by Elesin, the Oyo people, and Soyinka himself by drawing 
on the Freudian notions of Angstbereitschaft or preparedness for 
anxiety, latency, transference, and Robert Jay Lifton‘s concept of life 
continuity. I hazard the claim that what has been widely identified as 
Elesin‘s failure of will may, perhaps, be better explained as caused by 
the stunning impact of the colonial trauma that significantly 
determines the response of the Yoruba world which insists on acting 
as if its autonomy were still intact. I liken the structure of the anguish 
of ritual self-dissolution and reconstitution in Soyinka‘s ―chthonic 
realm‖ to that of a historical trauma, at least in the way that both 
chart the ambiguity of knowing and not knowing and how that 
determines action. Lastly, I will examine the transferential dynamics 
that Soyinka betrays in writing Horseman right inside the belly of the 
colonial whale—in England. To follow George, I could restate my aim 
as discovering what happens if we linger a bit longer on the 
dissonance made visible by Appiah and the psychological predicament 
that explains it, which in turn demands that we inspect more closely 
the fruitful intersection of play and playwright‘s prefatory note.13 This 
                                       
13 George‘s formulation on page 85 of his essay is as follows: ―What happens if we 
linger a bit longer on the dissonance made visible by Appiah and the predicament 
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seems like a very ambitious project, perhaps well beyond the scope of 
a dissertation chapter, but as already hinted, however, I shall not be 
taking all the questions above one by one but adopting them 
heuristically for my discussion. This way, I hope to keep the forest as 
the trees in proper perspective.  
 
“Nothing but the Will”: Of Trauma, Gods and (Hu)man(s)  
 
Let us start with Soyinka‘s conception of will in ―The Fourth Stage‖ 
where he insists that the will of acting man alone can rescue being 
from annihilation by inimical forces:  
 
[N]othing but the will ... rescues being from annihilation within 
the abyss. Ogun is embodiment of Will, and the Will is the 
paradoxical truth of destructiveness and creativeness in acting 
man. Only one who has himself undergone the experience of 
disintegration, whose spirit has been tested and whose psychic 
resources laid under stress by the forces most inimical to 
individual assertion, only he can understand and be the force of 
fusion between two contradictions. The resulting sensibility is 
also the sensibility of the artist, and he is a profound artists only 
to the degree to which he contemplates and expresses this 
principle of destruction and re-creation.14 
 
                                                                                                              
that explains it—that is to say, if we look more closely at the intersection of the 
prefatory author‘s note and the play itself?‖ 
14 Wole Soyinka, ―The Fourth Stage: Through the Mysteries of Ogun to the Origins of 
Yoruba Tragedy,‖ in Myth, Literature and the African World, 150. 
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But I have gone too far ahead, for we cannot make sense of this 
hallowed place reserved for Ogun without going a few pages back to 
the moment that distinguished him.  As noted above, what Soyinka 
calls the fourth stage, ―the seething cauldron of the dark world will 
and psyche,‖ the ―transitional yet inchoate matrix of death and 
becoming,‖ ―the chthonic realm,‖ among several other appellations, 
represents the domain in which Ogun alone of the deities that emerged 
from the insurrectionary fragmentation of Orinsa-nla, the original 
godhead, dared to cross the gulf created by the ―primal severance‖ 
between humanity and godhead. The gods, then, were in search of 
―reunion with man,‖ of self-completion or the recuperation of a 
dissociated identity through the reintegration of alienated ―essence‖ 
with self, just as the colonised or any subjugated people or group 
might in the more mundane terms of socio-political struggle for self-
determination. The fragmentation of godhead, according to Yoruba 
lore, was wrought by Orisa-nla‘s attendant slave, Atunda, rolling a 
rock down his unsuspecting master‘s back. Two of three dictionary 
definitions of trauma15 explain it as (a) an injury, such as a wound, to 
bodily tissue caused by an external agent, and (b) a disordered psychic 
or behavioural state resulting from mental or emotional stress or 
physical injury. In psychoanalytic terms, however, trauma connotes 
injury to both body and mind (more on this in Chapter Three), 
including the resultant mental state. As Cathy Caruth points out, 
what causes trauma is ―a shock that appears to work very much like a 
                                       
15 I refer to Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th edition. 
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bodily threat but is in fact a break in the mind‘s experience of time.‖16 
In Moses and Monotheism, Freud likens the cause of trauma to a 
catastrophic accident which a victim walks away from and apparently 
survives only for her to later enact the ordeal through repetitive 
actions triggered by flashbacks.17 As he further suggests in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, traumatic neuroses designate the condition that 
occurs after catastrophic events such as ―severe mechanical 
concussions, railway disasters and other accidents involving a risk to 
life.‖18 Such an event breaches the normal defences of the mind 
against external stimuli and enters into unconsciousness unmediated, 
hence its future return by way of repetitive acts as the mind seeks 
belatedly to master the event. It also creates the gap in consciousness 
he dubbed ―latency‖ and which I propose to adopt as a partial 
explanatory concept in this discussion. Following Soyinka‘s account in 
Myth, Literature and the African World, the fragmentation of the 
original godhead by a slave‘s boulder rolled down his back19 fits such a 
traumatic event, and the ensuing deities‘ search for reintegration 
parallels the return to the past for the pre-traumatised state of being: 
                                       
16 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 59. 
17 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1939), 84.  
18 Sigmund Freud, The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay (New York: W. W.  Norton, 1989), 
597. It should be pointed out, however, that the contemporary definition of trauma 
as Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome extends the definition beyond disordered mental 
responses to combat and natural or mechanical catastrophes to include rape, child 
abuse and a number of other violent occurrences. See Caruth‘s Introduction to Part 
I, ―Trauma and Experience,‖ in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), vii.   
19 Wole Soyinka, Myth, Literature and the African World, 152; subsequent reference 
within the text. Soyinka‘s extensive poetic elaboration of this myth of theogony can 
be found in the eponymously titled poem, ―Idanre,‖ in Wole Soyinka, Early Poems 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 53-84.  
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Spiritually, the primordial disquiet of the Yoruba psyche may be 
expressed as the existence in collective memory of a primal 
severance in transitional ether, whose first effective defiance is 
symbolised in the myth of the gods‘ descent to earth and the 
battle with immense chaotic growth which had sealed off 
reunion with man. For they were coming down, not simply to be 
acknowledged but to be re-united with human essence, to 
reassume that portion of re-creative transient awareness which 
the first deity Orisa-nla possessed and expressed through his 
continuous activation of man images ... just as man is grieved 
by a consciousness of loss of the eternal essence of his being 
and must indulge in symbolic transactions to recover his totality 
of being. (144-45) 
 
Thus, according to Soyinka, tragedy in Yoruba traditional drama is 
―the anguish of this severance, the fragmentation of essence from self.‖ 
It is important, for reasons that will become clear below, to note the 
stress Soyinka lays on the point that the gods‘ descent to earth was for 
the purpose of reunion with man, as otherwise, ―this tragedy would 
not be, the anguish of severance would not attain such tragic 
proportions if, the gods‘ position on earth  ... in man‘s conception ... 
was to be one of divine remoteness.‖ This fact assumes significant 
relevance in the light of Soyinka‘s dogged insistence on the 
metaphysical dimension as the ultimate source of the conflict in 
Horseman, alongside the unqualified view of will as the final arbiter of 
that conflict, which, as I claim, has often led to insufficient attention to 
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the psychological turmoil of Ogun, ―first suffering deity, first creative 
energy, the first challenger, and conqueror of transition,‖ as of Elesin. 
For, as Soyinka concedes, the protagonist actor in Yoruba tragedy 
―resists, like Ogun before him, the final step towards complete 
annihilation‖ (143). Soyinka not only speaks of the tragic actor‘s recoil 
from death, presumably driven by the self-preservation instinct, but 
also underlines an additional reason for it: the unknowing, and, so, 
the indecisiveness, that results from chthonic chaos cast here as ―the 
realm of nothingness ... which is potentially destructive of human 
awareness, through areas of terror and blind energies,‖ adding that 
ritual anguish is experienced as the ―primal transmission of the god‘s 
despair – vast, numinous, always incomprehensible‖(146; my 
emphasis).  
This is a good juncture, then, to attempt that parallel between 
the structure of the ritual anguish of the protagonist actor in Yoruba 
tragedy (Ogun/Elesin) as outlined for us by Soyinka and the stunned, 
amnesiac psychic state of the trauma victim.  The gap in 
consciousness exhibited by the victim of a traumatic event constitutes, 
in real terms, a period in which she finds her experience 
incomprehensible. Here is Freud‘s apt description of the phenomenon: 
 
It may happen that someone gets away, apparently unharmed, 
from the spot where he has suffered a shocking accident, for 
instance a train collision. In the course of the following weeks, 
however, he develops a series of grave psychical and motor 
symptoms, which can be ascribed only to his shock or whatever 
else happened at the time of the accident. He has developed a 
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―traumatic neurosis.‖ This appears quite incomprehensible and 
is therefore a novel fact. The time that elapsed between the 
accident and the first appearance of the symptoms is called the 
―incubation period‖... It is the feature which one might term 
latency.20 
 
While steeped in this state, the victim of trauma exhibits a compulsive 
tendency to repeat the event as part of the mind‘s belated effort to 
master what its defence mechanism was not prepared for. The victim 
is said then to be acting-out her trauma even while repressing or is in 
denial of what actually happened. Only a working-through of the 
trauma by way of a complex process of its acknowledgement can 
weaken the compulsion to repeat the founding event, integrate it into 
consciousness and restore agential capacity or will.21 Yet, even while 
acknowledging the protagonist actor‘s psychic despair, 
incomprehension and blind energies; even while accepting that man 
can be ―crushed and robbed ... of self-consciousness‖ by  ―disasters 
and conflicts‖ Soyinka nonetheless never wavers for a moment in 
insisting that only will ―rescues being from annihilation,‖ from ―loss of 
self within this abyss‖ (149).22 I shall subject this claim to further 
scrutiny23 in due course, but for now, it is worth delaying a moment to 
                                       
20 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones, 84. 
21 I have discussed the impact of this latency period on the trauma victim‘s effort at 
self-apprehension, or reconstitution of the self, as well as provided a more detailed 
explication of the concepts of acting-out and working-through in Chapters Three and 
Four respectively. 
22 In the line with the reading I am proposing, this abyss (of dissolution, transition) 
as well as the various other designations by which Soyinka names the chthonic 
realm of chaos and incomprehension would be similar to the gap or latency period of 
the victim‘s unconsciousness or unacknowledged trauma. 
23 Further, for instance, to the charge of over-valorization of will by Jeyifo to which I 
have already referred above. 
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highlight two examples, the one of another ―god-man‖ historical figure 
from Christian mythology and the other from Horseman itself.  
Regarding the former, we need only add to the parallel already drawn 
by Soyinka his further elaboration of the point, to the effect that ―the 
deities stand in the same situation to the living as do the ancestors 
and the unborn, obeying the same laws, suffering the same agonies 
and uncertainties‖ (148). Jesus the Christ is one such deity who 
bridges the primal severance between godhead and humanity wrought 
through the ―fall‖ in the Garden of Eden for the purpose of reunion 
with man, self-completion and redemption.  
The pathos of Elesin recalls Christ‘s in many ways. Like Christ, 
his existence had a single purpose: to willingly die and by his death 
effect what Soyinka might call an act of ―cosmic adjustment‖ (156) that 
would ensure the continued existence of humanity. The Old Testament 
prophet, Isaiah, uses language that casts Christ as a ritual scapegoat 
in foretelling his coming as the Messiah to deliver the Jews from 
bondage: ―he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows‖; ―with his 
stripes we are healed.‖ Perhaps even more poignant, Isaiah suggests 
that Christ would not resist the final step towards annihilation: ―he 
shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied.‖ 24 And, 
indeed, the first three gospels record Christ as master of his fate by 
readily accepting death,25 though all four also show him recoiling from 
his mission, even if temporarily. At the hour of his death on the cross, 
                                       
24 Isaiah 53:4, 5 and 11. All reference to King James Version of the Bible, Standard 
Text Edition. 
25 Christ predicts his death and its manner (betrayal by one of his twelve disciples) in 
Matthew 26:24-28, Mark 9:31, Luke 9:22 and 44, and Luke 18:33.  
67 
 
Matthew and Mark note that Christ thrice asked God, his father, to let 
the cup of his death pass away from him. The words Christ uses, the 
variations of the two chroniclers being so slight as to be negligible, are, 
―O my father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me.‖26 Although 
he is reported as reconciled to God‘s will being done—―O my father, if 
this cup may not pass away from me, except I drink it, thy will be 
done‖—he nevertheless betrays his trauma when he cries out at the 
moment of death reproaching his father for ―forsaking‖ him.27 Mark 
even shows Christ moving from imploring God to seemingly demanding 
an end to his ritual anguish: ―And he said, Abba, Father, all things are 
possible unto thee; take this cup from me.‖28 Christ‘s ―failure of will‖ in 
the grip of his death trauma is graphically illustrated in Luke‘s 
account. According to Luke, after Christ‘s first prayer asking that the 
cup be passed from him, an angel appeared from heaven to strengthen 
him. Yet, ―being in an agony he prayed more earnestly,‖ and then 
comes this fine detail: ―and his sweat was as it were great drops of 
blood falling down to the ground.‖29 If the deities and man obey the 
same laws and suffer the same agonies and uncertainties, the Bible 
offers sacred testimony! 
Confronted with the trauma of death, Will proves an inadequate 
resource and even gods resort to the strangest devices, as witness 
Christ both accepting and rejecting the very purpose for which he, as 
God, incarnates himself and descends to earth. Horseman begins with 
                                       
26 See Matthew 26:39-44 and Mark 14:35-39. 
27 See Matthew 27:46 and Mark 15:34. 
28 My emphasis. 
29 See Luke 22:42-44. 
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the same interesting stratagem for postponing death. We are 
introduced to the play by Elesin‘s own simultaneous denial and 
acceptance of death, indicative of the artful repression of his trauma or 
ritual anguish. If, as Caruth points out, the truth of a trauma being 
delayed or belated, it cannot be linked only to what is known, but also 
to what remains unknown in the actions and language of the victim,30 
then Elesin would be the perfect example. The sheer metaphorical 
exuberance of Elesin‘s language, indeed the pure poetry of his speech 
and ritual dance in this opening scene, betrays his death anxiety as it 
bespeaks a form of acting-out symbolic of an unacknowledged trauma. 
At the point when all earthly concerns ought to be over for him as 
nothing but the stark option of death remains, Elesin chooses the 
medium of poetry for the expression of his will. Poetry, being a genre 
defined by polysemy, due to its exultation in figures, it is no surprise 
that we soon discern a conflicted will more inclined to cling to life than 
enter the narrowing passage of transition into which he ostensibly 
dances through the detour of the market-place. Everything in the 
opening scene points to his unpreparedness for death, and we could 
even start with the very first words of his Praise-Singer, mock-serious 
in tone, but that nevertheless fault Elesin‘s choice of the market-place 
at this most solemn hour. But nothing betrays Elesin‘s 
unpreparedness for death, against all his boastful denials, more than 
his curious digressionary tale of the ―Not-I bird‖: 
 
 
                                       
30 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History , 4. 
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Death came calling. 
Who does not know his rasp of reeds? 
A twilight whisper in the leaves before 
The great araba falls. Did you hear it? 
Not I! swears the farmer. He snaps 
His fingers round his head, abandons 
A hard-worn [sic] harvest and begins 
A rapid dialogue with his legs.31 
 
Elesin sings the fear of several kinsmen of various callings—a 
representative list that includes hunter, courtesan,  mallam/teacher,  
priest, palmwine-tapper—who display similar panicked terror as the 
farmer at the mere prospect of the Not-I bird, of death, being within 
the vicinity. So universal is this fear of death that even the forest, ―the 
lair of beasts,‖ knows it too. Elesin ends his list with the Not-I bird 
itself whose tale signifies the very ubiquity of death: as it flees from its 
nest upon the ―whisper‖ of death‘s coming being borne to him on the 
wind, beasts and humans encounter it and are themselves panicked 
into flight. Thus even the Not-I bird is prey to death, as Elesin informs 
us: ―Not-I / Has long abandoned home. This same dawn / I heard him 
twitter in the gods‘ abode. / Ah, companions of this living world / 
What a thing this is, that even those / We call immortal / Should fear 
to die‖ (9). Humans and animals, even immortals fear to die; but not 
Elesin, as he would have us believe: 
 
                                       
31 Wole Soyinka, Death and the King’s Horseman, Norton Critical Edition (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 2003), 7; subsequent reference within the text. 
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I, when that Not-I bird perched 
Upon my roof, bade him seek his nest again, 
Safe, without care or fear. I unrolled 
My welcome mat for him to see. Not-I 
Flew happily away, you‘ll hear his voice 
No more in this lifetime. (9) 
 
The boast is so loud we recognise it right away for bluster, for if we 
take him seriously for a moment, then Elesin will have by his vaunted 
bravery—―without care or fear‖—alone banished death from the face of 
the earth altogether, at least in his lifetime! Seduced by his own 
powers of poetry, he declares that he is master of his fate:  
 
I am master of my Fate. When the hour comes 
Watch me dance along the narrowing path 
Glazed by the soles of my great precursors. 
My soul is eager. I shall not turn aside. (10) 
 
That Elesin‘s soul is eager he leaves no one in doubt, though it 
remains unclear whether it is for his appointed death. Which is why 
the market women, who have halted their closing ritual of emptying 
their stalls and gathered round him, ask if he will not delay, and even 
after he affirms his resolve, ask yet again if nothing would hold him 
back. Before going further into Elesin‘s loud pronouncement on 
honour as the meaning of life, followed, however, by his clever 
manipulation of the market women to satisfy his every demand to be 
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honoured—―honour me,‖ ―do me credit‖ he repeatedly demands—I 
would like to turn to Freud‘s speculations on the intriguing way the 
ego‘s instinct for self-preservation manifests itself and Robert Jay 
Lifton‘s concept of ―life continuity‖ in further elaboration of my 
argument about the impact of Elesin‘s death trauma on his will. 
 
A Betrothed Maiden or the Wish to Die Only on One’s Terms  
 
In language that resonates with the character of Elesin, Freud begins 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle with the view that in the theory of 
psychoanalysis ―the course taken by mental events is automatically 
regulated by the pleasure principle.‖  The course of such events, Freud 
explains, is activated by an unpleasure-pleasure tension, with the 
mind seeking to cause its resolution in favour of pleasure, or to ensure 
that the ―final outcome coincides with a lowering of that tension ... an 
avoidance of unpleasure or a production of pleasure.‖ But this primary 
mode of the mental apparatus comes in conflict with the outside world 
which seeks to regulate human conduct through the imposition of 
moral strictures, the function of the super-ego. Thus, driven by the 
ego‘s instinct for self-preservation, the pleasure principle is replaced 
by the reality principle which compels the ―postponement of 
satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on 
the long indirect road to pleasure.‖32 If we apply this insight to Elesin, 
we might say that he simply refuses to subject his mind‘s primary 
mode of seeking pleasure to the rude discipline of the reality principle. 
                                       
32 See Sigmund Freud, The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay, 594-96. 
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Thus, he sees his elaborate ruse as merely a step on the ―long indirect 
road to pleasure‖ since his voluntary death anon would elevate him to 
the world of the ancestors for reunion with the dead king, and, 
presumably, resumption of the giddy pleasures that they both shared 
when he was on earth. And here, following Msiska in my first 
epigraph, Soyinka certainly meets Freud. Soyinka‘s observation about 
the tendency of humans to have recourse to the strangest devices for 
nullifying or at least postponing death quoted above echoes Freud‘s 
outline of the mental course of the instinct for self-preservation. 
Needless to say, death is the greatest unpleasure; what remains to be 
explained is the exact cause of this phenomenon. Freud identifies it as 
fright, ―the state a person gets into when he has run into danger 
without being prepared for it.‖  
Clearly, no one is ever quite prepared for his or her death, which 
suggests that our death, though inevitable and long accepted, still 
comes to us as something of a surprise with relative degrees of 
traumatisation. Consequently, the trauma of death is caused precisely 
by a ―lack of any preparedness for anxiety.‖33 Even more crucial to my 
argument here is Freud‘s notion of death as a return to the original 
inorganic state of existence but only on conditions inherent to each 
organism; that is, on the organism‘s own terms. In other words, that 
life itself is the result of a traumatic event, in that it was caused by a 
shattering or cataclysmic act that turned a previously inorganic entity 
into a living one.34 The resultant process known as life or the organic 
                                       
33 Sigmund Freud, The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay, at 598 and 608-09. 
34 On this point, it is worth noting that birth, which instances the beginning of an 
autonomous living human being in the external world, has been described as a 
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state is then condemned to a compulsive wish to return to the old 
inorganic state—―If we are to take it as a truth that knows no 
exception that everything living dies for internal reasons.‖ From this, 
Freud concludes, following Schopenhauer, that ―‗the aim of all life is 
death‘ and, looking backwards, that ‗inanimate things existed before 
living ones.‘‖ Freud‘s conclusion bears quoting in full, especially as it 
throws much needed light on the curious behaviour of Elesin in the 
vortex of his death anxiety, even while volubly asserting mastery of his 
fate: 
 
The hypothesis of self-preservative instincts, such as we 
attribute to all living things, stands in marked opposition to the 
idea that instinctual life as a whole serves to bring about death. 
Seen in this light, the theoretical importance of the instinct of 
self-preservation, of self-assertion and of mastery greatly 
diminishes. They are component instincts whose function is to 
assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death, and 
to ward off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence 
other than those which are immanent in the organism itself. We 
have no longer to reckon with the organism‘s puzzling 
determination ... to maintain its own existence in the face of 
                                                                                                              
traumatic event. Robert Jay Lifton discusses this topic in Chapter Five of The Broken 
Connection: On Death and the Continuity of Life (New York: Touchstone, 1980), 53-72, 
and provides useful bibliographical material, including an aptly titled work by Otto 
Rank, The Trauma of Birth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936). It seems to me possible 
to argue that Soyinka‘s riposte to Nietzsche‘s assertion that it is an act of hubris to 
be born, to wit, that it is no less an act of hubris to die, locates the trauma at both 
ends of the axis of life. See Myth, Literature and the African World, 158. 
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every obstacle. What we are left with is the fact that the 
organism wishes to die only in its own fashion.35 
 
It goes without saying that humans will vary greatly in the terms or 
fashion according to which they would wish to die. It is no surprise, 
then, that Elesin chooses not only to lay his head upon the lap of the 
market-women ―and go to sleep,‖ to ―touch feet with their feet ... smell 
their flesh, their sweat, the smell of indigo on their cloth‖ as the last 
air he breathes36 on his way to ancestordom. And no surprise that he 
not only desires this lavish pleasuring of the senses at the market–
place but also insists, quite bewilderingly, on wedding a betrothed 
maiden so that his seed would take root in the earth he leaves behind. 
As before, he overawes the women by sheer force of rhetoric: 
 
All you who stand before the spirit that dares 
The opening of the last door of passage, 
Dare to rid my going of regrets! My wish 
Transcends the blotting out of thought 
In one mere moment‘s tremor of the senses. 
Do me credit. And do me honour. 
I am girded for the route beyond 
Burdens of waste and longing. 
Then let me travel light. Let 
Seed that will not serve the stomach 
On the way remain behind. Let it take root 
                                       
35 Sigmund Freud, The Freud Reader, 613-14; immediate preceding reference and 
quotations from 612-13, emphases original. Freud‘s acknowledgement of 
Schopenhauer comes several pages later, at 618. 
36 Wole Soyinka, Death and the King’s Horseman, 6. 
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In the earth of my choice, in this earth 
I leave behind. (16) 
 
Elesin who moments ago claims to gladly and voluntarily embrace—to 
have, indeed, conquered—death now betrays his longing for life by 
asking, in effect and rather contradictorily, that his joy be rid of 
regrets! Far from a willingness to enter the gulf of transition, then, 
Elesin‘s repressed fear of death returns as a wish for regeneration of 
life. Thus, Elesin‘s desire to wed in the wee moment before his death 
bespeaks the timeless human anxiety for life continuity, given 
metaphorical expression by the image of the parent and sapling 
plantain he evokes. This is underscored by Iyaloja‘s cowered 
acquiescence on the pretext that it is good that the strength of 
forebears (and, traditionally, Elesin at this numinous moment is 
already an ancestor) be ploughed back into the womb that gave them 
being (17). 
Robert Jay Lifton sets out to investigate what he describes as 
―the elusive psychological relationship between the phenomenon of 
death and the flow of life,‖ a quest that involves the question of 
identity and the life cycle in his acclaimed work, The Broken 
Connection: On Death and the Continuity of Life. Lifton posits the dual 
paradigm of ultimate and proximate levels for his exegesis in which the 
ultimate level ―has to do with symbolizing our connection to our 
history and our biology‖ and the proximate our ―more immediate 
feelings and images.‖ These two levels of symbolic activity, Lifton adds, 
combine in the human struggle ―not to merely remain alive but to feel 
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alive.‖ In adopting Lifton for my analysis here, I take the view that the 
ultimate dimension of connection to group history has been 
extensively analysed by critics of Horseman, but not so, if at all, the 
proximate level of powerful intimate feelings generated by the 
confrontation with death. As Lifton explains, we need to know about 
the mind‘s general possibilities and ―most extreme pitfalls around 
death imagery‖ in order to understand ―radical new influences,‖ which 
in turn would make it impossible for us to see ―‘ordinary‘ relationships 
to death and life-continuity outside a context of ultimate threat.‖37 As I 
hope to show below, colonialism constituted one such radical new 
influence that posed a grave danger to the way of life represented by 
Elesin. Indeed, that colonialism spelt ―social death‖ for the world of the 
colonised, hence one reason why Elesin manifests such ―enormous 
vitality‖38 in his wish to not only remain alive, but to also feel alive. In 
the sheer vitality of his presence, suggestive of nervous energy, Elesin 
also displays one of two likely psychic responses to mortal threat 
synthesised by Lifton: extreme stillness and cessation of movement, or 
frenetic compensatory activity (128). But nothing testifies to the feeling 
of aliveness—of virility, or vitality—more than the sexual act. Elesin 
makes a sexual display of himself among the women in the market-
place, much like a peacock preening its feathers; or as he even more 
precisely suggests, the cock-of-the-roost: ―This market is my roost. 
When I come among the women I am a chicken with a hundred 
                                       
37 Robert Jay Lifton, The Broken Connection, 4 and 5. 
38 Wole Soyinka, Death and the King’s Horseman, 5; in the opening stage directions. 
On this score, it is worth noting that Lifton proposes one definition of anxiety as 
―threatened vitality.‖ Robert Jay Lifton, The Broken Connection, 128; subsequent 
reference within the text. 
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mothers.‖39 He not only sings and dances vigorously and infectiously, 
but also charms, or rather, inveigles, the women to adorn him for 
sexual conquest. The entire scene is defined by Elesin‘s mobilisation of 
―festive idioms‖ 40 other than that of the ritual dissolution for which 
this is his chosen introit, resulting in a wasteful expenditure of psychic 
energy. This chosen fashion of departure is, nonetheless, a form of 
―ecstatic transcendence‖ that seeks to overcome ―the passage of time‖ 
and blend all in ―transtemporal harmony‖; a symbolic reordering, 
according to Lifton, ―central to various kinds of individual and 
collective revitalization.‖ For ―the plunge into chaos (disintegration, 
death) includes wildness and spontaneity‖ which is at the same time 
―culturally stylized.‖ Lifton quotes a passage from Octavio Paz‘s 
commentary on the meaning of the orgiastic features of the Mexican 
fiesta, of which the conclusion most relevant for my purposes here is 
that ―ritual death promotes a rebirth.‖41 The task humans are faced 
with, Lifton opines, is to combine the awareness of death and the loss 
and terror it induces with a capacity to feel, love, transcend and 
become whole (34). Lifton emphasises the view I alluded to at the very 
beginning of this chapter and underscored by Freud in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle: the struggle with death as the fundamental source 
of human anxiety, and that, thus, we must open ourselves to ―the full 
impact of death in order to rediscover and reinterpret the movement 
                                       
39 Wole Soyinka, Death and the King’s Horseman, 6. 
40 Biodun Jeyifo, Wole Soyinka, 154. 
41 Quoted in Robert Jay Lifton, The Broken Connection, 29, but see Octavio Paz, ―The 
Day of the Dead,‖ in Death and Identity, ed. Robert Fulton (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1965), 387-94. 
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and sequence of life‖ (51-52)— especially, I would add, of life lived 
under the awful threat of colonial enslavement. 
Elesin‘s death-hour wedding, purportedly to enable a parting gift 
of his seed in the earth of his choice, can also be linked, curiously 
enough, to his vociferous protestations of honour. Drawing on two 
accounts of the anxiety that surrounds dying, Lifton elaborates the 
view that death tests integrity at several levels, including ―one‘s 
capacity to anticipate an honourable ‗trace‘ one will leave behind for 
the future.‖ This, seen from a different angle, is not a small matter for 
Elesin after all. This ―trace for the future‖ as a test of the integrity of 
death occupies a far more important place in the ideological structure 
of Horseman than may be readily acknowledged, even though Iyaloja‘s 
closing words of the play are addressed to Elesin‘s bride now 
fortuitously pregnant from the lone night of their union. ―Now forget 
the dead,‖ Iyaloja urges her, ―forget even the living. Turn your mind 
only to the unborn.‖42 Elesin in all the contradictory boastfulness and 
simultaneous recourse to the strangest devices for eluding death thus 
exhibits ―the flow of life in the face of threat and death.‖  
So far, I have focussed on the individual character, Elesin, thus 
tending to highlight the personal dimension of his trauma, whereas I 
                                       
42 Wole Soyinka, Death and the King’s Horseman, 63. I should be quick to add, 
though, that Ketu H. Katrak rightly notes this dimension of the play‘s symbolic 
action. According to her, ―Elesin‘s failure of will is due to the fact that ―in the battle 
of the forces of creativity and destructiveness within him, the principles of life and 
fertility, embodied in the young girl, won,‖ adding that although the events depicted 
by the play centre on death, ―the drama ends with the assertion of life through the 
image of the unborn in the last line of the play.‖ She concludes that although the 
tragic personages die and leave the community behind, they nevertheless ―infuse it, 
through their deaths, with life-sustaining powers.‖ See her Wole Soyinka and Modern 
Tragedy: A Study of Dramatic Theory and Practice (Westport: Greenwood Press, 
1986), 99 and 100.  
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claim at the beginning that his tragedy as that of the Oyo kingdom 
dramatised in Horseman is a direct consequence of a collective 
angstbereitschaft, of a group unreadiness for anxiety. This, then, is a 
good point for extending my discussion of the intricate dynamics of 
historical trauma beyond the individual to the group while still keeping 
an eye on the protagonist actor whose action and inaction drive the 
narrative of the play. It means that I must now tackle the fraught 
question of the historical or colonial factor already mentioned in 
passing as it bears directly on the relation between Elesin‘s psychic 
turmoil and consequent voiding of will on the one hand and that of the 
collective psyche and capacity for self-determination on the other. For 
if trauma, to follow Kai Erikson‘s elaboration of its definition, is a blow 
to bodily tissues as well as the mental damage ensuing from it, then a 
collective trauma is such blow and damage to the social tissues of a 
community. The tissues of a community, Erikson argues, can be 
damaged ―in much the same way as the tissues of mind and body,‖ 
and even when that does not happen, the traumatic wounds inflicted 
on individuals can ―combine to create a mood, an ethos ... a group 
culture‖ that differs in significant ways from the sum of the private 
wounds that make it up.43 Erikson‘s argument is borne out by the 
characteristics of a human community, among them its functions as a 
cushion for pain, a context for intimacy, and perhaps more important 
(at least for my purposes here), as ―the repository for binding 
traditions.‖ Such that, where a disaster has befallen a community, its 
                                       
43 Kai Erikson, ―Notes on Trauma and Community‖ in Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory, 185. 
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members may feel ―torn loose from their cultural moorings‖ and set 
―adrift‖ in a strange new order, even where the community collectively 
survives the tragedy and it remains standing with much of its social 
structure still intact (188). With that in mind, let us now revisit the 
vexed question of the historical dimension or, properly speaking, the 
colonial factor, in the drama of existence Soyinka presents us. 
 
The Catalytic and the Catastrophic: Colonialism, a Closing Market 
and Anxiety in the African World 
 
For all the carnivalesque atmosphere of the first act of Horseman, a 
loud and unmistakable ―wail‖ provides the refrain to virtually every 
verse of Elesin‘s rhapsodic paean to life and its beauteous delights. 
The sonorous strains of Praise-singer‘s weighted anxiety come through 
wholly unbidden, as it were, and against the festive idiom of the 
opening scene. At any rate, the note of foreboding seems to be called 
forth by the merest suggestion: all it takes for Praise-singer to betray 
his anxiety, the fear that the Yoruba world is tilted dangerously on a 
precipice constituted by the successful incursion of colonialism is 
Elesin‘s passing invocation of the illustrious tradition of his great 
forebears as he expresses his odd terms of dying among the women in 
the market-place. The exchange is worth ―listening‖ to at some length: 
 
ELESIN  This night I‘ll lay my head upon their lap and go to sleep. 
This night I‘ll touch feet with their feet in a dance that is no 
longer of this earth. But the smell of their flesh, their sweat, the 
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smell of indigo on their cloth, this is the last air I wish to breathe 
as I go to meet my great forebears. 
PRAISE-SINGER  In their time the world was never tilted from its 
groove, it shall not be in yours. 
ELESIN  The gods have said No. 
PRAISE-SINGER  In their time the great wars came and went, the 
little wars came and went; the white slavers came and went, 
they took away the heart of our race, they bore away the mind 
and muscle of our race. The city fell and was rebuilt; the city fell 
and our people trudged through mountain and forest to found a 
new home but—Elesin Oba do you hear me? 
ELESIN  I hear your voice Olohun-iyo. 
PRAISE-SINGER  Our world was never wrenched from its true 
course. 
ELESIN  The gods have said No. 
PRAISE-SINGER  There is only one home to the life of a river-
mussel; there is only one home to the life of a tortoise; there is 
only one shell to the soul of man; there is only one world to the 
spirit of our race. If that world leaves its course and smashes on 
boulders of the great void, whose world will give us shelter? 
ELESIN  It did not in the time of my forebears, it shall not in 
mine.(6) 
 
This intriguing dialogue so early in the play creates an ominous 
material setting for the conflict of death, transition and renewal that it 
dramatises. Horseman is, after all, Soyinka‘s only play based wholly on 
an actual historical event. The sheer incantatory form of the exchange 
serves to make repetition—which might easily have tended towards the 
opposite effect of deflation or reduction of affect—underscore the acute 
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communal anxiety that drives the plot. Much can be made of the ―true 
course‖ of this fear, given Soyinka‘s relegation, and, indeed, outright 
denial of its immediate cause—and I will come to that presently—but it 
is obvious that long before Elesin would inch close to the transitional 
passage of dissolution, we are able to apprehend, to ―elicit,‖ the play‘s 
―threnodic essence,‖ a goal Soyinka insists is recoverable only from the 
metaphysical abyss of transition the drama tries to enact.44 An aspect 
of this dialogue that I would like to stress as evidence of the repressive 
structure of historical trauma is Elesin‘s denial of what is already 
obvious to his attendant. Note how short and shorn of any shred of 
doubt Elesin‘s answers to Praise-singer‘s recounted fears are; answers 
which, on second inspection, appear remarkably indirect and evasive. 
His tone is passive and he fails to use the first person pronoun in his 
response to each instance of Praise-singer‘s annotated fear, saying 
merely that ―The gods have said No‖ twice and, lastly, ―It did not in the 
time of my forebears, it shall not in mine.‖ The only time Elesin uses 
the first-person subject pronoun is in response to Praise-singer‘s 
rhetorical question, ―but ... Elesin Oba do you hear me?‖ to which he 
answers, ―I hear your voice Olohun-iyo.‖ This denial of death, 
notwithstanding, Elesin next launches, quite curiously, into the ballad 
of the Not-I bird! Even Praise-singer, griot and repository of cultural 
memory, is unaware of this birdlore. It is as if Elesin‘s own fear and 
anxiety having been rudely awakened by Praise-singer‘s apprehensions 
and so having been brought to momentary consciousness of his 
evasiveness, feels the need now to prove his will beyond any human 
                                       
44 Wole Soyinka, ―Author‘s Note‖ to Death and the King’s Horseman, 3.  
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weakness, contingency or force of history. As we have seen above, he 
concludes a virtuoso dramatisation of the Not-I bird‘s culturally 
dreaded role as harbinger of death with the outlandish claim that he is 
not only master of his fate but also that he alone in the whole world 
could meet death with scornful pride. With ill-timed bravado, he 
repeats his boast at the end of Act Three just before his death-trance 
is aborted: ―Only Elesin,‖ he says, ―dies the unknowable death of 
death‖ (35). 
But it is not only Praise-singer who betrays a death-anxiety or 
fear of the imminent plunging of the Yoruba world into chaos and 
disorder. The sole reason why Iyaloja and the women yield to Elesin‘s 
inordinate demands is the hope that their hands do not—to use their 
own apt words—―wrench[...] the world adrift / In emptiness.‖ They 
chant this fear as a refrain to their expression of relief upon 
discovering that Elesin‘s first feigned offence is only over the easily 
remediable matter of adorning him in deserving attire. It is the fear 
that informs Iyaloja‘s doubt, expressed, albeit in parable, when giving 
in to Elesin‘s next unconscionable demand to wed her would-be 
daughter-in-law.45 Indeed, it is possible to see the ―fear‖ that even the 
dead Alafin confesses ―will not depart from me‖ (34) as a subset of his 
social-death anxiety. For, who else but the Alafin should feel more 
immediately the withering impact on his sovereign will of both the 
early incursion, and, later, entrenchment, of the colonial order? 
Moreover, it is not only the external threat leading to a ―desperate 
battle against the cultural ‗other,‘‖ as Adebayo Williams puts it, that 
                                       
45 Preceding quotations at 12 and 17-18. 
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the Alafin had to contend with before his death but also contradictions 
and threats from within,46 stirred no doubt by the equally brutal logic 
of the Oyo Empire as of the invading British Empire. This death-
anxiety, as has been observed, even forms the physical setting and 
mood of the play as denoted by the central place of the market as both 
literal and figural space.  For instance, Ketu Katrak, commenting on 
the stage direction for the opening scene, describing the market as 
being ―in its closing stages,‖ says that the ensuing atmosphere ―evokes 
death.‖47 Williams, for his part, points out that for the Yoruba the 
market ―serves as a barometer for the spiritual and psychic health of 
the community,‖ which is why he considers the fact that Soyinka 
chooses to focus on it at the beginning of the play ―a stroke of genius.‖ 
But Williams notes that a ―profound irony‖ attends this choice, given 
the asymmetries of power that mark the market of ideas in the wake of 
colonialism as a site of unequal exchange between the indigenous and 
the alien cultures, a development that contradicts the ―natural logic‖ of 
the market as a ―forum for buying and selling.‖ The play confronts us, 
he argues, with the peculiar phenomenon of ―a culture that insists 
upon forcing its hardware on another culture without making a 
commensurate purchase in return.‖ Not surprisingly, Williams, like 
Katrak, moves from this bleak setting to the ―apocalyptic mood‖ set for 
the play by Praise-singer. Williams goes on to attribute Praise-singer‘s 
―unease and anguish‖ to Soyinka, citing the playwright‘s ―very choice 
of images‖—―wrench,‖ ―boulders,‖ and ―void‖—as evidence.48 I shall 
                                       
46 Adebayo Williams, ―Ritual and the Political Unconscious,‖ 78 and 74. 
47 Ketu H. Katrak, Wole Soyinka and Modern Tragedy, 96. 
48 Adebayo Williams, ―Ritual and the Political Unconscious,‖ 73. 
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have something to say on the question of Soyinka‘s self-presence and 
implication in Horseman in the concluding section where I discuss the 
possible dynamics of repression and transference that subtend the 
social vision of the play. 
Yet, until his arrest Elesin himself, Iyaloja and the market 
women, Olunde, and even Praise-singer persist in assuming a 
communal will to self-determination untouched in any substantive 
way by colonial power. It is now necessary to highlight the looming 
presence of the colonial factor in Horseman to show the extent and 
force of this uncanny denial. At this point, I will urge that we recall the 
title of this sub-section, with particular attention to the distinction I 
have sought to make between the ―catalytic‖ (merely) and the 
―catastrophic,‖ as well as the definition of trauma as a shocking 
experience that shatters previous epistemological frameworks, thus 
stunning the mind and its capacity for agency. The first notion of 
forces other than those within that may set the (Oyo) world adrift is 
given by Praise-singer when he speaks of ―white slavers‖ who took 
away ―the heart‖ and the ―mind and muscle of our race.‖ As Praise-
singer notes, however, the race survived that as well as several 
internecine tragedies. That the new epoch may not fare as well under 
similar or equally serious threats is the repressed burden of the play, 
but we do not have to wait long to find out.  
In Act Three, fresh from consummating his death-hour wedding, 
Elesin begins to dance himself into a trance as he enters the abyss of 
dissolution. It is here, however, that the colonial order unmistakably 
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vaunts its presence and power. Sergeant Amusa, a native now in the 
service of the colonial government, leads two constables to arrest and 
prevent Elesin‘s suicide. As he emphatically puts it, ―The government 
say dat kin‘ ting must stop.‖ If we may pause for a moment, the accent 
of power in which this colonial intent is expressed reminds of similar 
imperiousness in Things Fall Apart, Chinua Achebe‘s classic novel on 
the confrontation between the autochthonous, self-governing Igbos of 
eastern Nigeria and the emergent imperial order. As the people gather 
to decide what to do after the humiliation of their elders, including 
Okonkwo, the novel‘s protagonist, five messengers from ―the white 
man‘s court‖ arrive to stop the assembly. Challenged by Okonkwo, the 
messenger answers simply, ―The white man whose power you know 
too well has ordered this meeting to stop.‖ Although Okonkwo drew his 
machete and killed the messenger as if that would also kill the 
message, ―the meeting was stopped‖49 nevertheless. In the same way, 
Elesin in Horseman is also stopped from the execution of autonomous 
will quaintly described as ―committing death‖ (20) by Amusa to 
Pilkings. In fact, we learn something of the irrepressible causative, as 
opposed to merely catalytic, role of the colonial factor from the 
structure of the play. Of its five acts, only the first one assumes an 
entirely endogenous setting: the market. Yet, even here, we are made 
palpably aware of a threatening outside force, leading to the 
apocalyptic mood set for the drama of the ensuing acts by Praise-
singer. Quite remarkably, the very opening scene of the next Act 
presents the effective and undeniable change in the political order of 
                                       
49 Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart (New York: Anchor Books, 1994), 204-05. 
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the Oyo empire, for nothing can be more factual than stage directions 
for Act Two: the verandah of the District Officer‘s bungalow replete 
with the domestic jollity of Pilkings and his wife, Jane. Colonialism is 
here so confidently entrenched that, as we soon learn, it can 
symbolically rehearse tango-steps in the natives‘ ancestral masks of 
death. In other words, to literally celebrate its vanquishing of the Oyo 
empire while the colonized are transfixed by their death anxiety. It is 
in this act that Sergeant Amusa informs Pilkings of the impending 
ritual suicide and where the stage is set for the resultant conflict of 
will and world view between colonizer and colonized. I have already 
noted the major event in Act Three above; suffice it to say in addition 
that it begins with colonial power flexing its muscle, albeit though its 
native errand-boys. The setting for this act is shared between the 
District Officer‘s bungalow and the market, very close to which Elesin 
evidently consummates his strange wedding, thus bolstering a false 
sense of autonomy. It is as if once the chorus of girls at the market 
successfully taunts and harasses Sergeant Amusa and his two 
partners into a temporary retreat, the omen of an imminent 
disintegration of their world earlier expressed by the women is 
banished and things are once again as they had always been. 
Consequently, both scene and act close movingly and powerfully with 
the same intense note of poetry that defines the first act, this time with 
the added poignancy of Elesin‘s death-trance which unforgettably 
enacts the metaphysical dimension of the conflict. But far more crucial 
to the point I am making here is the fact that the colonial factor is the 
central propelling force of the plot in the play‘s crucial last two acts. 
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Two facts are important here: first, the new setting in the Residency, in 
particular, the old slave-holding cellar annexed to it which becomes 
Elesin‘s prison; and, second, the unforgettable visual demonstration of 
the colonial order as represented by the figure of the Prince who, as 
Olunde rightly points out, is on a ―tour of colonial possessions‖ (43). 
Effectively, then, the action of the play takes place mostly on the 
grounds of the colonial administration. Moreover, if Horseman begins 
with an exuberant assertion of vitality and self-determination in one-
and-a-half50 acts, so to speak, it ends with the stark reality of 
determination of the false indigenous sense of will and agency by the 
colonial factor that constitutes the temporal and spatial setting for the 
rest of the play. Indeed, it is within the confines of the residency that 
the imprisoned Elesin is condemned to perform the lowly task of 
merely whispering the secret words to release the dead Alafin into the 
ears of Olunde, the son who confirms the reversal of the order of the 
world by preceding the father into the gulf of transition as the king‘s 
favoured horseman. We can press the point further, for if ultimately 
the theme affirmed by Horseman is the ritual of life continuity, then it 
should be noted that Iyaloja, the redoubtable champion of tradition as 
bulwark of racial perpetration, speaks the last and poignant forward-
looking words of the play in this same residency annexe-now-prison 
(60,62). Furthermore, although Elesin vacillates between his own 
weak, we might say ―weakened,‖ will and the historical determining 
force of colonialism as the cause of his and the community‘s tragedy, it 
                                       
50 This, of course, is not an attempt to introduce the notion of a half-Act as a new 
theatre terminology but merely an admittedly inelegant way of pressing home my 
argument about the centrality of the colonial factor. 
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is safe to say that taking him at his own words can only at best give 
equal prominence to both factors. And, at worst, highlight the 
communal denial of the change in the political order against which he 
is so disadvantageously pitted. There is good evidence for this reading 
of Elesin‘s progression, with a notably more serious tone, from the one 
cause (personal tragic flaw) to the other (the determination from 
without) in his attribution of blame, especially in the light of Iyaloja‘s 
focus on the former in her scathing condemnation. Says Elesin: 
 
What were warnings beside the moist contact of living earth 
between my fingers? What were warnings beside the renewal of 
famished embers lodged eternally in the heart of man? But even 
that, even if it overwhelmed one with a thousandfold 
temptations to linger a little while, a man could overcome it. It is 
when the alien hand pollutes the source of will, when a stranger 
force of violence shatters the mind‘s calm resolution, this is 
when a man is made to commit the awful treachery of relief, 
commit in his thought the unspeakable blasphemy of seeing the 
hand of the gods in this alien rupture of his world. I know it was 
this thought that killed me, sapped my powers and turned me 
into an infant in the hands of unnameable strangers. I made to 
utter my spells anew but my tongue merely rattled in my mouth. 
I fingered hidden charms and the contact was damp; there was 
no spark left to sever the life-strings that should stretch from 
every finger-tip. My will was squelched in the spittle of an alien 
race, and all because I had committed this blasphemy of 
thought—that there might be the hand of the gods in a 
stranger‘s intervention. (56-57) 
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Indeed, one could say that Elesin hastily acknowledges his weakness, 
projected as a general human problem, only in order to move on to the 
true source of his predicament. Thus, he dismisses the attribution of 
his failure to ―the renewal of famished embers lodged eternally in the 
heart of man‖ with the firm conviction that a man could easily 
―overcome‖ that.  Apparently, what could not be so readily surmounted 
was the very colonial factor, the purportedly ―catalytic incident, 
merely.‖ And hence the ubiquity of references to it in the rest of his 
self-justification: ―the alien hand [that] pollutes the source of will,‖ the 
―stranger force of violence [that] shatters the mind‘s calm resolution,‖ 
―the hands of unnameable strangers‖ in which he is turned into a 
mere infant, ―the spittle of an alien race‖ in which his will is 
squelched. As Iyaloja never lets him forget for a second, Elesin held in 
chains and under surveillance is far from the man who boasted that 
he is master of his fate; who, as Jeyifo puts it, uttered the ―fabulous 
conceit‖51 of being the only one in the universe with no fear of death. 
And, for that matter, who did not need to boast his powers in this 
respect as the market women—and so, Iyaloja52—proudly did so on his 
behalf to Sergeant Amusa: ―Tonight our husband and father will prove 
himself greater than the laws of strangers‖ (28). 
 
 
 
                                       
51 Biodun Jeyifo, Wole Soyinka, 156. 
52 Since Iyaloja means mother-at-the-market, but more precisely, leader of the 
market women.  
91 
 
Standing on Ceremony—or a Hollow Ritual of Honour? 
 
But this argument not only runs counter to Soyinka‘s dogged 
insistence on the merely catalytic impact of the colonial factor but also 
that of Jeyifo, his one-time leading critic on the question of the 
marginalisation of the historical-materialist dimension of the play‘s 
conflict. With the publication in 2004 of Wole Soyinka: Politics, Poetics 
and Postcolonialism, Jeyifo is arguably not only now Soyinka‘s pre-
eminent interpreter but also his most famous defender on that claim. I 
base this reading, of course, not on the early critiques53 but on the 
series of reflective and self-critical work from the late eighties 
culminating in the magisterial 2004 work, a painstaking and 
penetrating study of the complexity and sources of the alleged 
obscurity of Soyinka‘s oeuvre54 in the context of the framing themes of 
radical subjectivity in the postcolony to which the playwright responds 
in a distinctly profound, paradoxical and deeply humanist way.55 To 
                                       
53 Among them the following:  ―Soyinka Demythologized: Notes on a Materialist 
Reading of A Dance of the Forests, The Road, and Kongi’s Harvest‖ (Ife, Nigeria: 
1984),  ―Tragedy, History, and Ideology: Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s Horseman 
and Ebrahim Hussein‘s Kinjeketile‖ in Marxism and African Literature, ed. Georg M. 
Gugelberger (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985), 94-109, or the version of it that 
appears as ―Ideology and Tragic Epistemology: The Emergent Paradigms in 
Contemporary African Drama‖ in his The Truthful Lie: Essays in a Sociology of African 
Drama (London: New Beacon, 1985), 23-45.  
54 Jeyifo partly defines his objective as ―a critical response to the influence of critical 
commentary on Soyinka‘s works in the last four decades, the purpose being to locate 
the ‗difficulty‘ and ‗complexity‘ of his writings in their appropriate linguistic and 
cultural sources‖ in relation to ―the historic avant-garde movements of the 
contemporary world‖ and, further, in relation to ―issues of interpretation and 
explanation‖ as they pertain ―to the framing ideas and themes.‖ See Jeyifo, Wole 
Soyinka, xviii. 
55 Jeyifo‘s early position distilled from three essays is cogently summarized by 
Olakunle George as follows: 
According to Biodun Jeyifo, the dramatist‘s [Soyinka‘s] mythopoesis needs to 
be rescued from a deep encrustation at the heart of its idealism: an 
undialectical attitude to myth and ritual. Jeyifo suggests that in privileging 
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conclude this section of my discussion, therefore, I will now examine 
Jeyifo‘s defence of Soyinka‘s claim to see how well my argument holds 
up against it. In doing so, however, my aim is not ultimately to argue 
for a right-or-wrong response to Soyinka‘s assertion but to stay with 
the founding ethos of his poetics aptly identified early on by Wilson 
Harris as constituted by the dialectic of ―complexity and freedom,‖56 
                                                                                                              
mythology and the transhistoricity of archetypes, Soyinka ends up being 
abstract and ahistorical; in so far as the logic of myth sublimates historical 
trauma, the playwright‘s vision risks being iconic but protean, wise but aloof, 
brooding but conservative. In Jeyifo‘s often quoted formulation, Soyinka‘s 
theory of art and being instances the familiar predicament of bourgeois 
aesthetics, one where ‗thought, in a bewitched, becalmed, vaporous zone of 
absolute self-subsistence, frees itself from its moorings in the sea of real life 
processes.‖ See Olakunle George, ―Cultural Criticism in Wole Soyinka‘s Death 
and the King’s Horseman,‖ 68.   
Jeyifo‘s revised and current position is hinged on the view that in Soyinka‘s most 
ambitious and successful works, among which Horseman must be included, will is 
not an ahistorical category, after all; that its reification does not prevent it from 
―meeting its limits in determinate institutional and socio-economic structures.‖ In 
other words, Soyinka‘s vaunting of the metaphysical through ritual archetypes 
notwithstanding, history retains its hold by dint of ―rigorous fidelity to the demands 
of complex and sophisticated artistic representation.‖ See Wole Soyinka, 285-86. 
Jeyifo‘s revisionism, spurred by his reflections on the complexities, tensions and 
ambiguities of postcolonial or modern African literature—in short, the antinomies of 
postcolonial existence—began earnestly in his important 1988 essay, ―Soyinka and 
the Tropes of Disalienation,‖ the essence of which is that Soyinka‘s poetics evinces a 
―contradictory discourse‖ that is ―variously traditionalist and modernist, pan-
Africanist and liberal-humanist, individualistic and communalistic, gnostic and 
skeptical, unapologetically idealist and yet on occasion discreetly materialist.‖Jeyifo 
also points out what he calls Soyinka‘s ideological and theoretical struggle to 
articulate a view of the African world that ―in its ideational systems and ideological 
superstructures is both essentialist and non-essentialist,‖ thereby constituting ―a 
willed aporia as much as a verifiable construct‖ resulting from a ―a theoretical 
anxiety to affirm archaic, autochthonous insights and yet be at one with the march 
of human thought and progress.‖ Jeyifo concludes that in this sense ―aporia may 
well be the master trope for society, like contemporary Africa, wracked by profound 
antipodal impulses and rapid, vertiginous transformations.‖  See ―Wole Soyinka and 
the Tropes of Disalienation,‖ Introduction to Art, Dialogue and Outrage, xxix, xxvii-
viii. See also his introductory essay to the volume of critical essays on Soyinka edited 
by him, ―Of Veils, Shrouds and Freedom: Soyinka and the Dialectics of Complexity 
and Simplicity in Postcolonial Discourse,‖ in Perspectives on Wole Soyinka: Freedom 
and Complexity (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001), ix-xxii. 
56 I have discussed this notion in greater detail with respect to the poet and 
playwright, Derek Walcott—a writer with whom Soyinka is often compared—in 
Chapter Four, but see Wilson Harris, ―The Complexity of Freedom‖ in Perspectives on 
Wole Soyinka: Freedom and Complexity, 51-61. 
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doing so by complicating Jeyifo‘s redrawn picture from the 
psychoanalytic standpoint I have adopted. The questions I shall be 
attempting to answer are: first, assuming that Soyinka is right in his 
claim for the additional reason that Jeyifo gives on the nature of ritual, 
what then is the value of the reified concept of honour that would be 
salvaged from the collapse of the superstructural or juridico-political 
foundation that gives it meaning in the first place? And, second, in 
tracing the sources of Elesin‘s divided will, is there a place or not for 
the colonial factor, and if yes, how significant?  
Jeyifo urges us to ―take seriously‖ Soyinka‘s insistence that the 
intervention of the colonial district officer, Pilkings, is a mere catalyst 
for ―the more decisive protagonist agency of Elesin‘s divided, conflicted 
will.‖ Jeyifo comes to this position by the light of what he calls the 
―fragility of ritual and its sanctions and claims,‖ for as he argues, 
 
Ritual efficacy is not, ab initio, guaranteed; rather it is 
predicated on so many other factors beyond the control of the 
internal economy of the ritual act itself. One of these factors is 
the precondition that the ritual act must not be interrupted or 
foreclosed before its completion. This is why we must take 
seriously Soyinka‘s insistence that the intervention of the 
Colonial District Officer is only a catalyst for the more decisive 
protagonist agency of Elesin‘s divided, conflicted will. The tragic 
flaw of the protagonist of this play is thus Elesin‘s willful 
misrecognition of his divided volition, willful because it is only 
by acting out and vibrantly playing the elaborate conceits of his 
mastery of death and his self-projection as an avatar of earth‘s 
regenerative powers that he is able to live the lie of being an 
94 
 
absolutely willing ritual scapegoat. The lie of course catches up 
with him—and the ritual is aborted.57 
 
It seems to me that a contradiction tugs at the edges of Jeyifo‘s 
argument, and it is as follows. In order for Soyinka‘s claim to stand, 
for us to take it seriously as Jeyifo implores, the external factor 
responsible for the abortion of Elesin‘s ritual suicide has to be 
irrelevant, in essence, to its successful performance. In other words, 
this would be in accord with the anecdotal gloss on the word ―catalyst‖ 
that I offered above. The colonial factor may present the occasion for, 
but not in any way determine, the enactment of Elesin‘s ―more decisive 
protagonist agency,‖ for, as Jeyifo asserts, the efficacy of a ritual is 
contingent on its not being ―interrupted or foreclosed before its 
completion.‖ After all, the only way to show the merely incidental and 
so inconsequential character of the colonial presence is for the ritual 
to proceed to completion, in spite of Pilkings‘s most ardent desire and 
intent. This, surely, is the confidence that the market women 
expressed in taunting and telling off Sergeant Amusa:  
 
AMUSA  The government say dat kin‘ ting must stop. 
WOMEN  Who will stop it? You? Tonight our husband and father 
will prove himself greater than the laws of strangers. 
 
 Yet, as Jeyifo rightly admits, the ritual is aborted. But not, as we 
must point out, suo moto or on Elesin‘s own initiative, but on the 
                                       
57 Biodun Jeyifo, Wole Soyinka, 156. 
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active agency of the colonial factor. Consequently, there is warrant for 
a reading that sees Jeyifo as suggesting that the very unwilled and 
forcible abortion of Elesin‘s ritual suicide—which guarantees its failure 
to affirm his agency—is the ground on which to take seriously the 
claim that the effective thwarting agent is merely incidental. Jeyifo is 
right of course to note the role played by Elesin‘s divided will and the 
fabulous mental conceit of having mastered death, leading him to the 
practical diversionary conceit of what I have called his death-hour 
wedding. But, again, what is the ultimate cause of that conflicted will; 
what divides and fractures it? As ambiguous—deliberately so, it would 
appear—as the plot is on the question of the precise time Elesin was 
expected to die, a strong argument can be made for the view that he 
had not in fact forfeited the appointed moment by his dalliance. At the 
beginning of Act Five, when Pilkings seeks to reconcile with the 
imprisoned Elesin on the wrong notion that he might perhaps find his 
favour having saved his life, Elesin implies that he began the moving 
trance-dance that ends Act Three, in which his ritual dissolution is 
well underway, upon receiving word from the house of osugbo, the 
secret executive cult in charge of summoning him to his duty. Here is 
the speech he makes to correct Pilkings‘s mistaken belief: 
 
You are waiting for dawn white man. I hear you saying to 
yourself: only so many hours until dawn and then the danger is 
over. All I must do is keep him alive tonight. You don‘t quite 
understand it all but you know that tonight is when what ought 
to be must be brought about. I shall ease your mind even more, 
ghostly one. It is not an entire night but a moment of the night, 
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and that moment is past. The moon was my messenger and 
guide. When it reached a certain gateway in the sky, it touched 
that moment for which my whole life has been spent in 
blessings. Even I do not know the gateway. I have stood here 
and scanned the sky for a glimpse of that door but, I cannot see 
it. Human eyes are useless for a search of this nature. But in 
the house of osugbo, those who keep watch through the spirit 
recognised the moment, they sent word to me through the voice 
of our sacred drums to prepare myself. I heard them and I shed 
all thoughts of earth. I began to follow the moon to the abode of 
the gods ... servant of the white king, that was when you entered 
my chosen place of departure on feet of desecration. (51) 
 
We might, like the implacable Iyaloja, say that Elesin is here only 
rationalising his failure in the hope of gaining ―peace of mind‖ (57), but 
there is nothing in the text that persuasively or at all rebuts his 
account. If anything, he is corroborated by Praise-singer who bears 
witness that Elesin—wait for it—may in fact have hurried into the void 
of transition a tad too early! That Elesin rushed into the abyss of 
dissolution like an impatient bride, he says, when ―[i]t is ―not yet noon 
in heaven.‖ What is also worth noting in Praise-singer‘s testimony is 
the report that Elesin was at the very least already half-way into the 
world of the ancestors. In other words, whereas the haste with which 
Elesin lunges for the market at the very beginning of the drama is in 
the hope of staying his feet longer on the earth in order to fulfil his last 
desires of the flesh, Praise-singer—and we might add, Soyinka by way 
of his stage directions—testifies to a different intent here: 
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How shall I tell what my eyes have seen? The Horseman gallops 
on before the courier, how shall I tell what my eyes have seen? 
He says a dog may be confused by new scents of beings he never 
dreamt of, so he must precede the dog to heaven. He says a 
horse may stumble on strange boulders and be lamed, so he 
races on before the horse to heaven. It is best, he says, to trust 
no messenger who may falter at the outer gate; oh how shall I 
tell what my ears have heard? But do you hear me still Elesin, 
do you hear your faithful one? 
 
[ELESIN in his motions appears to feel for a direction of 
sound, subtly, but he only sinks deeper into his dance-
trance.] 
 
Elesin Alafin, I no longer sense your flesh. The drums are 
changing now but you have gone far ahead of the world. It is not 
yet noon in heaven; let those who claim it is begin their own 
journey home. So why must you rush like an impatient bride: 
why do you race to desert your Olohun-iyo? 
 
[ELESIN is now sunk fully deep in his trance, there is no 
longer sign of any awareness of his surroundings.] (35) 
 
Praise-singer next launches into a long poetic goodbye and 
lamentation of Elesin‘s imminent complete departure into the abyss of 
dissolution, ending with the plaintive cry, ―If the world were not 
greater than the wishes of Olohun-iyo, I would not let you go‖ (36). Act 
Three ends with stage directions that emphasise Elesin‘s deeper 
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progression into the gulf of transition.  I have quoted Praise-singer at 
length because of the crucial bearing the question of the time of 
Elesin‘s arrest has on Soyinka‘s claim and Jeyifo‘s endorsement.  
Moreover, that Elesin may not have dallied to his and the Oyo world‘s 
peril, which then locates the thwarting of his will in the colonial 
intervention, is a perfectly legitimate interpretation of the sequence of 
events the plot unfolds and is one that many readers share, as 
eloquently shown by Tanure Ojaide in an interesting account of his 
classroom experiences teaching Horseman. According to Ojaide, the 
most difficult and perhaps debatable aspect of the play revealed to him 
when he taught it at two colleges in the United States is that his 
students could not understand why Iyaloja, Olunde, Praise-singer and 
others ―blame Elesin for not doing his duty when already arrested.‖ To 
many of the students, he adds, Elesin ―goes very far in the trance and 
has no way of killing himself once arrested.‖58 On the face of it, 
Ojaide‘s counter that Elesin kills himself in the end ―in spite of 
chains‖—indeed, with those very chains—―when he really wants to‖ is 
persuasive, but falls apart under the light provided by Elesin‘s 
response to Pilkings‘s solicitation quoted above and Jeyifo‘s 
clarification on the precondition for effective ritual. To be sure, the 
―weight of longing‖ on Elesin‘s ―earth-held limbs‖ may have come from 
his need for a bride ―as the abyss across which my body must be 
drawn‖ but in his self-justification to Iyaloja a few pages later, he is 
quick to assign a greater, ultimately more determining role, to the 
                                       
58 Tanure Ojaide, ―Death and the King’s Horseman in the Classroom,‖ in Death and 
the King’s Horseman, 115-120, at 119; originally published in College Literature 
19/20, nos. 3-1 (October 1992): 210-14. 
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colonial intervention. As he ―confesses‖ to his sobbing bride, he could 
have shaken off his earthly longing, for ―already my foot had begun to 
lift‖ but that was precisely when the ―the white ghost entered and all 
was defiled‖ (53). The keywords here are ―but then‖ and ―all was 
defiled.‖ In other words, the moment of colonial intervention effectively 
defiled and thwarted the ritual, such that any further step towards its 
completion was doomed to futility. This is the import of Iyaloja‘s acidic 
judgement on Elesin‘s eventual suicide, what Ojaide suggests could 
still have saved the day. ―Why do you strain yourself,‖ she says to 
Eelsin‘s fallen body. ―Why do you labour at tasks for which no one, not 
even the man lying there [meaning Olunde], would give you thanks? 
He is gone at last into the passage but oh, how late it all is. His son 
will feast on the meat and throw him bones. The passage is clogged 
with droppings from the king‘s stallion; he will arrive all stained in 
dung‖ (62). In any case, it seems Elesin might have killed himself 
sooner in fulfilment of the ritual had he been able to locate the right 
alignment of the moon from his prison cell. As he tells Pilkings, he had 
stood in his cell and ―scanned the sky for a glimpse of that door‖ but 
could not see it. Obviously, the Oyo gods were not going to subject 
themselves to the further ignominy of perfecting a sacred ritual in the 
dungeon of an alien enemy race that has conquered their abode.  
If Jeyifo is right about the condition for ritual effectiveness, then 
unless it can be convincingly shown that only Elesin‘s politically 
untouched, but internally divided and conflicted will, delayed his 
suicide beyond the appointed and sacred moment—and the evidence 
suggests otherwise—then what we are left with is the purportedly 
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merely catalytic incident of the colonial factor as the decisive and 
determining cause of his abortive suicide. For the critical consensus is 
that even Olunde‘s suicide which came earlier and so must have been 
in time, hence his being ―the swiftest ever messenger of a king‖ (61), is 
also futile. In the view of Williams, Olunde‘s suicide ―only compounds‖ 
the misery of an Oyo kingdom crumbling under the weight of the 
external threat of colonialism. Williams can see no redeeming quality 
in what another critic describes as a ―self-important‖ act aimed at 
arresting, by a mere gesture of will, the socio-political process that 
Elesin‘s failure lays bare. While for Williams it is unclear whether 
Olunde‘s suicide makes him a cultural hero or ―the rearguard defender 
of a backward-looking political order,‖ for George it is symbolic of an 
―aristocratic concern for the metaphysical ‗balance‘ of the Yoruba 
world as by the transforming gaze of the colonial eye.‖59 Either way, a 
hollow ritual of honour is all that Elesin‘s timely or untimely suicide, 
as well as Olunde‘s swift and presumably timely self-sacrifice, might 
yield. The fact of the matter, however, is that the effective foreclosure 
of ritual began not with Elesin‘s arrest and imprisonment but at the 
very moment colonialism successfully entrenched itself, complete with 
the appurtenances of power. Nothing testifies to this better than the 
symbolism of Elesin‘s prison, a former slave-holding cell in the seat of 
colonial power, or the fact that a direct representative of the colonising 
power, H.R.H the Prince, is on an official tour of his possessions at the 
time. Any obdurate insistence on an intact and unfragmented political 
                                       
59 See Adebayo Williams, ―Ritual and the Political Unconscious,‖ 75, and Olakunle 
George, ―Cultural Criticism in Wole Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s Horseman,‖ 86. 
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will—and the context is none other than political—smacks of a 
nostalgia for what has been lost, which would be no more than 
standing on ceremony to save face. Hence, the abstract or idealistic 
ethical code in which Elesin is flagellated by Iyaloja and which compels 
Olunde‘s sanctimonious substitutive suicide: honour; because it 
cannot be endured that ―honour fly out of doors.‖ But we may ask, 
what would have happened had Pilkings not listened to his wife, Jane, 
and stuck to his original disdain and indifference. ―I don‘t have to stop 
anything,‖ he tells Jane. ―If they want to throw themselves off the top 
of the cliff or poison themselves for the sake of some barbaric custom 
what is that to me?‖ (25). There is no prize for the answer, but my 
guess is that the District Officer‘s bungalow, the Residency, together 
with its old slave-holding annexe, as well as the Native Administration 
Police, would have remained, and the apprehension—the apocalyptic 
fear—that Praise-singer expresses at the beginning of the drama, 
repeated as I have shown by all the major characters down to the dead 
Alafin, would still have constituted a constant reminder of the threat 
they faced. It is the calm assurance of this new political reality that 
informs Pilkings‘s solicitousness, on the understanding that by now a 
sobered Elesin would know better. And, indeed, Elesin is clear about 
the undeniable fact of colonial suzerainty. Thus when Pilkings insists 
on Elesin‘s word (of honour) that if Iyaloja is allowed into the cell he 
will not let her pass anything to him, here is Elesin‘s reply: ―You have 
my honour already. It is locked up in that desk in which you will put 
away the report of this night‘s events. Even the honour of my people 
you have already; it is tied together with those papers of treachery 
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which make you masters in this land‖ (55). Elesin‘s answer hardly 
needs a gloss: there was no honour left to defend or affirm once 
treacherous treaties backed by superior military strength had made 
Pilkings master in the land. It is therefore out of the charitable heart of 
the conqueror that Pilkings wishes to save Elesin from himself. Not 
surprisingly, then, he accuses Elesin of bringing politics into a merely 
humanitarian concern for human life threatened by a primitive custom 
and right then adopts a higher accent of power: ―Alright, I am trying to 
make things easy,‖ he says, ―but if you must bring in politics we‘ll 
have to do it the hard way‖(55).  
This may seem a stretch, but I will hazard it anyway. When 
Pilkings then proceeds to draw a line on the ground that Iyaloja may 
not cross, once granted audience with Elesin, the reality that she has 
studiously refused to acknowledge begins to dawn on her. It is a line 
that marks the balance of power and the alignment of forces: on the 
one side, an imprisoned Elesin symbolising a conquered kingdom; on 
the other Pilkings representing the new ―masters in this land.‖ Thus, 
when in the excitement of Iyaloja‘s castigation of Elesin she does step 
over the line and the guards blow their whistles to alert Pilkings ,while 
simultaneously rushing to restrain Elesin, her lament points to an 
understanding of what Elesin already knows. Once, she rightly notes, 
Elesin had no need to open his mouth in explanation ―because evil-
smelling goats ... had lost their senses.‖ And it would take exceptional 
bravery for a man to dare lay hands on him simply because ―Iyaloja 
stepped from one side of the earth onto another.‖  Indeed, it is Iyaloja 
who unwittingly corroborates the claim of standing on ceremony that I 
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make here. Reduced to begging leave for Elesin to fulfil ―the lesser 
oaths he need not break,‖ she seeks to persuade by appealing to 
Pilkings‘s sense of decorum: ―White one, you have a king here, a visitor 
from your land. We know of his presence here. Tell me, were he to die 
would you leave his spirit roaming endlessly on the surface of earth? 
Would you bury him here among those you consider less than human? 
In your land have you no ceremonies of the dead?‖ When Pilkings fails 
at first to be persuaded by her argument, Iyaloja finally acknowledges 
the new reality, even if by way of attributing hers and the communal 
humiliation solely to Elesin whose ―weakened will holds us in bondage 
to you‖ (58). However this loss of decisive agency was wrought, 
Iyaloja‘s choice of words makes it clear that the Oyo kingdom is now in 
bondage, enslaved to the will of another juridical authority, and it is 
only by supplicatory gestures where hitherto the autonomous will to 
action would brook no challenge,60 that Elesin may be allowed to 
perform even his lesser duty. In short, colonial domination has so 
thoroughly penetrated the Oyo kingdom whose honour Elesin had 
sought to defend that he can admit Pilkings now ―advised all our lives‖ 
(52). The ―idiom of power‖ evoked by Iyaloja and Elesin at this crucial 
moment of the play thus acknowledges the ―social death‖ of the 
autochthonous community in its current mode of organisation 
symbolised by a kingship system in rapid decline and reminds of 
Orlando Patterson‘s brilliant expostulation of slavery as a form of 
                                       
60 Though it must be pointed out that Samuel Johnson, the eminent Yoruba 
historian, records several instances of resistance to the demand of ritual suicide by 
the Elesin upon the king‘s death to the point where by the end of the nineteenth 
century ―all‖ the chiefs expected to accompany a dead Alaafin refused to die, but 
more on this below.  
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social death distinguished ultimately by the slave‘s lack of honour. As 
Patterson points out, ―it is possible to honor any person, or any animal 
(such as a cow), or any thing (such as a totem). But to be honoured 
does not imply that one is honourable.‖61 Elesin, too, is clear about the 
relation between dishonour and death:‖ Life is honour. / It ends when 
honour ends‖ (11). If so, then all that Iyaloja pleads for when every 
pretence to honour is clearly lost is no more than the opportunity to 
observe the outward form of ceremony so that honour may appear to 
have been kept within doors.  
But saving face cannot be an adequate reason for the grave and 
solemn custom of ritual suicide, and this is where Jeyifo‘s observation 
that Soyinka achieves the goal of an immanent critique of the very 
mythological premise of his African world view by making a reified will 
meet its limits in almost every instance in his major plays is a 
profound insight that preserves the aestheticised social vision 
espoused in Horseman.62 In my reading then, it is not so much a 
                                       
61 See Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 331. On Patterson‘s conception of 
―the idiom of power‖ and ―social death,‖ see Chapters 1 and 2.  
62 I should add that Williams and George also defend Soyinka‘s vision in Horseman 
in slightly different ways. Says Williams: ―In the final analysis, what Soyinka 
accomplished in Death and the King’s Horseman was to counterpose the dominant 
culture of the ancient Oyo kingdom against the equally hegemonic culture of the 
white invaders. His strategy is a brilliant, decolonizing venture. In an age 
characterized by new forms of cultural domination that result from the economic 
marginalization of the third world, such an approach might well represent a more 
pressing project than analyzing the class content of indigenous cultures.‖ See 
Williams, ―Ritual and the Political Unconscious,‖ 77. For his part, George whose 
reading also seeks to unmask Soyinka‘s disavowal of the colonial factor in Horseman 
insists that there are lessons to be learnt nevertheless from a close, deconstructive 
reading: ―If it is accepted that Soyinka‘s disavowal is strategic; if it is further 
accepted that orthodox Marxist criticism failed to follow the play to the recesses of its 
ideological hideout, at least one can in both cases point to a reason, a motivation 
(conscious or not), for the author‘s disavowal and the critics‘ under-complication of 
it. What, the question will then be, motivates the kind of reading I am proposing 
here? One obvious response is that [it] accords the play the analytical attention 
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fragmented will or the foreclosure of the specific ritual of Elesin‘s 
voluntary suicide as such that constitutes the tragedy of Horseman. 
For we may ask, at what point does the Yoruba will as expressed 
through its protagonist actor, Elesin, become so irremediably divided 
and fractured that the hegemonic power of its sustaining ideology is 
unable to paper over the fissures? George, Williams and Jeyifo have, to 
my mind, more than answered this question on the cultural-political 
level. On the psychological level, I have suggested that Elesin‘s 
conflicted will is a reflection of his death trauma which merely 
instances the collective or social death trauma. And that, 
consequently, his and the Oyo community‘s assertion of the fabulous 
conceit of mastery and agency in the face of a radically changed 
political order betrays their unpreparedness for anxiety. In general, 
anxiety has an anticipatory quality; ―an unmistakable relation to 
expectation,‖ as Freud puts it. The anxiety signal, Freud says, 
announces: ―the present situation reminds me of one of the traumatic 
experiences I have had before. Therefore I will anticipate the trauma 
and behave as though it had already come, while there is yet time to 
turn aside.‖ But the expectation is really a foreboding, a threat or 
danger about which one feels a sense of helplessness. The anxious 
person‘s ―estimation of his own strength compared to the magnitude of 
the danger‖ leads him or her to admit ―helplessness in the face of it.‖63 
                                                                                                              
commensurate to its complexity. It pays due attention to the multiple levels at which 
the play thrashes out the problem that constitutes its object…. the intricate 
contradictions that British colonialism set in motion as a consequence of its advance 
into the lives and minds of the African community captured by Soyinka‘s 
imagination.‖ See Olakunle George, ―Cultural Criticism in Wole Soyinka‘s Death and 
the King’s Horseman,‖ 87. 
63 Quoted in Robert Jay Lifton, The Broken Connection, 126. 
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Freud concludes that realistic anxiety, as opposed to neurotic anxiety, 
represents ―a state of increased sensory attention and motor tension‖ 
that can be described as ―preparedness for anxiety.‖ Two reactions are 
possible in the face of such a threat: ―flight or defence,‖ or a paralysed 
affective state unable to meet the threat.64 In the chapter, ―Anxiety and 
Numbing,‖ Robert Jay Lifton reviews a host of writers on the subject of 
anxiety from Freud to Heidegger and Leslie Farber and provides 
several useful insights, almost all of them worth citing. I will take only 
two of them. Rollo May defines the term as ―the apprehension cued off 
by a threat to some value which the individual holds essential to his 
existence as a personality‖ including the experience of danger or peril 
to oneself and a ―breaking down or dissolution of the world,‖ while 
Leslie Farber usefully describes it as entailing the ―range of distress 
which attends willing what cannot be willed,‖ a psychic state that 
denotes intention that cannot be realised.  These definitions of anxiety 
bring it closer to the life continuity paradigm I am using for my 
analysis via Lifton, who concludes his review with a restatement of 
Freud in terms of what happens when tension (useful for equilibrium) 
gives way to anxiety which has to do with ―grounding and centering‖: 
 
Grounding is impaired in the sense that one‘s ―roots‖ are part of 
the disintegration. The self cannot seem to counter the threat 
with strength derived either from its history or its biological ties. 
Part of the helplessness and foreboding has to do with the 
feeling of having been put adrift from ordinary manageable 
existence and thrust into an alien realm dominated by the 
                                       
64 Sigmund Freud, ―Anxiety and Instinctual Life‖ in The Freud Reader, 774.  
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threat. The threat is both familiar and alien. ... it cannot be 
assimilated. Something in it cannot be formulated or felt—and in 
that sense numbing exists even where the mind seems to be 
overactive.65 
 
My detailed discussion up to this point makes a further gloss on this 
passage unnecessary. But the sense of a lack of precise knowledge 
about the danger—in short, the sense of foreboding—does merit one 
more word. For when Elesin cries out at the height of Iyaloja‘s 
merciless taunting, ―I need neither your pity nor the pity of the world. I 
need understanding. Even I need to understand,‖ he is in essence 
saying, I need to work-though, come to terms, with this trauma. A 
failure to do so, as we have already seen, marks a repression of the 
trauma and leads inexorably to the phenomenon of acting out as the 
mind continues its effort at mastery. But if a play is an artifice, a 
fictional or imaginative re-presentation of events and experience 
(however close to reality or an actual historical event), then the role of 
the author becomes relevant where it can illuminate the text. I will 
conclude this chapter then with a brief examination of the anxieties, 
the psychological tensions, that may have joined with Soyinka‘s overt 
political telos when writing Horseman. If any authority is needed for 
this sort of methodological harping back in an epoch that celebrates 
the death of the author and strenuously contests the notion of a 
subject-centred intentionalism in literary discourse, Jeyifo‘s will do. 
Jeyifo not only declares as a distinctive aspect of Wole Soyinka 
                                       
65 Robert Jay Lifton, The Broken Connection, 131. See 127-28 for the quotes from 
Rollo and Farber. 
108 
 
―considerable emphasis on the active relationship between Soyinka‘s 
textual constructions of his ‗personality‘‖ and his openness to 
possibilities for expanding the scope of freedom but also goes on to 
designate his unique and complex mode of self-fashioning ―homologies 
of the self and the social.‖66 There is much to be learned, I think, in 
approaching Horseman from the additional nexus of the author‘s 
equally complex grappling with the anomalies of affect that the bitter 
history he engages produced and still produce. 
 
Repression and Transference: Soyinka and the Writing of Disaster 
 
According to Freud, anxiety creates repression of unpleasure, or 
uncomfortable truths in this case.67 If so, and if it is true that as 
Williams insists against Soyinka‘s protestations Horseman is his 
―creative equivalent of a return of the repressed,‖68 what then does 
Soyinka repress in his re-presentation of an actual historical event 
modified in several minor, but nonetheless important, details? For as 
Jeyifo notes, the aspects of departure from the historical material are 
―so crucial to Soyinka‘s purposes as to constitute the play‘s basic 
dramaturgical supports.‖69 And they are: moving back the date of the 
actual historical event which he believed occurred in 1946—but, 
                                       
66 Biodun Jeyifo, Wole Soyinka, xx-xxi. 
67 Repression, needless to say, is a basic concept of psychoanalysis; as such, one 
encounters it everywhere in Freud and his followers. I have made particular 
reference, however, to Freud‘s ―Anxiety and Instinctual Life,‖ a lecture that came 
later in his career and in which, according to Peter Gay, he took full account of the 
revisions he had undertaken in his theories in the 1920s to ―offer a detailed survey of 
his new views on anxiety.‖ See The Freud Reader, 773-783. 
68 Adebayo Williams, ―Ritual and the Political Unconscious,‖ 72. 
69 Biodun Jeyifo, The Truthful Lie: Essays in a Sociology of African Drama, 27. 
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actually, 1945, as Izevbaye, and, in particular, James Gibbs, point 
out70—by two or three years so that the action of the play coincides 
with the Second World War; Elesin‘s death-hour wedding to an already 
betrothed maiden; the visit of His Royal Highness, the Prince; Olunde‘s 
departure for medical studies in England and his timely return; and 
the suicide of Elesin. Even a cursory reader would agree that sans 
these changes the play loses its dramatic vigour and ideological 
salience. But perhaps most important of all is the total silence about 
any discontent or resistance in the Oyo kingdom to the tradition of 
ritual suicide. Dan Izevbaye, one of the earliest commentators to point 
to this elided aspect of Oyo history in the two well-known dramatic 
representations of the event, writes as follows:  
 
Johnson the Yoruba historian notes that at one time delay or 
reluctance on the part of chiefs who are expected to accompany 
a dead Alaafin had such grave moral implications that members 
of the offending official‘s lineage would rather strangle him than 
suffer the stain of ignominy. But he could add that by the end of 
the nineteenth century when he compiled his history ―all the 
men now refused to die and they are never forced to do so. … 
The Oyo period which provided the material for Oba Waja and 
Death and the King’s Horseman had become less demanding on 
her citizens than the plays emphasize. Voluntary suicide had 
become little more than an ―act of love‖ by citizens.71  
                                       
70 See Dan Izevbaye, ―Mediation in Soyinka,‖ 122 and James Gibbs, Wole Soyinka 
(London: Macmillian, 1986), 117-18. 
71 See Dan Izevbaye, ―Mediation in Soyinka: The Case of the King‘s Horseman‖ in 
Critical Perspectives on Wole Soyinka, ed. James Gibbs (Washington, D.C.: Three 
Continents Press, 1980), 116-125, at 122. 
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Yet, what we have in Soyinka‘s account is a tradition of ritual suicide 
joyfully embraced and celebrated by all past horsemen of the Alafin. 
Indeed Elesin is at his lyrical best when expressing this implausibly 
romantic view of self-sacrifice: he would, he says, only be dancing to 
his death along the path ―Glazed by the soles of my great precursors.‖ 
Mobilizing every poetic and rhetorical strategy for the task, Soyinka 
paints the dazzling picture of untrammelled power and glory such as 
might have been the case in an ancient Oyo kingdom but certainly not 
in the tottering and fearful regime that has already lost its power to 
colonialism in mid-Twentieth century. And here, perhaps, is where we 
find a significant indication of the play and potency of the repressed in 
the text.  
A view exists in trauma studies on the possible intermingling of 
the notions of originary and post-originary trauma that tends towards 
―the impossible quest for a return to the putative originary, 
pretraumatic condition of full unity, identity, or communion.‖72 In this 
light, we may liken to such an ―originary, pretraumatic‖ historical 
moment the pristine pre-colonial epoch of Oyo history wherein Soyinka 
bases his idea of an auto-dynamic or self-sufficient African world, a 
culture ―whose reference points are taken from within the culture 
itself.‖73 This is the period of absolute autonomy when the Ogunian 
will-to-action was subject to no determining factor other than the 
integrity of the Yoruba world‘s protagonist actor. It is only in this 
                                       
72 Dominick LaCapra, History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 89. 
73 Wole Soyinka, Myth, Literature and the African World, viii. 
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setting that the mysteries of Yoruba tragedy and its peculiar way of 
grappling with the trauma of death can be on its own terms—on its 
―actual soil,‖ as Soyinka emphasises in his author‘s note. For 
Soyinka‘s urgent and overarching goal is to contest the epistemological 
grounds of Europe‘s assumed superiority and the imperialist desires it 
powered to such unquantifiable cultural and political costs in the 
colonies and other peripheries of empire.  For this purpose, Soyinka 
creates Olunde who has to have gone to England to read medicine and 
so lived among the enemy. Olunde‘s sparring with Jane on the 
question of the barbarism of ritual suicide provides, arguably, the best 
moments of the play in terms of the calm confidence with which he 
takes away the assumed moral grounds—the civilising mission 
claims—of colonialism. As Olunde, in one of several retorts, tells Jane, 
colonial arrogance assumes that ―everything which appears to make 
sense was learnt from you.‖ Olunde derives a great deal of his 
authority from having studied the enemy on her own soil, so to speak. 
So he tells Jane, ―You forget that I have now spent four years among 
your people. I discovered that you have no respect for what you do not 
understand.‖ By the time Jane offers Olunde on a platter the perfect 
argument against denigrating ritual suicide as primitive—the story of 
the captain who blows himself up in his boat in order to save other 
ships, the harbour and the populations on the coast—Soyinka leaves 
no one in doubt as to how strenuously he meant to defend his ―actual 
soil.‖ The captain‘s story, considered ―morbid news‖ by Jane but as 
―an affirmative commentary on life‖ by Olunde, comes at the very 
beginning of their meeting. Towards the end of their conversation, 
112 
 
Olunde, feeling every inch of his turf won, cannot help sounding 
triumphant: ―I had plenty of time to study your people. I saw nothing, 
finally, that gave you the right to pass judgement on other peoples and 
their ways. Nothing at all.‖ But Soyinka‘s point does not merely turn 
on negation, is not fully made by taking away the assumed grounds. It 
is about the cultural self-sufficiency that prepared Olunde for his 
mission of infiltrating and observing the enemy at close quarters. In 
other words, his mental sinews were formed within the culture itself 
before ever setting foot in England. So to Jane‘s notion that Olunde 
must be referring to racism as that which disqualifies her people from 
arrogating the wisdom of the world to themselves, Olunde tells her not 
to assume that when he left, he ―took nothing at all with me.‖74 
Several commentators have fingered Olunde as Soyinka‘s 
ideological spokesman and it is easy to see why. Olunde launches his 
insurrectionary sallies against a totalising imperial knowledge system 
at just about the same time as Soyinka‘s forceful articulation of the 
idea of a unique African world in the landmark Myth, Literature and 
the African World. Nor for that matter is it surprising that the Olunde-
Jane scene echoes the well-known ―telephone conversation‖ in 1962 
between a young African looking for affordable accommodation in 
London and a well-to-do English landlady. The speaker of that poem, 
like Olunde, goes to battle on behalf of Soyinka and just as handily as 
in Horseman, gets the upper hand of the English lady in a debate.75 
Not to belabour the point, suffice it to say that Soyinka has not one 
                                       
74 Wole Soyinka, Death and the King’s Horseman, 41-44.  
75 See Wole Soyinka, ―Telephone Conversation‖ in Modern Poetry from Africa, eds. 
Gerald Moore and Ulli Beier (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1963), 111-112.  
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but several spokespersons in Horseman, if we take cognisance of the 
not-negligible job of asserting the validity of the Yoruba world‘s 
cultural referents by the chorus of girls at the market, as it were in 
anticipation of Olunde. But Olunde and the girls acquire their capacity 
for an effective oppositional agency mostly from the knowledge they 
have gained as the new elite educated in the western knowledge 
system. In short, as recently as 2009, Soyinka gives further reason to 
suspect the resentment and repressive structure at work during the 
time he composed this play. In an article that followed the recent 
production of Death and the King’s Horseman at the National Theatre 
in London, Andrew Gumbel reports a conversation with Soyinka in the 
course of which Soyinka disclosed what ―triggered‖ his writing of the 
play: 
 
Wole Soyinka is explaining what moved him, in the mid-1970s, 
to write his play Death and the King‘s Horseman. And that 
means, inevitably, telling a story. At the time, he was a fellow at 
Churchill College, Cambridge, he says, one of the Nobel 
laureate‘s many periods of exile from home in Nigeria. Every day, 
as he came down the college staircase, he would pass a bust of 
Winston Churchill, that old bulldog of British colonialism. And, 
every  day, he caught himself thinking the same thing. ―I had an 
overwhelming desire,‖ he says, smiling, ―to push it and watch it 
crash.‖  
 
There we have it. Soyinka, finding himself right inside the belly of the 
colonial whale is suddenly possessed by an iconoclastic fervour. But 
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as Gumbel further reports, he never does in fact act out his desire, 
compelled, we might say, to be of good behaviour in the presence of his 
hosts who happen also to be the same who have shattered his world 
and dispossessed him, one of the consequences of which is that he is 
periodically forced into bitter exile from home. Nonetheless, it is this 
repressed desire that forms the ―triggering mechanism,‖76  Soyinka 
says, for Horseman and other works that followed. So a traumatic 
history, repression, desire and a triggering mechanism: can we be any 
closer to the psychoanalytic? 
Which makes it no surprise at all that Soyinka insists on an 
endogenous, self-sufficient knowledge-world in the play triggered by 
his memory of dispossession. Nor that in doing so he is compelled to 
return to a pre-traumatic historical epoch for his narrative, ―lest the 
rationale for mustering a stiff resistance disappears,‖ as Williams 
notes. More important, Williams adds that the conflict presented by 
this choice is indeed ―the political unconscious of the writer himself‖ 
that, his protestations aside, is revealed in the ―imaginary resolution of 
a concrete cultural dilemma.‖77 But Jeyifo is more specific on this 
question of what I am arguing is the tendency of trauma victims to 
hanker after an impossible return to a pre-traumatic condition, the 
―dilemma‖ and ―impossibility‖ of what he calls a ―pure anteriority‖: 
 
The significance of Soyinka‘s deployment of highly inventive 
rhetorical ―riffs‖ and conceits ... in Myth, Literature and the 
                                       
76 See Andrew Gumbel, ―Wole Soyinka on How He Came to Write Death and the 
King’s Horseman,‖ The Guardian (UK) of 8 April 2009.  
77 Adebayo Williams, ―Ritual and the Political Unconscious,‖ 78. 
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African World for negotiating the inescapable dilemma of the 
project begun in the book—―race retrieval‖—is incalculable. This 
dilemma, simply stated, is the dilemma of pure anteriority, a 
dilemma which involves the near impossibility of eliciting the 
constitutive elements of an ―African world‖ with its own internal 
cohering reference points absolutely without recourse to any 
external sources. Which culture or tradition in the history of 
human cultural evolution can meet this rigorously 
autochthonous requirement? How far back do you go to ―recover‖ 
the absolutely pristine values and matrices of the African 
―racial‖ heritage in culture?78 
 
The answer to Jeyifo‘s closing rhetorical questions is already evident in 
his repeated use of the word ―dilemma‖ reinforced by the phrase ―near 
impossibility.‖ Yet how far Soyinka is prepared to go is also already 
clear from all of the foregoing: to the point before a major threat from 
without threatened the spiritual and material foundations of the 
African world. Although Soyinka looks beyond the Western-Christian 
triangular trade to the earlier Oriental-Muslim trans-Saharan slave 
trade, it is nonetheless the moment that Praise-singer dolefully tells us 
when the ―white slavers‖ came and ―took away the heart of the race ... 
bore away the mind and muscle of the race.‖  
This, then, is the burden of Soyinka‘s political unconscious, the 
realm of his trauma and what he was thus driven to repress. It bears 
restating that I am drawing on trauma and psychoanalytic concepts 
both in a general but also narrow sense; in other words, 
                                       
78 Biodun Jeyifo, Wole Soyinka, 67; original emphases. 
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psychoanalysis as a tool of social analysis rather than as clinical 
practice and so as something that social scientists, clinical therapists 
and literary critics can work with. In concluding this chapter, I will 
now discuss the concept of transference in order to elucidate the 
possible manner in which the writer—as indeed any so-called objective 
interpreter of historical trauma—can be implicated in the object of her 
study, including the tendency to repeat in varying and often veiled 
ways the traumatic forces in the object studied. I should like to cite 
two essays as examples of this sort of approach to understanding the 
text through the author‘s self-presence or imbrication in it: LaCapra‘s 
examination of the transferential dynamics revealed by Paul de Man‘s 
World War II journalistic writings through the intriguing efforts by his 
followers to defend him against charges of anti-Semitism in the essay, 
―Paul de Man as Object of Transference,‖ and Cathy Caruth‘s 
―Unclaimed Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History‖ in 
which she locates Freud‘s implication in his speculative theory of 
history as the history of trauma in his Moses and Monotheism.79  
Transference is, simply, the transfer of emotions in an earlier 
traumatic relation or situation by the patient or victim onto the 
analyst or physician; the emotions can be positive or negative. As 
Freud explains it, transferences are ―new editions or facsimiles‖ of 
impulses and phantasies aroused and made conscious in the course of 
analysis. Freud usefully adds that while some of the transferences do 
not differ from their model in any way except for the substitution, 
                                       
79 See Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust, 111-136, and Cathy Caruth, 
Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History, 10-24; especially the closing 
section, ―From Captivity to Freedom, or Freud‘s Exodus.‖ 
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others are ―more ingeniously constructed‖ as their content has been 
subjected to ―a moderating influence—to sublimation.‖80 Thus, while 
the clinical picture of transference that emerges from this definition is 
of an intricate context-specific concept, Freud‘s clarifications make it 
possible to extend and apply it to the social realm where the traumatic 
event that produces the transferential symptoms occurred in the first 
place. In its sublimated form, it becomes easier to see how the writer 
may repeat or revive painful psychological experiences transmitted 
from the past in the present. In this sense, Soyinka comes very close 
to this dynamic in his catalogue of a range of past traumas and the 
way the colonial present repeats them; the way, in short, that the 
colonial and neo-colonial present of Horseman and Myth, Literature 
and the African World trigger memories of the previous traumas.  At 
the purely conceptual level, his often-quoted remark on the living 
impact of the colonial and neo-colonial project seems once again to be 
on all fours with the structure of a transference: 
 
Both in cultural and political publications, and at such 
encounters as the UNESCO Conference on the Influence of 
Colonialism on African Cultures, Dar es Salaam 1972, the 6th 
Pan-African Congress, Dar es Salaam 1974, the pre-Colloque of 
the Black Arts Festival, Dakar 1974 etc., etc., we black Africans 
have been blandly invited to submit ourselves to a second epoch 
of colonialism – this time by a universal-humanoid abstraction 
defined and conducted by individuals whose theories and 
                                       
80 See for instance Sigmund Freud, ―An Autobiographical Study‖ and ―Fragment of 
an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (Dora)‖ in The Freud Reader, 3-41 at 26 and 172-
239 at 234, respectively. 
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prescriptions are derived from the apprehension of their world 
and their history, their social neuroses and their value systems.81  
 
Soyinka‘s inclusion of ―social neuroses‖ in this list is instructive, as 
his call for a response to the imperial mission of re-colonisation, ―this 
new threat.‖ If, in leading by example, Soyinka, in a major dramatic 
response, elects to set the action constituted by the lived history of the 
time of his play in a pristine, literally immemorial pre-traumatic past, 
it seems safe in the light of the foregoing to attribute this gesture to 
the force of repression and transference that in the end marks his now 
famous relegation of the colonial factor to the status of ―a catalytic 
incident, merely.‖  
On a last note, I should like to suggest that precisely because of 
the necessarily ingenious or sublimated form of the transferential 
factor in the African writer‘s re-presentation of the traumatic history of 
the encounter with the West, the postcolonial critic and theorist must 
increasingly pay attention to the psychological dimension of that 
history. This will, in a way, be merely fulfilling Fanon‘s unfinished 
project in Black Skin. Questions that bespeak trauma and beg answers 
or elaborations include at least the following two. First, the extent to 
which the African or postcolonial writer is traumatised by the 
necessity of fashioning a unique personal and collective identity in the 
language and literary forms of the alien culture. For while Obi Wali‘s 
apocalyptic fear of ―the dead end of African literature‖82 may have been 
                                       
81 Wole Soyinka, Myth, Literature and the African World, x. 
82 See Obi Wali, ―The Dead End of African Literatures,‖ Transition, No. 10 (1963), 13-
18. 
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dispelled by the creative domestication of the colonial languages, it is 
also true that the postcolonial writer has not undergone the necessary 
task of mourning the literary death of the mother-tongue. Yet, given the 
stark reality of the near impossibility of artificially creating native print 
languages that would justify their existence as vital indices and 
carriers of culture, it seems clear that a process of coming to terms 
with ―the real loss of a loved object‖83—in this case the native language 
as a medium of literary expression on the global stage—is needed. As 
George observes of Soyinka, the very imperative of contesting 
European cultural arrogance by denying Europe the status of 
―originating protagonist‖ in Horseman confirms Europe in that self-
proclaimed status, which cannot be a negligible cause of trauma. It is 
worth quoting George further on this point: 
 
Soyinka contests European cultural arrogance by seeking to 
deny Europe the status of originating protagonist in his play; yet 
the very fact of the contestation confirms Europe in the status 
under contestation. For the specific idiom of address—that is, 
the modern stage, the printed text, and the perceptible 
murmurings of Aristotelian tragedy—remains at the very least of 
European provenance: Europe, not to belabor the point, remains 
the occasion and irreducible addressee of the playwright‘s 
labor.84 
 
                                       
83 See Sigmund Freud, ―Mourning and Melancholia‖ in The Freud Reader, 584-589, 
at 587. 
84 Olakunle George, ―Cultural Criticism in Wole Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s 
Horseman,‖ 86. 
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Let us just add to George‘s argument the point noted earlier: the fact 
that Soyinka wrote Horseman and that it got its first reading in the 
imperial heart of colonialism at the very time his striving for a 
uniquely African mode of self-apprehension was being denied the 
stature of literature to his face at Cambridge University. And, surely, it 
cannot be deemed a trivial matter nor be taken as just another 
stereotype that Soyinka points up against a minor colonial agent when 
in Horseman he has the ADC attempt to put the ―uppity‖ Olunde in his 
place, by saying, ―These natives put a suit on and they get high 
opinions of themselves‖ (45). Olunde, we recall, makes his entrance 
―dressed in a sober western suit.‖ In this context, I think it should not 
be sloughed off as a mere case of idle speculation to note that Soyinka 
has cultivated a personal sartorial style that is among other things 
remarkable for its studious avoidance of the western suit, sober or 
otherwise! Second, the extent to which the traumas visited by the pre-
independence ruling class and by the national bourgeoisies of the 
post-independence states—which themselves are laughable parodies of 
the modular nation-state imposed by the departing colonial regimes—
repeat the traumas of slavery and colonialism, often to more shocking 
dimensions, and knock the wind out of the sails of the postcolonial 
writer. In concrete terms, how such atrocities and depradations as the 
Crisis in the Congo that claimed Patrice Lumumba; the Nigerian Civil 
War of 1967-70; the seemingly unending chain of coups and counter-
coups; the grotesque phenomena of Mobutu, Field Marshall Idi Amin 
Dada, Emperor Bokasa, Master-General Sergeant Doe, Generals 
Ibrahim Bagangida and Sani Abacha; the ―revolutionary‖ wars of 
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Liberia and Sierra Leone, the ethnic cleansing genocides of Rwanda 
and Sudan, etc., etc.,  make a mockery of any claim to even a moral 
victory in the project of self-apprehension and race retrieval.85 As 
Soyinka so early in his career observed, the ―black tin god,‖ given 
equal opportunity—which he has certainly been given or seized by any 
odious means necessary—―would degrade and dehumanize his victim 
as capably as Vorster or Governor Wallace.‖ Consequently, if the 
African writer, whose ―innocence‖ is ―daily questioned‖ by the 
newspapers‘ accounts of one disaster after another, is assigned the 
onerous task of reconsidering ―our relationship to the outer world‖ and 
determining ―what alone can be salvaged from the recurrent cycle of 
human stupidity,‖86 how does he or she deal with the inevitable 
question of the repressed or the political unconscious? How, indeed, 
does the writer come to acknowledge her implication in the very 
                                       
85 I am not suggesting that atrocities and depradations are peculiar to Africa, and 
that the postcolonial writer or public intellectual automatically loses the moral high-
ground for that reason alone. As Walter Benjamin famously noted, every civilization 
is a document of barbarism, and the postcolonial intellectual can legitimately claim 
that the West has the far more voluminous document of barbarism in which s/he 
has been a victim too many times. The point, however, is that the West already 
occupies the epistemological grounds and through its domination of the means of 
propaganda continues to set the terms and tone of the debate. For instance, while 
the Rwanda genocide took place at the same time as the bloodbath in Bosnia-
Hercegovina, the dominant mode of presenting the former was that of African 
barbarism or savagery merely reasserting itself while the ethnic cleansing horror in 
Europe was always humanized through historical context. The dark continent image 
of Africa ingrained by a racist imperial ideology produces all kinds of nervous 
reactions to every new instance of so-called black-on-black violence on the continent 
which at its worst extreme leads to such anomalies of affect as witnessed by Keith 
Richburg‘s self-loathing in his account of the Rwandan tragedy, Out of America: A 
Black Man Confronts Africa (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1988). The history of unequal 
global power relations thus puts the burden of always being morally correct on the 
postcolonial subject.  
86 Wole Soyinka, ―The Writer in a Modern African State‖ in Art, Dialogue and Outrage, 
15-20, at 19. 
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processes she seeks to re-present? How can she bring to 
consciousness what necessarily is, or must, be repressed? 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
EXPERIENCE AS THE BEST TEACHER: TRAUMA, REFERENCE AND 
REALISM IN TONI MORRISON‘S BELOVED 
 
Well over a decade after Joan Scott dismissed experience as an 
essentializing category too dubious to be relevant to the discourse of 
identity1 the scepticism may have shifted to a new terrain. Dominick 
LaCapra, for instance, is convinced that Scott may have overstated her 
strict constructivist view of experience, but he views efforts aimed at 
defending its cognitive salience as compromised by their 
epistemological focus.2 LaCapra posits trauma as the aporetic limit 
case of experience and although his goal is to theoretically link trauma 
to ordinary experience, he does so by abandoning the epistemological 
grounds altogether. LaCapra sees trauma only as a category that 
betrays the effects of experience but which really escapes the concept 
(4, 69). Such definitions of trauma and experience propound serious 
claims and because they go to the core of what predominantly 
constitutes objective knowledge in the academy today, they merit 
continued scrutiny.  For, both ordinary experience and such 
extraordinary kinds of experience as historical trauma lie at the heart 
of claims about social and cultural identity.  Moreover, our identities 
index ethical values, given that who we think or know ourselves to be 
                                       
1 Joan Scott, ―The Evidence of Experience,‖ Critical Inquiry 17 (1991), 773-97; further 
reference within the text. 
2 Dominick LaCapra, History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004); see especially Chapter One, ―Experience and 
Identity.‖ Subsequent reference to this work within the text. 
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determines to a large extent, for better or worse, our choices and 
capacity for moral agency.  
Evidently, the category of experience proves rather resistant to 
all attempts to erase its cognitive salience. Experience, Scott admits in 
her already cited essay, constitutes an indispensable way of talking 
about historical events, delineating difference and similarity and 
―claiming knowledge that is ‗unassailable‖3 (797). Scott confesses 
further that the quotidian value of experience makes it far ―more 
useful to work with it, to analyze its operations and to redefine its 
meaning‖ than the peremptory disavowal that her logic otherwise 
compels. LaCapra, on his part, denies the cognisable reality of 
traumatic experience, yet he not only finds it possible to praise a 
realist interpretation of trauma in Toni Morrison‘s Beloved but has 
also written persuasively on socially-mediated ways of working-
through its effects.4 Clearly, what Scott and LaCapra end up proposing 
is possible only if experience has an inherent cognitive value. For how 
does one redefine or work-through what one cannot possibly know? It 
seems more useful to agree with Robert Jay Lifton that ―Anything that 
is psychological experience has to do with meaning.‖5  
I contend in this chapter that trauma is not beyond but is 
merely a more complex form of experience requiring a supple but 
                                       
3 My emphasis. 
4 See in particular the concluding chapter of his Representing the Holocaust: History, 
Theory and Trauma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 205-223, and in general 
his further reflections on the notions of acting-out and working-through in History in 
Transit. 
5 See Cathy Caruth, ―An Interview with Robert Jay Lifton‖ in Caruth, ed. Trauma: 
Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 128-147, 
at 133. 
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equally complex theory to elicit its cognitive dimensions. What is 
lacking and therefore constitutes the shortcoming of the theories of 
experience and identity propounded by Scott and LaCapra—and even 
Cathy Caruth whose work I both draw on and critique and who 
accepts the reality of traumatic experience—is an adequate theory of 
reference. For reference expresses the relation between language or 
any symbolic system and significant constitutive features of the world. 
Consequently, only a cogent theory of reference would make it possible 
for experience to play the critical role that Scott is willing to concede to 
it:  talking about what happened (history, memory), ascertaining 
difference and similarity (identity), and establishing knowledge 
(epistemology).  If Scott writes from a Foucauldian framework of power 
and knowledge, with its attendant precept of radical indeterminacy, 
LaCapra launches his critique apparently as a realist sympathiser. The 
idea of experience as a useful category of intellectual enquiry has been 
of long-standing interest to LaCapra, a historian, and he had been part 
of an extended debate in the field of intellectual history on the subject 
involving Joan Scott and John Toews.  While reviewing that debate, 
John Zammito describes LaCapra as being closer to the realist 
position,6 a view that LaCpra himself admits, making his critique 
                                       
6 See Zammito‘s essay, ―Reading ‗Experience‘‖ in Reclaiming Identity, 279-311.  
Zammito reviews the following works: Joan Scott‘s already cited essay, ―The Evidence 
of Experience,‖ a shorter version of which appears as ―Experience‖ in Feminists 
Theorize the Political, eds. Judith Butler and Joan Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992), 
22-40; John Toews, ―Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of 
Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience,‖  American Historical Review 92 (1987),  
879-907; refers to Dominick LaCapra‘s ―History, Language and Reading: Waiting for 
Crillion,‖ American Historical Review 100 (June 1995), 799-828; Representing the 
Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); 
Soundings in Critical Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Rethinking 
Intellectual History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
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something of a collaborative effort in expounding the dynamics of what 
he describes in History in Transit as ―the experiential turn‖ (3), a 
phrase that immediately evokes the so-called linguistic turn whose 
influence is still so pervasive in the academy. I would like, then, to 
begin by laying out LaCapra‘s argument, as I understand it, given that 
it is central to the perspective I defend in this chapter.   
 
Trauma and Experience: LaCapra’s Caveat to Realists 
 
In History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory, LaCapra 
discloses his goal to be that of gaining ―greater clarity about the 
concept of experience, especially in its implications for historical 
understanding‖ (2). LaCapra probes the still opaque area where 
experience intersects with history and social life with a view to 
identifying ―what escapes experience‖ and yet has ―experiential effects‖ 
(4). One of the ways he does this is by identifying some slippery modes 
that cannot be classified as experience, or that are not ―encompassed 
by a certain conception of experience‖ (23). That certain conception is 
the post-positivist realist one proposed and developed by several 
theorists and published under the title, Reclaiming Identities: Realist 
Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism. 7 The realist conception 
                                       
7 Edited by Paula M. L. Moya and Michael R. Hames-García (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000); see in particular the Introduction by Moya and the essay by 
Linda Martín Alcoff, ―Who is Afraid of Identity Politics?‖ For further accounts of the 
post-positivist realist conception of experience and identity, see Satya Mohanty, 
Literary Theory and the Claims of History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, Multicultural 
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), especially Chapter 7 and, in 
particular the section, ―A Realist Approach to Culture and Politics,‖ 206-216; 
Mohanty, ―Can Our Values Be Objective? On Ethics, Aesthetics, and Progressive 
Politics,‖ New Literary History, 32 (2001) 803-833; Paula M. L. Moya, Learning from 
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of identity, elaborated in this volume, holds that our experiences have 
a cognitive value, that with the help of a complex mediating theory 
they yield objective knowledge about the salient features of the 
actually lived world. Realists believe that although experience is 
context-specific, it refers nevertheless in verifiable ways to the social 
world. And that the ways of determining the objectivity of any 
epistemological claim based on experience are not different from the 
processes employed to validate scientific knowledge held to be the 
model of objectivity. To the realist, all knowledge is partial and subject 
to review. Consequently, realists do not hanker after an impossible 
ideal of a mode of knowing absolutely free of bias or error but, instead, 
celebrate fallibilism as a necessary part of scientific enquiry. The 
realist admits that identities may indeed be ideological constructs but 
insists that they are not less real for that reason since her notion of a 
post-positivist realism disavows a vulgar, essentialist idea of identity 
that presumes a natural correspondence between experience and the 
phenomenal world. In the words of the feminist philosopher and 
scholar, Linda Martín Alcoff, identities are, in this way, no more than 
―positioned or located lived experiences in which both individuals and 
groups work to construct meaning in relation to historical experience 
and historical narratives.‖ Thus, an individual or group‘s identity can 
be said to represent their ―horizon of agency,‖8 their experience 
                                                                                                              
Experience: Minority Identities, Multicultural Struggles (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), especially 12-17; Linda Martín Alcoff, Visible Identities: Race, 
Gender, and the Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Alcoff et al, 
Identity Politics Reconsidered (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).   
8 Linda Martín Alcoff, Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 42. 
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constituting in the first instance an ―epistemic privilege‖9 which may 
be defined as prima facie or contingent knowledge claims available to 
the individual or group as a result of a specific historical experience 
and social location. For realists, the category of experience includes 
even emotional experience, since our emotions, Mohanty argues in 
Literary Theory (following Ronald de Souza), are ―ways of paying 
attention to the world‖ as ―they fill the ‗gaps‘ between our instinctually 
driven desires, on the one hand, and our fully developed reasoning 
faculties, on the other‖ (210). The potential for growth in knowledge 
and consciousness represented by this epistemic dimension of 
experience is what Paula Moya describes as ―learning from experience‖ 
in her book of the same title and which I extend in the main title of 
this chapter by reference to the adage, Experience is the best teacher.  
Mohanty defines experience as referring ―very simply to the 
variety of ways humans process information‖ (205), a definition that 
LaCapra quarrels with and which forms the main prong of his critique 
in the essay ―Experience and Identity‖ in chapter two of History in 
Transit. LaCapra puts pressure on the realist argument for the 
cognitive value of experience by positing trauma as the limit case of 
experience. He is of the view that the realist conception limits 
experience to humans and that while it may cover ―certain forms‖ of 
experience, it is not all-embracing; that it is, in short, ―too narrow and 
epistemocentric‖ (40). To illustrate his argument, he lists eight 
                                       
9 Mohanty gives an explanation of this term with respect to workers and the 
oppressed in several places in Literary Theory, but the reader might find the most 
precise account in his discussion of the ―third‖ specific advantage of the realist 
approach to experience and identity at 232-34. 
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dictionary definitions, and ten categories, of experience that would 
expose the limitations of the realist perspective. If my reading is 
correct, then it seems clear that of the ten subversive instances he 
privileges trauma—including post-traumatic experience—as that 
which encompasses several of the characteristics or related factors 
that destabilise the realist conception. Trauma, it is worth noting, has 
been a major theme of several of LaCapra‘s writings, enjoying extended 
treatment in at least two earlier works.10 A post-positivist orientation, 
LaCapra maintains, ―remains neopositivist if it confines itself to 
objectification and does not engage the problem of other modes of 
signification that may complement, be intimately bound up with, and 
also test objectification as well as place in question the binary 
opposition between objectivity and subjectivity (or the external and the 
internal)‖ (70). As I have already indicated and hope to show below, in 
seeking to extend the discursive terrain of experience and identity 
LaCapra may have fallen short of his mark by not only abandoning the 
epistemological grounds but also seeming to lean towards the very 
indeterminacy for which he censures Scott. And for that, as well as for 
the additional reason of an absence of a theory of reference in his 
impressive body of work on the subject of history and trauma, he fails 
to see the potential of realism for expanding the category of experience 
without giving up its cognitive status and its critical import for 
progressive identity politics. But so much depends on the term that we 
                                       
10 See his already cited Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma  and 
Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
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must ask, What is trauma? And in what specific ways might it 
contribute to a realist literary and cultural theory? 
 
Trauma and Literary Theory 
 
The original meaning of trauma is a ―wound,‖ an ―injury‖ to living 
tissue, but the more specific usage of the term in medical literature 
has it as injury inflicted not only on the body but on the mind as well. 
In the glossary of Katherine Jones‘s translation of Freud‘s Moses and 
Monotheism, trauma is defined simply as ―injury, bodily or mental.‖11 
Derek Walcott, who advocates a poetics of amnesia in relation to the 
historical trauma of slavery—and whose work I examine in the next 
chapter—keeps both meanings alive in his poem, ―Laventille‖ when he 
speaks of ―a wound, / some open passage that has cleft the brain, / 
some deep, amnesiac blow.‖12 Walcott merges cause and effect and as 
it were ―closes‖ the gap that ordinarily separates them. This is in 
keeping with the nature of a trauma defined as a shattering event 
―experienced too soon, too unexpectedly, to be fully known and is 
therefore not available to consciousness,‖13 thus its constant return by 
way of flashbacks or repetitive actions in the mind‘s attempt to master 
it.  A trauma launches the victim—individual or group—into an 
unfamiliar situation beyond their imagination. And being unfamiliar, 
                                       
11 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: 
Vintage, 1939), 178. 
12 Derek Walcott, Collected Poems: 1948-1984 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1986), 85-88, at 88. 
13 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 4. 
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there is nothing in the victim‘s experience or consciousness, in her 
memory of past occurrences, for mediating and understanding the 
strange event. The traumatic event shatters every pre-existing frame of 
reference and makes its integration into consciousness extremely 
difficult, hence the apparent memory void that characterises it. 
Standing between the event and the belated consciousness of it is the 
gap described as the period of ―incubation‖ or ―latency‖ by Freud. It is 
precisely in this period when the experience is unavailable, wholly or 
partially, to consciousness that its most dramatic impact on memory 
occurs and produces the sort of ambivalent behaviour manifested in 
the ―apparent‖ form of a willed amnesia. In Moses and Monotheism, 
where Freud uses the concept to explain Jewish history, he analogises 
a traumatic event to the experience of a victim of a catastrophe: 
 
 It may happen that someone gets away, apparently unharmed, 
from the spot where he has suffered a shocking accident, for 
instance a train collision. In the course of the following weeks, 
however, he develops a series of grave psychical and motor 
symptoms, which can be ascribed only to his shock or whatever 
else happened at the time of the accident. He has developed a 
―traumatic neurosis.‖ This appears quite incomprehensible and 
is therefore a novel fact. The time that elapsed between the 
accident and the first appearance of the symptoms is called the 
―incubation period‖... It is the feature which one might term 
latency.14  
 
                                       
14 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, 84. 
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This concept of inherent latency informs LaCapra‘s emphasis on the 
distinction between the traumatic event and the traumatic experience: 
the former is punctual and situated in the past; the latter is not 
punctual and remains elusive to the extent that ―it relates to a past 
that has not passed away,‖ that ―intrusively invades the present and 
may block or obviate possibilities in the future‖ (55). Latency, then, 
constitutes a lacuna in the victim‘s memory, occluding immediate 
knowledge of the experience of her trauma. It creates a seemingly 
unsolvable paradox—a ―quite incomprehensible‖ fact, as Freud says—
for victim and sympathiser alike. Concrete reference to the insidious 
operations of this phenomenon might be seen in the gap in self-
knowledge exhibited by the two characters in Beloved, Sethe and Paul 
D, whom I discuss below.  And, hence, LaCapra‘s logic: if a traumatic 
experience is not available to the victim in a way that it can be 
integrated into her consciousness, then it cannot be experience 
properly speaking. It is a persuasive argument, seeing that ordinary—
or what LaCapra calls ―existing‖—experience is itself not static or 
transcendental and bears no self-evident knowledge. But have we 
reached the limit of our understanding of experience, its multiform 
and complex modes? Does, in fact, our present understanding of 
experience, with a little more of the analytical work Scott urges, wholly 
support the exclusion of trauma from the category of experience? Or 
does the challenge posed by the extreme case of traumatic experience 
require us to work outside our usual frameworks of understanding? 
For, we must remember that as Caruth points out, trauma, though 
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admittedly opaque, generates nevertheless ―a force of knowledge.‖15 
Perhaps the more salient point to make about the epistemic question 
posed by trauma is that it denotes a kind of knowledge that has yet to 
attain the narrative form which would make it amenable to memory, 
as Caruth suggests while putting a gloss on Claude Lanzmann‘s 
deliberate strategy of denying the possibility of telling the story of the 
Jewish holocaust in his film, Shoah.16 Indeed, seen this way, the 
mystery of trauma can be likened to the opacity that surrounds any 
hidden knowledge access to which is possible only with a special key 
or code, the ease of access to such knowledge depending on its 
complexity and the degree of ignorance surrounding it. It should be 
noted that in excluding trauma from experience, LaCapra does not 
distinguish between ―types,‖ or, we should say, degrees of trauma and 
seems to base his claim on such extreme or aphasic forms as might 
absolutely defy recall. In which case, more than the traumatic 
experience would be in issue (for instance, where there is such 
grievous brain or other bodily injury that biological functioning is 
seriously impaired). In the typical traumatic instance, Caruth points 
out, what the phenomenon of latency confronts us with is not so much 
the period of forgetting after the accident, but, rather, the absence of 
full consciousness during the accident.  This feature of belatedness, 
first diagnosed by Freud in his treatment of returned World War I 
combat soldiers, and recognised in the United States among veterans 
of the Vietnam war, is what the American Psychiatric Association in 
                                       
15 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 18. 
16 Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 155. 
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1980 named broadly as post-traumatic stress disorder or PTSD.17 But, 
obviously, what is delayed or not immediately remembered is open to 
future recovery, however complicated and prolonged its process might 
be. Indeed, Caruth insists that the experience of trauma and the fact 
of latency do not consist ―in the forgetting of a reality that can hence 
never be fully known.‖18 
But what are the need and relevance of the psychoanalytic 
concept of trauma to literary and cultural theory? An obvious answer 
would be that it pertains to the mind and the human actions it 
determines, which, in turn, is the realm of literature as of other 
narratives. Secondly, the record of our civilization, ancient and 
modern, is a rather violent and bloody book of atrocities, most of 
which have had to be repressed if the human mind were to function in 
any ―normal‖ way. If we include natural disasters, the list of horrors 
grows even longer. Consider: inter-tribal, civil, ideological, 
imperialist/colonialist and world wars; genocide and ethnic cleansing; 
the use of increasingly sophisticated weapons of mass destruction (the 
atomic bomb, cluster bombs, nerve gas); the breakdown of family and 
social mores (rape, incest, child and spousal abuse, violent pop culture 
of cinema and video); droughts and famine, earthquakes, tsunamis 
and other natural disasters, etc. All of these constitute to varying 
degrees shattering events that overwhelm the mind‘s sturdiest 
defences. Their unspeakable reality cannot be accepted into 
                                       
17 Prior to this moment, some of the early terms for trauma were combat stress, shell 
shock, traumatic neurosis and delayed stress syndrome. See Caruth‘s succinct but 
informative Introduction, ―Trauma and Experience,‖ in Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory for an account of the evolution of trauma as a medical concept. 
18 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 17. 
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consciousness, but though repressed or forgotten returns when 
triggered by similar events to produce symptoms of compulsive 
repetition or the acting-out of the originary unintegrated event as the 
mind battles to master its horror. A theory of trauma helps throw light 
on this intractable problem of the human condition simultaneously at 
the personal and social levels. If literary narratives are, among other 
things, ways of bearing witness to life, then the narratives of survivors 
are testimonies that bring lived perspectives to the tragedies of 
traumatic events. But even this calls for caution, for inherent in the 
capacity to remember is the capacity to distort. Thus, as testimonies to 
events whose effects and the memory of which range over a period of 
time, they must be subjected to the most careful evaluation with no 
guarantee of successful interpretation. The retrospective imperative of 
the exercise, however, has the benefit of enabling a reflective 
reconstruction in which truth and error are better articulated for the 
recovery of agency. It is necessary to stress this point because that 
opportunity for reflexivity, as James Berger rightly points out, is ―both 
constructivist and empirical‖ for the simple reason that the process 
compels close attention to ―the representational means‖ through which 
an event is remembered while still retaining the importance of the 
event itself. In other words, trauma never excludes us from its hard 
reality (what actually happened, ―the event itself‖), even when we 
encounter it in a refracted or filtered medium, such as through 
survivors‘ testimonies in a (literary) narrative. A concept of trauma, 
then, holds immense potential for the study of history and historical 
narrative, even of narrative in general, ―as the verbal representation of 
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temporality.‖19 The primary text I examine in this chapter, Beloved, 
aptly illustrates this view. Lastly, the above circumscribes the 
intersection of trauma with literature and literary theory, 
anthropology, philosophy, history and historiography, and culture, 
making it perhaps indispensable to the social psychology of an 
increasingly troubled—not to say traumatised—epoch. 
But I should address a second and narrower question: what is 
the relevance of trauma studies to the post-positivist realist approach 
to literary theory? Put another way, what is the common ground 
between trauma studies and realism? And with LaCapra‘s critique in 
mind, in what particular way does a psychoanalytic concept of trauma 
studies help to recover the realist dimensions of trauma seen as a limit 
case of experience? Before venturing an answer, I would like to clarify 
that I am here not concerned with the task of elaborating a definition 
of trauma, clinical or otherwise—a task I am not qualified for, in any 
case—but in seeking through such a working definition as I have 
already proffered a better understanding of the peculiar social 
psychology of the post-colonial condition. In other words, to examine 
how trauma unsettles existing definitions and compels us to revisit 
our understanding of experience as a crucial basis of identity. It is a 
move partly informed by a realisation on the part of very sensitive 
readers of Beloved that a more satisfactory account of traumatic 
experience would require insights beyond the specific limits of literary 
theory. But realism, at least the post-positivist variety that I affirm 
                                       
19 James Berger, ―Trauma and Literary Theory,‖ Contemporary Literature, vol. 38, no. 
3 (Fall 1997), 569-582, at 569-74. 
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here, in its defence of the meaning-making dynamics of any symbolic 
system is nothing if not a hermeneutics. I rely on the psychoanalytic 
concept of trauma, then, as an interpretive theory that mediates the 
relationship between experience and identity; as, in the words of 
LaCapra, ―a form of critical theory with explicitly evaluative and socio-
political dimensions‖ and not as an ―escapist‖ adventure in the realm 
of psychotherapy or ―an ideologically saturated substitute for 
philosophy.‖20 In his often-cited essay, ―The Epistemic Status of 
Cultural Identity: On Beloved and the Postcolonial Condition,‖ 
Mohanty anticipates the benefits of such a cross-disciplinary strategy 
for a realist project of literary analysis and the recuperation of 
besieged social identities.21 Within such a cross-disciplinary 
framework, Berger arrives at a convergent ―realist‖ reading of Beloved 
with Mohanty, albeit via a differing ―post-apocalyptic‖ framework.22 
Given that psychoanalysis has emerged from early doubts and 
obscurity23 to become a very influential science of the mind with an 
                                       
20 Dominick LaCapra, History in Transit, 2. 
21 Originally published in Cultural Critique 24 (Spring 1993), 41-80, and included in 
a slightly revised form as ―Postcolonial Identity and Moral Epistemology in Beloved‖ 
in his Literary Theory and the Claims of History; see especially 216-229. 
22 LaCapra describes their two readings as such (History in Transit 43n), but see the 
section, ―Ghosts of Liberalism: Beloved and the Moynihan Report‖ in Berger‘s After 
the End: Representations of Post-Apocalypse, 188-216.  
23 Perhaps the most cogent charge against Freud is that the ―science‖ he founded 
isn‘t really a science but mere speculation. His most famous critic along this line 
would be Wittgenstein who in his Lectures and Conversations in Aesthetics, 
Psychology, and Religious Belief dismissed psychoanalysis as being basically 
speculation that didn‘t rise to the level of hypothesis. Freud, he claimed, conflated 
reasons with causes, concluding that psychoanalysis was at best ―A powerful 
mythology.‖ I have relied on Harold Bloom‘s summary of Wittgenstein‘s 
characterisation of psychoanalysis here. See his ―Freud: Frontier Concepts, 
Jewishness, and Interpretation,‖ in Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 113. 
Interestingly, a charge from within the camp of psychoanalysis is that Freud was too 
―scientistic,‖ too preoccupied with the need to justify his theory on scientific grounds 
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established place in the humanities curriculum, nods to Freud by 
critics and scholars lend support to Harold Bloom‘s observation that 
Freud was not only a ―good materialist‖—or empiricist, if we follow 
Berger—but in fact ―too good an observer not to know that we are 
driven by something beyond material knowledge.‖24 I contend that this 
―something beyond material knowledge,‖ when successfully decoded in 
all of its complexity, tells a ―story‖ of the original event that ―refers us, 
indirectly, to the unexpected reality—the locus of referentiality—of the 
traumatic story,‖25 as Caruth rightly points out but fails to show 
convincingly, but more on this below.  
On this question of the undergirding realism of the 
psychological, one can do no better perhaps than point out the 
fundamental premise of psychoanalysis; at least, the classic Freudian 
                                                                                                              
that he often failed to follow the unruly drives he had uncovered to the logical end. 
For one instance of this view, see ―An Interview with Robert Jay Lifton,‖ by Cathy 
Caruth, in  Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 128-147, especially at 133 where Lifton 
says, inter alia, that ―as Freud struggled painfully to remain a scientist in the terms 
of his era, in the nineteenth century terms of science, he often neglected the very 
thing that he had so importantly discovered, the aspect of experience, of 
psychological experience. He neglected it for theories of origin, which were primarily 
instinctual.‖ It is a focus, according to Lifton, that could lead to losing ―a sense of the 
flow of experience‖ itself.  
While noting the possible dangers Lifton points out here, especially given his 
concern with the problematics of a return to origins in the interpretation of 
experience, I am nonetheless convinced that a focus on origins, when supplanted by 
other analytical concepts, such as realism, or even Lifton‘s symbolic structure of 
image and meaning, can be very useful in efforts to understand such complex 
experiences as trauma. Finally, I find Bloom quite convincing when he says of 
Wittgenstein that he paid an ―involuntary tribute to Freud‘s mythologizing power‖ 
since ―All mythology is interpretation, but interpretation only becomes mythology if it 
ages productively‖ and that what counts in the end about psychoanalysis is ―its 
interpretive power‖ (ibid). To Bloom, Freud‘s peculiar strength was ―to say what could 
not be said, or at least to attempt to say it, thus refusing to be silent in the face of 
the unsayable,‖ or as Morrison might have put it, in the face of ―unspeakable 
thoughts, unspoken.‖ 
24 Harold Bloom, ―Freud: Frontier Concepts, Jewishness, and Interpretation,‖ in 
Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 115. 
25 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 6. 
139 
 
variant which I draw from here. Freud‘s theory is rooted in the family, 
hence the place of its Ur-concept, the oedipal complex. There can 
hardly be a firmer ground for dealing with reality than that constituted 
by the family, generally seen as a microcosm, and certainly the 
crucible, of society as we currently know it. As Peter Gay notes, 
Freud‘s ―account of the growth of the ego (and, of course, the super-
ego) implicitly makes a great deal of room for the impact of the 
external world—society in its varied manifestations—on the 
individual.‖ Gay adds that one reason why Freud ―wrote little explicit 
social psychology‖ is that ―he thought individual and social psychology 
to be virtually the same.‖26 Indeed, in Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego, Freud himself makes plain this assumption: 
 
The contrast between individual psychology and social or group 
psychology, which at a first glance may seem to be full of 
significance, loses a great deal of its sharpness when it is 
examined more closely. It is true that individual psychology is 
concerned with the individual man and explores the paths by 
which he seeks to find satisfaction for his instinctual impulses; 
but only rarely and under certain exceptional conditions is 
individual psychology in a position to disregard the relations of 
this individual to others. In the individual‘s mental life someone 
else is invariably involved, as a model, as an object, as a helper, 
as an opponent; and so from the very first individual psychology, 
                                       
26 Sigmund Freud, The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay (New York: W. W.  Norton, 1989), 
626; subsequent reference within the text. 
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in this extended but entirely justifiable sense of the words, is at 
the same time social psychology.27 
 
Morrison frames family as her primary narrative prism and the 
complex way in which the individual narratives of the characters in 
Beloved are intertwined and serve to complete not only each other but 
also to fashion the collective narrative of an interpretive community of 
slaves and free negroes against the backdrop of the Fugitive Slave Law 
testifies to Freud‘s insight. It should be noted that Freud very quickly 
goes on to compare the dialectic of individual and group psychology to 
relations within the family and underlines its primary place as a site of 
psychoanalytic discourse. He concludes that all such relations are to 
be considered as social phenomena: ―The relations of an individual to 
his parents and to his brothers and sisters, to the object of his love, 
and to his physician—in fact all the relations which have hitherto been 
the chief subject of psycho-analytic research—may be considered as 
social phenomena‖ (3-4). Lastly, I should add that the attraction that a 
good concept of social psychology holds for the realist is its relevance 
to a wholistic hermeneutic project. However speculative or abstruse 
psychoanalysis as a science of the mind may be, it is at its best, as 
Bloom argues, not only ―a method of interpretation‖ but also ―itself an 
interpretation.‖28 In his argument for the relevance of trauma to 
literary theory, Berger endorses this view when he says that ―trauma 
                                       
27 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, the Standard 
Edition, translated and edited by James Strachey, with autobiographical 
introduction by Peter Gay (New York: W. W. Norton, 1959), 3. 
28 Harold Bloom, ―Freud: Frontier Concepts, Jewishness, and Interpretation,‖ in 
Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 113. 
141 
 
provides a method of interpretation‖ and that it facilitates the 
―interpretation of cultural symptoms‖ manifested in ―the growths, 
wounds, [and] scars on a social body.‖29 If a good interpretation is that 
which broadens our knowledge by referring more accurately to the 
lived world, that which offers a more cogent understanding of human 
experience in all its variety—even of such experience as might at the 
onset be unsayable or unthinkable—then a concept of trauma is one 
more useful tool of analysis for the theorist.   
In what follows, I will attempt to show how trauma‘s opacity 
might be made more intelligible to extend the argument in defence of 
the epistemological grounds of experience. I will do so by examining 
from the standpoint of philosophical realism30 the intriguing category 
of trauma posited as the limit case of experience that threatens, 
subverts and undoes its cognitive claims. My argument is that 
although trauma undeniably constitutes a limit case, every trauma 
nevertheless presents a narrative that refers, albeit indirectly, to its 
underlying reality. If a narrative is what occurs when we apply intellect 
to events or observable phenomena, then its underlying reality is the 
social location in which event or observation and interpretation take 
place. Every trauma, then, refers us to an interpretive horizon, the site 
in which we live our experiences and from which ―we must engage in 
the process of meaning-making.‖31 With the right mediating theory, 
the hidden meanings of a trauma can be gradually uncovered by 
                                       
29 James Berger, ―Trauma and Literary Theory,‖ 572-73. 
30 See the ―Introduction,‖ footnote 9 above, for a brief explanation of this term which, 
basically, is the view that scientific knowledge is theory-dependent, contingent, and 
subject to review and that it is no less objective for that reason.  
31 Linda Martín Alcoff, Visible Identities, 43. 
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reference to its socially constitutive space.  I demonstrate my claim 
with a realist reading of Beloved, a work whose subject is the founding 
and inherited trauma of slavery. Its narrative tension is sustained in 
the main by the self-cancelling and self-constituting paradox of 
memory and forgetting, a poetics of amnesia that is at the same time a 
compulsion to remember as a precondition for individual and 
communal healing. I read Beloved as highlighting the near-paralysing 
complexity of traumatic experience up to the point where it might be 
possible to agree that it is indeed too unstable for any epistemic 
pursuit or identity politics, but also as eloquently displaying the 
intricate processes though which knowledge and error are eventually 
sifted. But the first part of this claim would be true only if one seeks, 
whether by design or default, an error-free, trans-historical basis of 
knowledge; what in my view unwittingly makes LaCapra, for instance, 
to argue that with trauma the realist notion of fallibility presents an 
inadequate reality check to the epistemological process. Yet, 
throughout in Beloved historical reality serves as the frame and 
referent of the disempowering trauma that the characters seek to 
escape but which they can successfully grapple with only by 
acknowledging it. In short, it becomes obvious that the further Sethe 
and Paul D sink into the abyss of the unconscious the nearer they 
come to the socio-historical reality of their trauma. I show through 
extensive discussions of selected moments and passages the dynamics 
of trauma and memory and how the narrative does the hard but 
necessary work of evaluating competing mediating theories until a 
more accurate and liberating one is attained. In this epistemic 
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struggle, Morrison portrays two characters whose individual narratives 
underscore the fundamental dialectic of objective or ―scientific‖ 
inquiry: that all knowledge is partial and subject to review. She 
presents them as traumatised persons who, starting from the relative 
advantage of their social location, are constantly revising, 
supplementing, or refining earlier conceptions of self and community 
the more they learn about the causal features of their world. I 
conclude by asserting the cognitive status of traumatic experience.  
 
 “But How Will You Know Me?” Trauma, Memory and Meaning 
 
Early in Beloved, an intriguing conversation takes place between Sethe 
and her daughter, Denver. She has just told Denver the story of her 
(Denver‘s) miraculous birth on the bank of the Ohio River where she 
had nearly died from the exhaustion of her escape from Sweet Home. It 
is spurred by a statement made by the fugitive Amy Denver—Sethe‘s 
fortuitous midwife and for whom Denver is named—while nursing 
Sethe‘s battered feet that ―Anything dead coming back to life hurts.‖32 
This fine detail is important for the following reason: the phrase 
―coming back to life‖ echoes the concepts of ―return of the repressed‖ 
central to the structure of trauma, and ―return to the source,‖ a major 
trope of the anti/post-colonial project of reclaiming identities best 
expatiated by Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral.33 Amy‘s remark 
makes Denver link an image she ―sees‖ of a white dress holding onto 
                                       
32 Toni Morrison, Beloved (New York: Vintage International, 2004), 42; henceforth all 
reference within the text. 
33 See the Introduction for specific references. 
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Sethe as she prayed to the baby ghost that haunted 124 Bluestone 
Road until Paul D‘s arrival. The ghost, Denver says, ―looked just like‖ 
Sethe. To Denver‘s enquiry as to what Sethe had been praying about, 
this is Sethe‘s strange response: 
 
I was talking about time. It‘s so hard for me to believe in it. 
Some things go. Pass on. Some things just stay. I used to think 
it was my rememory. You know. Some things you forget. Other 
things you never do. But it‘s not. Places, places are still there. If 
a house burns down, it‘s gone, but the place—the picture of it—
stays, and not just in my rememory, but out there, in the world. 
What I remember is a picture floating around out there outside 
my head. I mean, even if I don‘t think it, even if I die, the picture 
of what I did, or knew, or saw is still out there. Right in the place 
where it happened.‖ (43) 
 
When Denver tests the claim that the picture of a past event can 
assume an objective existence ―out there‖ by asking, ―Can other people 
see it?‖ Sethe does not hesitate to reply very emphatically in the 
affirmative. To Sethe, so real and ineradicable is the past that anyone 
can even apprehend it by ―bumping into a rememory that belongs to 
somebody else.‖ But if we go beyond her rather esoteric rendition, 
what we discern is her conviction about the unshakable hold of an 
undying past, an emphatic way of delineating a collective history and 
the inter-generational transmission of traumatic experience. Walter 
Benn Michaels has a similar reading of this passage: ―because what 
once happened is still happening, because … slavery needn‘t be part of 
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your memory in order to be remembered by you.‖34 Sethe then goes on 
to connect the abstract return of the trauma (what will ―happen 
again‖) to the concrete site of the already happened event: ―Where I 
was before I came here, that place is real. It‘s never going away. Even if 
the whole farm—every tree and grass blade of it dies. The picture is 
still there and what‘s more, if you go there—you who never was there—
if you go there and stand in the place where it was, it will happen 
again; it will be there for you, waiting for you.‖ Sethe is so sure of this 
―fact‖ that she warns Denver never to go there: ―So, Denver, you can‘t 
never go there. Never. Because even though it‘s all over—over and 
done with—it‘s going to always be there waiting for you.‖ All of this 
leads Denver to conclude that ―nothing ever dies,‖ to which Sethe 
readily concurs: ―Nothing ever does.‖35 
If so, why, then, is Sethe resolved to keep the past at bay, to 
define for herself the somewhat religious task of daily ―beating back 
the past‖?  Why, in another context, does Morrison speak of this desire 
in the real, non-fictional, world of lived experiences? In a tone of 
personal and collective indictment, she says that Beloved is about 
―something that the characters don‘t want to remember, I don‘t want 
to remember, black people don‘t want to remember, white people don‘t 
want to remember,‖36 showing that the past of slavery is taboo alike to 
                                       
34 Walter Benn Michaels, ―‘You Who Never Was There‘: Slavery and the New 
Historicism—Deconstruction and the Holocaust,‖ in The Americanization of the 
Holocaust, ed. Hilene Flanzbaum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 
181-97, at 185.  
35 Preceding quotations from 43-44. 
36 See Toni Morrison, ―The Pain of Being Black,‖ Time, 22 May 1989, as quoted in 
Henderson, ―Toni Morrison‘s Beloved: Re-Membering the Body as Historical Text,‖ 
83. 
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slaves and to slave-owners and their descendants. As Mae Henderson  
points out, however, such a will to forget, paradoxically encapsulated 
in the novel‘s closing injunction that the haunting story of Beloved was 
not one ―to pass on,‖ (324) cannot be taken literally as that would 
―contradict the motive and sense of the entire novel.‖37 Which explains 
why Morrison is equally intent on proving Sethe wrong by expressing 
her resolve to insulate Denver from the past in language that 
guarantees the futility of the endeavour: ―As for Denver, the job Sethe 
had of keeping her from the past that was still waiting for her was all 
that mattered‖ (51).38 If the past is never past but simultaneously a 
pending event as well, it must be so for Denver as for Sethe. And it is 
precisely the inexorable imbrication of past, present and future that 
Sethe has just tried to explain to Denver. Moreover, this past, following 
Denver, has taken on Sethe‘s image: ―Like you. It looked just like you‖ 
(43). What Denver suggests is that the very history that Sethe seeks to 
banish has come to assert such an intimate claim that it has become, 
for all intents and purposes, her doppelgänger, and so totally 
inescapable. 
This, then, leads to the question of what is really at play in the 
narrative: a wilful or a determined amnesia? In other words, is there 
something here far more surreptitious and subversive of agency than 
the story reveals on the surface? The issue this question raises 
becomes even more poignant given that a poetics of wilful amnesia 
                                       
37 Mae G. Henderson, ―Toni Morrison‘s Beloved: Re-Membering the Body as 
Historical Text,‖ in Comparative American Identities: Race, Sex, and Nationality in the 
Modern Text, ed. Hortense J. Spillers (New York: Routledge, 1991), 83. 
38 My emphasis. 
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constitutes a recurrent motif in the literature of memory and identity 
in the New World, perhaps the most radical proponent of which is the 
Caribbean poet and playwright, Walcott (already mentioned above), 
who urges the descendants of slaves to ―sear their memory with a 
torch.‖39 The view I propose in answer to this question is that the 
amnesiac tendency is more determined than willed and that this is a 
dimension of the psycho-affective condition of the (post)colonial 
experience, and I attempt to show below why this is the case. This 
helps to explain, I will argue, the active oxymoronic functioning of 
remembering and forgetting—or to use Morrison‘s own quaint 
neologisms, ―rememory‖ and ―disremembering.‖ To put it another way, 
why the characters are relentlessly and remorselessly beaten back and 
forth between the hard pillar of forgetting and the burning post of 
remembering in a manner that acts-out and so compulsively repeats 
the trauma of the very experiences they wish so much to escape. The 
interesting point here, however, is that it is in the very desire to flee 
from history that the slave manages to breach the iron curtain of the 
master‘s identity-negating narrative and to reclaim individual and 
collective agency. Thus, by the curious road of denying the very 
historical memory that should define her identity, the slave even more 
unforgettably remembers it and so recovers her being. This is a 
fundamental contradiction, a perplexing irony, that I believe can only 
be adequately explained through close attention to the nature of what 
Morrison herself describes as ―unspeakable thoughts, unspoken‖ (235) 
                                       
39 Derek Walcott, ―The Muse of History‖ in What the Twilight Says: Essays (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), 5.  
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and Caruth as ―the unthinkable realities to which traumatic 
experience bears witness.‖40 It is, indeed, ―a special psychological 
situation.‖41 As Caruth notes, the central enigma Freud reveals is the 
fact of the victim‘s lack of full consciousness during the accident, since 
he walks away apparently unharmed. The historical power of this 
complex psychological situation, Caruth stresses, is ―not just that the 
experience is repeated after its forgetting, but that it is only in and 
through its inherent forgetting that it is first experienced at all.‖42 
Morrison evokes these elements of a traumatic experience, especially 
the founding trauma inherited by Sethe and intensified by her own 
slave experiences; events that repeat the original trauma and drive her 
towards infanticide and the central conflict of the plot. The founding 
trauma is the original act of violent capture in Africa, aggravated by 
the horrors of the middle passage, which Morrison foregrounds in the 
preface. If that event marked the separation of Sethe‘s mother from 
family and familiar surroundings, Sethe herself would experience a 
similar forceful separation at Sweet Home plantation. As she tells the 
story of this childhood trauma within the larger trauma of slavery 
itself, and, remarkably, in answer to Beloved‘s simple question 
whether or not her mother did not fix up her hair, Sethe never really 
knew her mother. She is pointed out to her by Nan, the crippled old 
woman who watched over the little children while their parents worked 
the fields. Nor did she know her father but had to content herself with 
the mere thought that one of the men who ―danced the antelope ... 
                                       
40 Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ix. 
41 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, 84. 
42 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 17. 
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certainly was her own‖ (37). She rarely saw her mother before she was 
lynched and ―hung‖ from a tree, and the brutal facts of this early 
childhood are summed up in Sethe‘s answer to Beloved: ―She never 
fixed my hair nor nothing. She didn‘t even sleep in the same cabin 
most nights I remember.‖ These details assume a special significance 
in the light of the place of family in the trauma of slavery, and we gain 
a better understanding of the dialectical process of (traumatic) 
experience and identity in the only episode of Sethe and her mother in 
the novel. As Sethe tells Beloved, the only thing that her mother did do 
was show her the distinctive mark by which she could know her as her 
mother; that is, she identifies herself to her daughter through the 
somatic mark of her trauma: 
 
One thing she did do. She picked me up and carried me behind 
the smokehouse. Back there she opened up her dress front and 
lifted her breast and pointed under it. Right on her rib was a 
circle and a cross burnt right in the skin. She said, ―This is your 
ma‘am. This,‖ and she pointed. ―I am the only one got this mark 
now. The rest is dead. If something happens to me and you can‘t 
tell me by my face, you can know me by this mark.‖ (72)  
 
Sethe‘s mother‘s wound marks her individual identity; indeed, she is 
the wound: she points to the mark and says, ―This is your ma‘am. 
This.‖ As the only one left among her generation of slaves who had the 
closest links to an ancestral heritage or knowledge fast fading from the 
memory of the New World slave—in short those who spoke a language 
―which would never come back‖ (74)—her identity is as unique as her 
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experience. But the moment would probably be best remembered by 
Sethe‘s plea that she be branded so her mother would recognise her if 
anything happened to her as well. When she asks, ―How will you know 
me?‖ and begs, ―Mark me, too … Mark the mark on me too,‖‖ she 
evokes one of the three uses of experience that Scott concedes—
establishing difference and similarity.  
Sethe‘s thoughts after telling this story return the reader to the 
paradox of remembering and forgetting wrought by her trauma. She 
had just remembered, the narrator informs us, ―something she had 
forgotten she knew.‖ But had she indeed forgotten this rather 
unforgettable moment? There are two possible grounds for speculating 
that she hadn‘t, but had rather walked away from the moment 
apparently unharmed. First, the innocence of her tender age that 
makes it impossible for her to be fully seized of the origin and nature 
of her mother‘s wound; and, second, the words that the narrator uses 
to describe Sethe‘s pain of recollection: that something privately 
shameful ―had seeped into a slit in her mind behind the slap on the 
face and the circled cross‖ (72-73). The phrase, ―a slit in her mind‖ 
conveys immediately the idea of a violent cleaving of the brain by the 
―amnesiac blow‖ described by Walcott, the precise detail of the place 
from where the shame of the wounding seeps into Sethe‘s mind 
serving to link both bodily and mental injury. As Freud points out in 
The Ego and the Id, consciousness is the ―surface of the mental 
apparatus … ascribed … as a function to a system which is spatially 
the first to be reached from the external world‖ of perception.43 A 
                                       
43 Sigmund Freud, The Freud Reader, 632. 
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traumatic experience, therefore, is precisely that which is so forceful, 
so shattering, that it breaches this very mental surface and enters 
directly into the unconscious; that is, it enters the mind unmediated. 
Sethe‘s forgetfulness, then, seems more of a psychic defence against a 
horrific event for which she was intellectually unprepared; an event 
that bypassed the ego, the site of ―reason and commonsense‖ (636). 
Trauma, as Caruth, following Battaille, explains, instances a 
―confrontation with an event that, in its unexpectedness or horror, 
cannot be placed within the schemes of prior knowledge—that cannot 
… become a matter of ‗intelligence‘—and thus continually returns ... at 
a later time.‖44 The process by which the mind shuts out slave 
experiences, according to Freud, would be seen as ―regulated by the 
pleasure principle,‖ whose ultimate aim is ―an avoidance of unpleasure 
or a production of pleasure.‖45 It proceeds from the ego‘s instinct of 
self-preservation, but Freud makes an important observation relevant 
to my point: those who suffer from the effects of a trauma are ―more 
concerned with not thinking of it‖ (598).46 In other words, it is not so 
much that their trauma is beyond their experience—for they have 
indeed experienced it—but that it is an experience they would rather 
not remember, though remember it they must. For, trauma‘s 
constitutive paradox lies precisely in the fact that only by forgetting it 
does it acquire the force that compels its return, its acting-out, and so 
the possibility of working it through and  integrating it into 
consciousness. 
                                       
44 Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 153. 
45 Sigmund Freud, The Freud Reader, 594-95. 
46 Original emphasis. 
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This explains the irony of Sethe repeating her trauma the more 
she tries to forget it. The first act of repetition, infanticide,47 stands as 
the main conflict of the novel. The second is Sethe‘s rape at Sweet 
Home which fulfils her wish to be given the bodily mark of her trauma. 
Of all the indignities of slavery, one of the two that scar Sethe above all 
others and harden her resolve to escape is her rape by Schoolteacher‘s 
nephews.48 For complaining to her bedridden mistress, Schoolteacher 
had her whipped even while she was pregnant. The whipping deadens 
the tissue and leaves a gruesome scar on her back. Although Sethe 
successfully flees Sweet Home—that is, walks away from the scene 
apparently unharmed—it is clear she is yet to come to terms with the 
experience a full eighteen years after while narrating her ordeal to Paul 
D. For, the force of a trauma has to do not only with the severity or 
barbarity of the event itself—that is, the physical wounding of the 
body—but also, and more important, the brutal scarring of the psyche. 
This is why Sethe later describes the dishonour resulting from the 
savaging of her dignity as ―far worse‖ than the putatively inhuman act 
of drawing a saw across her own infant daughter‘s throat and 
watching her blood pump into her hands as she tries to absorb her 
death spasms by squeezing her (295). Thus, to every other physical 
                                       
47 The old woman, Nan, tells Sethe the story of how she and her mother were 
together from the sea, how they were severally raped by the crew, and how Sethe‘s 
mother threw away all the issues of her rape except Sethe whom she had with a 
black man. (Beloved 74) 
48 The other event occurs when Schoolteacher teaches a lesson in phrenology to one 
of his pupils ―doing‖ Sethe by instructing him to ―line up‖ her ―human 
characteristics‖ on the left side of his notebook and ―the animal ones‖ on the right 
(228). This forms a central justification for her infanticide because ―no one, nobody 
on this earth, would list her daughter‘s characteristics on the animal side of the 
paper‖ (296). 
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measure of the inhumanity of Schoolteacher‘s action, Sethe can think 
only of the dishonour of her violation and repeat merely the reply, 
―And they took my milk‖; the second time with as much a note of 
outrage as of a censure to Paul D who seems to be focussed only on 
the bodily wounding:  
 
―They used cowhide on you?‖ 
―And they took my milk.‖ 
―They beat you and you was pregnant?‖ 
―And they took my milk!‖ (20) 
 
This compulsive repetition, itself a mode of acting-out and so unwilled 
remembering of a repressed experience, indicates the continuing 
struggle by Sethe‘s mind to come to terms with and master a 
shattering event it was unprepared for. Indeed, long before her 
conversation with Denver, Sethe anticipates this compulsion when 
Denver queries the irony of a seeming nostalgia for, and a tortured 
escape from, a place named Sweet Home when she admits the 
involuntary nature of her memories: ―But it‘s where we were. ... All 
together. Comes back whether we want it to or not‖ (60). 
It is necessary at this point to briefly address the question of the 
unspeakability of the traumatic story of Beloved, as Morrison asserts, 
vis-à-vis its burden of historical reality. While Morrison enacts this 
narrative binary by further complicating the plot with a ghost story, 
she simultaneously invites a realist reading by basing the novel‘s 
principal character on an actual historical figure—that of the fugitive 
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slave, Margaret Garner (xvii). The problems of reading and 
interpretation that this move creates are exemplified by Ann Snitow 
who first damned the novel in her review, but later identified its 
enigmatic subject as ―the trauma of slavery.‖49 It is by now a 
consensus that the ghost embodies the past50 and figures a lived 
experience, which, in its race-specific particularities, ―provides the 
mechanism for, as well as the meaning of, the conversion of history 
into memory.‖51 The process of conversion of history into memory, into 
conscious knowledge, is perhaps best illustrated by Paul D who, like 
Sethe, is similarly intent on forgetting the past. And this is significant 
for two reasons. Firstly, in his personal search for meaning and 
agency, Paul D‘s reflections on the determining social world of his 
identity as a slave chart the difficult evaluative process of attaining 
objective knowledge. In his wrestling with the crisis of identity 
resulting from his trauma, he best epitomises the distinguishing 
human faculty of reflexivity and the substitution of insight or objective 
knowledge for mystification or error. Secondly, and as testimony to 
this fact, Sethe‘s ability to finally ―lay it all down‖ by acknowledging 
her past so she might begin the task of working through her own 
trauma is linked to Paul D‘s arrival at 124 Bluestone Road, a factor 
that points to the inherited and collective nature of their slave 
                                       
49 See Ann Snitow, ―Death Duties: Toni Morrison Looks Back in Sorrow,‖ originally in 
The Village Voice Literary Supplement, September 1987, reprinted in Toni Morrison: 
Critical Perspectives Past and Present, 26-32. 
50 Mae G. Henderson, ―Toni Morrison‘s Beloved: Re-Membering the Body as 
Historical Text,‖ in Comparative American Identities: Race, Sex, and Nationality in the 
Modern Text, 83. 
51 Walter Benn Michaels‘s  ―You Who Never Was There‖: Slavery and the New 
Historicism—Deconstruction and the Holocaust,‖ in The Americanization of the 
Holocaust, 186-87. 
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experiences. Indeed, Sethe anticipates the emotional solidarity, the 
―[t]rust and rememory,‖ that he inspires early on in the novel when she 
admits that Paul D adds something to her life that she had been too 
afraid to count on and that her own story was bearable ―because it 
was his as well‖ (116). As the reader notes at the end of the novel, Paul 
D returns to Sethe at the precise moment when she is already lying in 
Baby Suggs‘s death-bed to await her own ―rest.‖ But that is only after 
Paul D had learned the true meaning of his slave identity by coming to 
terms with its shameful history. His involuntary copulations with 
Beloved, the embodiment of this history, inaugurates both the inward 
and outward interpretive moves that would unfold the ―wonderful lie‖ 
of his ascribed manhood by relating his trauma to the real nature of 
the world around him. Sweet Home plantation owner, Mr Garner, 
practised a kind of benevolent slavery that complicated the trauma 
suffered by Paul D and his fellow male slaves by inhibiting accurate 
self-knowledge on their part. Garner saw and treated his male slaves 
as men, and boasted this to his fellow farmers. At the cost of fights 
and bruises, he revelled in being tough and smart enough ―to make 
and call his own niggers men‖ (12-13). Even then, we are reminded 
that Baby Suggs is worried by Garner‘s order to his man-bred slaves 
never to leave Sweet Home except in his company (166), a worry 
confirmed when, after Garner‘s death, Schoolteacher arrives to end the 
pretence, and—after a disastrous escape attempt—finally set Paul D 
on the complex task of working-through his trauma. Paul D belatedly 
contemplates the true meaning of manhood in slavery; his lengthy self-
interrogation is worth quoting in full: 
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Now, plagued by the contents of his tobacco tin, he wondered 
how much difference there really was between before 
schoolteacher and after. Garner called and announced them 
men—but only on Sweet Home, and by his leave. Was he naming 
what he saw or creating what he did not? That was the wonder 
of Sixo, and even Halle; it was always clear to Paul D that those 
two were men whether Garner said so or not. It troubled him 
that, concerning his own manhood, he could not satisfy himself 
on that point. Oh, he did manly things, but was that Garner‘s 
gift or his own will? What would he have been anyway—before 
Sweet Home—without Garner? In Sixo‘s country, or his 
mother‘s? Or, God help him, on the boat? Did a whiteman 
saying it make it so? Suppose Garner woke up one morning and 
changed his mind? Took the word away. Would they have run 
then? And if he didn‘t, would the Pauls have stayed there all 
their lives? Why did the brothers need the one whole night to 
decide? To discuss whether they would join Sixo and Halle. 
Because they had been isolated in a wonderful lie, dismissing 
Halle‘s and Baby Suggs‘ life before Sweet Home as bad luck. 
Ignorant of or amused by Sixo‘s dark stories. Protected and 
convinced they were special … being so in love with the look of 
the world, putting up with anything and everything, just to stay 
alive … (260)  
 
In terms of its direct interrogation of slavery as the absolute negation 
of subjectivity, of its Hegelian depiction of the slave‘s attainment of 
consciousness and agency in the death struggle with the master, this 
passage is arguably the most important in Beloved.  Yet, a cursory 
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reading might suggest that what Paul D confronts in this self-scrutiny 
is ordinary, and not traumatic, experience. In order to show how this 
passage helps to make my claim about the referential reality of 
traumatic experience clearer, it needs to be unpacked. And there is no 
better place to start than the opening sentence which makes reference 
to the tobacco-tin whose ―contents‖ are the subject of Paul D‘s 
reflections. The tobacco tin, we remember, is the sealed receptacle of 
his slave memories. It is where Paul D has ―packed away‖ troubling 
―doubt, regret and every single unasked question,‖ a self-defence 
measure he resorts to as a way of willing himself into being (261). The 
tobacco tin, ―lodged‖ remarkably enough ―in his chest‖—in his most 
secret place—stands as the emblem of his repressed trauma. By the 
time he got to 124 Bluestone Road—that is, by the time of his 
compulsive rendezvous with history—he believed nothing in the world 
could pry it open (133). The more important thing to note in this 
passage, however, is the fact that Paul D can unravel the wonderful lie 
of his interpellated identity as man-slave or slave-man only by 
referring his experiences at Sweet Home to—testing them against—the 
objective or external features of the world he knows. This world is not 
limited to the plantation governed by the juridical economy of slavery 
but extends also to that of his African ancestors, as he demonstrates 
in the questions about what his true identity would have been before 
Sweet Home, without Garner‘s power of naming, in Sixo‘s country or 
his own unmentioned (and perhaps unknown) mother‘s.  
If a first step in working-through trauma is to acknowledge it, 
then it becomes even more significant that the ―rusted shut‖ tobacco 
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tin flies open the very moment Paul D is compelled by what the 
narrator describes as a ―brainless urge to stay alive‖ to call by name 
and then couple with—in other words, confront and grapple with—his 
traumatic history. Beloved‘s account of her arrival at 124 Bluestone 
Road establishes her as the undeniable claim of the past on the 
present, a reading underscored by her sections of the monologues of 
possession and merger where she emerges as the literal ―bridge‖ that 
spans the troubled present and the misty past symbolised by the 
water out of which she claims to have climbed onto land (88-89). As 
has been noted, her monologues ―reconnect‖ not only to those 
ancestors who perished in the Middle Passage but, also, ―specifically 
with Sethe‘s mother who had come from Africa.‖52 The mere 
acknowledgement of his trauma, the narrative suggests, proves 
enough to reveal a red heart—his non-slave human heart—to Paul D in 
place of the substituted tobacco tin. And it offers him the contrast to 
see that far from being a man, his worth in dignity was less than a 
rooster‘s (86); that he was after all just an owned thing, property with 
a set dollar value (267). In his quest for meaning, therefore, Paul D‘s 
examination of his trauma yields him a more accurate self-knowledge 
which replaces the erroneous self-conception arising from the shame 
and self-doubt that tells him he is a ―trespasser[s] among the human 
race‖ (147). He comes to this moment by first learning to value his 
ancestral origins, the original hermeneutical space that defines his 
pre-slave identity and from which he can meaningfully engage the 
trauma of his new world. As he confesses, Beloved, ―escorted‖ him to 
                                       
52 Satya Mohanty, Literary Theory and the Claims of History, 224. 
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some ―ocean-deep place he once belonged to‖ (311) and reminded him 
of something he was ―supposed to remember‖ (276). 
And if, as Sethe says before the critical moment defining the 
ethical conflict at the heart of the novel, she needs Paul D to recover 
the past she has put at bay in order to work-through her trauma, then 
it is clear he can play that role only if he has himself come to terms 
with that very past which happens to be his as well. The temporal logic 
of the novel seems to stress this point by putting Paul D‘s reflections 
near the end of the plot. As a result of her trauma, Sethe, like Paul D 
has come to the point, according to Robert Jay Lifton, of a ―radically 
altered‖53 sense of self. The worst thing slavery did to you, Sethe says, 
was not ―just work, kill or maim you, but dirty you. Dirty you so bad 
you couldn‘t like yourself anymore. Dirty you so bad you forgot who 
you were and couldn‘t think it up (295).‖ Consequently, she does not 
believe she has any self worthy of her care separate from her children, 
her ―best thing‖ (296). Till the very end of the novel, Sethe does not 
reverse this low self-esteem, and in her defence, it can be said that 
nothing in her lived experience compels a differing sense of self.  And 
because she remains firmly in the grip of this false consciousness of 
self, she is even more vulnerable to the crippling power of her trauma. 
Hence, Sethe‘s attempted murder of Mr Bodwin, friend and benefactor 
of the black community and owner of House No. 124 itself where she 
finds refuge in Cincinnati, but whose appearance triggers memories of 
Schoolteacher and his posse coming to return her children to slavery. 
                                       
53 Cathy Caruth, ―Interview with Robert Jay Lifton‖ in Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory, 137. 
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But although Morrison does not portray Sethe as coming to such self-
knowledge as would enable her to rethink her radically altered sense of 
self—to claim ownership of herself, as Sethe memorably puts it54—the 
novel ends on a note that suggests she is well on her way to that 
moment; that she is about to find a new meaning in life. The first sign 
of this possibility is Sethe‘s tacit acceptance of Paul D‘s return. It has 
to be noted that the long first part of the novel which covers well over 
half of its entire length ends on a cold note of finality to their parting 
caused by Paul D‘s unsympathetic condemnation of Sethe for her act 
of ―thick‖ love. As Paul D makes his exit, Sethe, with back turned to 
him,55 murmurs the ominous words, ―So long.‖ But armed with a 
                                       
54 Sethe‘s thoughts on her first twenty-eight days of ―unslaved life‖ in which she 
notes the difference between being free and claiming ownership of the freed self are 
presented as follows: 
―Sethe has had twenty-eight days—the travel of one whole moon—of unslaved 
life. From the pure clear stream of spit that the little girl dribbled into her 
face to her oily blood was twenty-eight days. Days of healing, ease and real-
talk. Days of company: knowing the names of forty, fifty other Negroes, their 
views, habits; where they had been and what done; of feeling their fun and 
sorrow along with her own, which made it better. One taught her the 
alphabet; another a stitch. All taught her how it felt to wake up at dawn and 
decide what to do with the day. That‘s how she got through the waiting for 
Halle. Bit by bit, at 124 and in the Clearing, along with the others, she had 
claimed herself. Freeing yourself was one thing; claiming ownership of that 
freed self was another.‖ See Toni Morrison, Beloved, 111-12 (original 
emphasis). 
55 And here, I think, it is worth noting the symbolism of this gesture given that it was 
indeed Paul D‘s spontaneous empathy shown first by his shock at its sight and then 
by his loving caress of Sethe‘s frightfully scarred back that fanned the dead embers 
of trust in her heart.  Morrison gives a moving account of this moment, set 
appropriately in perhaps Sethe‘s most romantic moment with a man (I don‘t think we 
can name any other, not even with Halle, to rival it) on pages 21-22, from which I 
excerpt the following: 
―She [Sethe] opened the oven door and slid the pan of biscuits in. As 
she raised up from the heat she felt Paul D behind her and his hands under 
her breasts. She straightened up and knew, but could not feel, that his cheek 
was pressing into the branches of her chokecherry tree. 
Not even trying, he had become the kind of man who could walk into a 
house and make the women cry. Because with him, in his presence, they 
could. ... 
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better and more accurate understanding of the trauma of slavery, Paul 
D returns to Sethe a changed man. He acknowledges the error of his 
previous judgement, likening Sethe to a beast for allowing herself to be 
pushed to infanticide. ―You got two feet, Sethe, not four,‖ he had 
pronounced. His condemnation of Sethe for killing her daughter rather 
than let her be returned to slavery had lacked empathy, any sense of 
fellow-feeling for the peculiar way in which Sethe as a woman 
experienced the trauma of slavery differently from him as a man. Paul 
D‘s apathy not only thwarts the trust and solidarity he had inspired in 
Sethe, but also puts paid to his own ambition of taking root and 
starting a new life with her in the relative freedom of Cincinnati (261). 
But in more senses than one, Paul D‘s return to Sethe is also a 
return to a repressed and unexplored realm of his nature: empathy. It 
is precisely that quality that Paul D exhibits on the first day of his 
arrival at 124 and which achieves the magical effect of making Sethe 
want to trust and remember things again. Two instances mark this 
repressed trait to which Paul D now returns. First, he overlooks 
Denver‘s apparent resentment that the Sweet Home man who finds his 
way to them is not the father she pines for and instead defends her 
against Sethe‘s quick and stern chastisement (16). Second, and more 
important, Paul D, at the very beginning of their reunion, admits his 
                                                                                                              
Would there be a little space, she wondered, a little time, some way to 
hold off eventfulness, to push busyness into the corners of the room and just 
stand there a minute or two, naked from shoulder blade to waist, relieved of 
the weight of her breasts, smelling the stolen milk again and the pleasure  of 
baking bread? Maybe this one time she could stop dead still in the middle of 
a cooking meal—not even leave the stove—and feel the hurt her back ought 
to. Trust things and remember things because the last of the Sweet Home 
men was there to catch her if she sank?‖ 
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ignorance of the peculiarity of a woman‘s experience of slavery which 
must necessarily be different from either a man‘s or the general 
experience of slavery in significant ways. Implicitly, he also concedes 
the epistemic privilege that motherhood confers by confessing that 
―Men don‘t know nothing much‖ when Sethe begins to talk about her 
rape, the taking of her milk which nobody else could get to her baby 
fast enough or appropriately (19). And now when Sethe asks him if he 
has returned to count her feet, Paul D says only that he has come to 
rub them (321). Given that Sethe has at this point all but given up the 
ghost, Paul D‘s response recalls another moment of rescue from 
imminent death: when the fugitive Amy Denver rubs Sethe‘s ―dead‖ 
feet back to life and saves her on the bank of the Ohio River. These two 
moments, one evoking the other, as so much else does in this gripping 
narrative of inter-subjectivities, gestures towards the healing on the 
horizon. Thus, the beginning of Paul D‘s recovered consciousness and 
healing sets the stage for the kind of shared meaning and fellow feeling 
that would empower Sethe to begin the process of carefully reversing 
her negative sense of self. She is her own best thing, Paul D tells her. 
Although this seems incomprehensible to Sethe at first—she responds 
with a puzzled ―Me? Me?‖—the powerful ending scene nevertheless 
gives purchase to Paul D‘s optimism for the future when leaning over 
to take her hand and touch her face, he declares: ―me and you, we got 
more yesterday than anybody. We need some kind of tomorrow‖ (322). 
Inspired by Paul D‘s uncovering of the referential reality and 
epistemological basis of their shared trauma, Morrison presents Sethe 
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on the verge of recovering her human identity defined by will and 
moral agency.  
  
Reference as Epistemic Access: Trauma’s Horizon of Meaning 
 
We have seen the intriguing play of memory and forgetting in trauma 
return Sethe and Paul D, even at the most fraught moment, to a better 
interpretation of their experiences and an empowering self-knowledge. 
This seems an appropriate juncture for a discussion of reference as 
the conceptual category that facilitates the move from the one moment 
of self-apprehension to the other. For, it will be recalled, the absence of 
an adequate concept of reference in the work of the theorists I 
mentioned early on is, as I claim, a major lapse that prevents their 
useful insights from achieving their full explanatory potential. It is a 
lapse, I argue, that can be remedied by a realist conception of identity, 
given its privileging of reference as an inherently epistemological 
concept. Moreover, it is this lack, as I also show, that leads LaCapra to 
the contradiction earlier observed: asserting that the post-positivist 
realist conception of experience is too ―epistemocentric‖ while at the 
same time praising a realist reading of trauma in Beloved; doing so in 
opposition to readings which see the novel as an instance of misguided 
identity or memory politics. LaCapra applauds Mohanty for 
―elaborat[ing]‖ a reading that sees the novel instead ―as a significant, 
critical staging of the relation of a community to its past in terms of a 
shared traumatic memory.‖56 But what explains this relation, and how 
                                       
56 Dominick LaCapra, History in Transit, 43. 
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can a literary or cultural theory achieve LaCpra‘s avowed goal of 
―gain[ing] greater clarity about the concept of experience, especially in 
its implications for historical understanding?‖ (2). The absence of such 
an explanatory nexus is what Berger, reviewing Representing the 
Holocaust with specific regard to the intersection of history and 
literature, sees as ―a loss‖ in that LaCapra ―has not examined the 
relations between historical trauma and any literary text.‖57 Berger did 
not name it reference but I read him with the premise in mind that it 
is only in the way that human experience, linguistically expressed or 
otherwise, refers to the lived world that meaning is made—a reading, 
in any case, not far from Berger‘s acceptance of narrative as ―the 
representational means‖ through which a traumatic event may be 
remembered and yet retain its empirical essence. As Richard Boyd 
argues, literary-historical terms give us ―epistemic access‖ to the 
object of their terms only in their referentiality, what he describes with 
regard to metaphor as the ―accommodation of language‖—and we 
might add, any signifying practice—to the ―causal structure of the 
world.‖58 For Boyd, and for my purposes here, reference is 
―fundamentally an epistemological notion‖ and the main task of a 
theory of reference is to ―explain the role of language in the 
acquisition, assessment, improvement, and communication of 
knowledge‖; in particular, its role in facilitating ―social co-operation 
and rational deliberation.‖ Boyd sees this knowledge gathering process 
                                       
57 James Berger, ―Trauma and Literary Theory,‖ 577. 
58 See Richard Boyd, ―Metaphor and Theory Change: What is ‗Metaphor‘ a Metaphor 
For?‖ in Metaphor and Thought, 2nd ed, Andrew Ortony, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), especially 481-552. 
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as irreducibly social, as constituting the ―essential core‖ and ―basis‖ of 
a theory of reference. One of Boyd‘s illustrations of the sociality of this 
process is the manner sparrows successfully warn each other about 
the presence of predators in their midst.59 Epistemic access, then, 
entails the gathering of information about relevant explanatory 
features of the world. Being a social undertaking, we can engage in it 
only from specific locations, as social beings able to exercise reasoning 
and judgement with our background theories, our foreknowledge, as 
the starting point. Reference becomes in this view the condition of our 
existence as historical beings whose thoughts and actions have 
meaning or purpose only in the context of lived experience. Seen this 
way, epistemic access is the same thing as what Mohanty, extending 
Boyd, calls ―epistemic privilege‖60 and Alcoff, drawing extensively from 
the hermeneutic tradition, affirms as the ―horizon of agency‖ or an 
―interpretive horizon.‖61 What is common to these terms is the view 
that knowledge is socially embedded and that identities contain 
contingent meanings or interpretations of the world available to the 
individual or group as a result of shared location and experience. 
An insufficient appreciation of this aspect of experience and its 
role in meaning-making constitutes a serious lacuna in the effort by 
Caruth to attempt a theory of reference. In Unclaimed Experience, 
Caruth discloses the need to specify the ―link between narrative and 
reality‖ as the subject of her essay on reference and de Man. But 
although Caruth is quite mindful of the role of reference in giving 
                                       
59 This explanation will be found in 500-503. 
60 Satya Mohanty, Literary Theory and the Claims of History, 232-34. 
61 Linda Alcoff, Visible Identities, 42, 94. 
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access to history, she fails nevertheless to elaborate a convincing 
theory. It is worth pointing out, however, that this failure is partly due 
to an implicit and perhaps driving desire to defend Paul de Man from 
charges of anti-semitism in his World War II journalistic writings. 
Caruth justifies her choice of de Man with a focus on ―The Resistance 
to Theory‖ on the ground that it addresses ―the resistances, or 
objections, to theory made in the name of referential reality, or of an 
external world‖ (74). In that essay, it was de Man‘s mission, Caruth 
tells us, to disavow the claim that ―language cannot refer adequately to 
the world‖ nor ―truly refer to anything at all, leaving literature and 
language, and even consciousness in general, cut off from historical 
reality.‖ What de Man opposed, she adds, is the idea of linguistically 
oriented theories ―modelling the principles of reference on those of 
natural law.‖ He wished, rather, to demonstrate ―a way … of precisely 
keeping history from being swallowed up by the power of abstraction.‖ 
It is, then, against a naïve natural correspondence theory of reference 
that de Man offers the idea of a resistance ―from ‗within‘ theory‖ by 
associating it with ―falling,‖ with ―the resistance one feels upon ... the 
impact ... [of] falling down‖ (73-74). Caruth adopts this task of 
debunking simplistic correspondence theories of language and 
reference, but just as with de Man, without an intent to formulate a 
sophisticated and coherent alternative. It explains, I think, why she 
never contemplates a different framework that does not assume an 
unmediated link between sign and object, experience and reality. In 
the result, she is unable to pursue in the right direction her insight 
regarding the surprising force of knowledge constituted by trauma‘s 
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historicity (22); a force, she rightly observes, generated by the opacity 
resulting from trauma‘s inherent latency.  
Yet Caruth remains very close to the social hermeneutics of 
Boyd‘s epistemic access and what LaCapra alludes to when she notes 
that the belated experience of trauma inscribes a communal history 
that transcends the individual victim or one generation (71), and that 
―the story of trauma is inescapably bound to a referential return.‖ 
Caruth even goes so far as to speak of the ―interpretation of reference 
through trauma‖ to account for its belated impact (17). Unfortunately, 
Caruth‘s commitment to the de Manian view of reference leads her to 
an uncritical acceptance of the rather abstruse—she calls it 
paradoxical—idea of theory as a ―fall.‖ Distancing herself from any 
coherent notion of referential reality, Caruth asserts that reference 
emerges not in its accessibility to perception but in the resistance of 
language to perceptual analogies. Here is the full concluding passage: 
 
―[R]eference emerges not in its accessibility to perception, but in 
the resistance of language to perceptual analogies; that the 
impact of reference is felt, not in the search for an external 
referent, but in the necessity, and failure, of theory. This 
theoretical knowledge, however, cannot be separated from the 
particular performance of de Man‘s own text, which always 
accompanies its theoretical lesson with a story. It is the 
originality and unique referential resonance of de Man‘s writing, 
I would suggest, to discover the resistance of theory in the story 
it tells of its own falling. What theory does, de Man tells us 
repeatedly, is fall; and in falling, it refers. To capture the reality 
of this falling is the crucial task de Man‘s theoretical work is 
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engaged in, and it is the task that falls upon us as we read the 
very particular story of de Man‘s writing.‖ (90) 
 
The self-referential tenor of the argument apart, it is clear that Caruth, 
as de Man, speaks only of one kind of semiotic theory—the naive 
correspondence sort—but casts it as all theory which once it fails 
constitutes an absolute fall and thereby debunks external 
referentiality. Obviously, the basis of this argument lies outside of 
theory itself, as two critics point out. In his analyses of three key 
responses to de Man‘s World War II writings—including Jacques 
Derrida‘s no less, but not Caruth‘s essay62—LaCapra concludes that 
they fall within the ―justifiable motivation‖ of countering 
condemnations of de Man‘s early journalism as if it ―proves that 
deconstruction is politically dubious.‖63 James Berger who in his 
review of Unclaimed Experience responds directly to Caruth‘s essay 
shares this view. Berger considers the de Man chapter as 
―problematic,‖ as merely an apology for de Man through a defence of 
figurative language ―as the only properly referential language.‖ The 
chapter, he adds, valorises de Manian methods as the only valid mode 
of interpretation. Caruth‘s notion of theory or reference as falling, 
Berger charges, simply ―blurs at the end into an implied apology for de 
                                       
62 For this reason, I should stress that this is an interpretive move, a priori, on my 
part, and I dare it for the simple reason of Caruth‘s investment in the deconstructive 
project and her ebullient defence of de Man. It is unclear to me, however, why 
LaCapra fails to make any mention of Caruth whose essay, as originally published  
in the Yale Journal of Criticism (October 1990), precedes LaCapra‘s own original 
publication of his essay in History and Memory (vol. 4, 1992) by two years.  
63 Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma, 135. 
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Man‘s wartime writings.‖64 Indeed, Caruth ends up conflating the two 
terms: theory and reference. 
If neither de Man nor his explicator succeeds in formulating a 
theory of reference that would keep history from abstraction, it is easy 
to agree with the view that the best way to read de Man on reference is 
to see him as merely ―criticizing a foundationalist epistemology.‖65 For, 
clearly, de Man was still seeking the elusive linguistic access to history 
as late as the retrospective essay, ―The Return to Philology.‖66 The key 
to that access can be found in another kind of return—call it a return 
to the human—envisioned by M. H. Abrams in ―The Transformation of 
English Studies: 1930-1995‖ 67  and is fashioned by the social 
communication theory of language, elucidated by such realist 
philosophers of semiotics as Charles Sanders Peirce, Hilary Putnam, 
Mikhail Bakhtin, and the already cited Richard Boyd, among others.68 
Abrams‘s essay, like de Man‘s, is a retrospective look at the field of 
English and literary studies and provides a good perspective for 
highlighting the major failing of de Man‘s theory of language. ―I am 
confident,‖ Abrams says, ―that after all the current challenges and 
alternatives, the primary site of literary criticism and studies will again 
                                       
64 James Berger, ―Trauma and Literary Theory,‖ 578-79. 
65 Satya P. Mohanty, ―The Dynamics of Literary Reference: Narrative Discourse and 
Social Ideology in Two 19th Century Indian Novels‖ in Thematology: Literary Studies 
in India, ed. Sibaji Bandyopadhyay (Kolkata [Calcutta]: Jadavpur University, 2004), 
230-248, at 231. See also his Literary Theory, 32.  
66 Paul de Man, ―The Return to Philology,‖ in The Norton Anthology of Theory and 
Criticism, Vincent B. Leitch, editor (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 1527-31.  
67 M. H. Abrams, ―The Transformation of English Studies: 1930-1995,‖ Daedalus, 
126: 1 (Winter 1997), 105-131. 
68 For a detailed discussion of this theory from the standpoint of post-positivist 
realism, see the chapters, ―Paul de Man, Language, and the Politics of Meaning‖ and 
―Reference and the Social Basis of Language‖ in Mohanty‘s Literary Theory, 25-72.  
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be, as it has been for twenty-five hundred years, the human world; 
that is, a world of purposive human beings communicating with each 
other in an environing reality.‖ A return to such a world, says Abrams, 
―is an indispensable precondition to account for the historical 
development of a common language, as well as for the way each 
individual in turn learns to understand and to use that language ... 
the indispensable presupposition of all linguistic interchanges in the 
conduct of everyday life.‖ Abrams contrasts the social use of language 
to the driving impulses of contemporary literary theory which shift 
―intellectual vantage‖ from ―the humanistic frame of reference‖ to a 
―nonhuman site,‖ one defined by ―the play of language as such.‖ In the 
result, ―the human agents who produce and interpret a literary work, 
as well as the world that the work is said (directly or in a qualified 
way) to refer to or represent, are all translated into the products, 
effects, or constructs of language or discourse ... [and] ... the functions 
of human agency are transferred to the immanent dynamics of the 
signifying system.‖69 
No scholar writing after the ―linguistic turn‖ more unequivocally 
valorises such a signifying autonomy of language than de Man who 
figures it as inhering in ―the structure of language prior to the 
meaning it produces.‖70 It is the dominant current of de Man‘s writing 
on the subject and in many ways offers several useful insights along 
the deconstructive vein. The problem arises, however, when de Man 
                                       
69 See M. H. Abrams, ―The Transformation of English Studies: 1930-1995,‖ 
Daedalus, vol. 126, no. 1 (Winter 1997), 105-131. 
70 Paul de Man, ―The Return to Philology,‖ in The Norton Anthology of Theory and 
Criticism, 1530. 
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goes on to assert that it is a ―highly questionable ontological 
presupposition‖ to claim that ―language, poetic or otherwise, can say 
any experience.‖71 This is a never re-examined premise that leads de 
Man to create an exceptional figural status for literary language and to 
exaggerate that status beyond any useful caution against the aleatory 
dynamics of a symbolic system. Even at the cusp of the linguistic turn 
in the academy, it was fairly axiomatic—as the work of Peirce (whom 
de Man selectively cites),72 Bakhtin, Putnam, shows—that all forms of 
language, all signifying practices, even those constituted by inert 
signals (such as traffic signals), are as a rule socially mediated. But for 
de Man, literary language is ―the only form of language free from the 
fallacy of unmediated expression.‖73 The characteristic essence of 
literature, or fiction, he says, is ―its divergence, as a sign, from a 
meaning that depends for its existence on the constitutive activity of 
this sign‖ (ibid), a specificity that ―resides in the possibility of 
misreading and misrepresentation‖ (280). De Man‘s point here is that 
misreadings or misrepresentations are not functions of erroneous 
interpretation—a hermeneutical, and, so, human problem—but of the 
very nature of figural language. In short, one comes away from reading 
essay after essay that figural language for de Man becomes a god that 
gives birth to itself, hence its absolute self-referentiality: ―the structure 
                                       
71 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 232.  
72 See the chapter, ―Paul de Man, Language, and the Politics of Meaning,‖ especially 
the section, ―Reference and the ‗Autonomy‘ of Language‖ in Mohanty‘s Literary 
Theory, 42-46, for a discussion of the limited use de Man makes of Peirce. It is worth 
pointing out also that in the section on the underlying epistemological thesis of de 
Man‘s radical deconstructive theory of language, Mohanty also points out a similar 
narrow reading of Nietzsche (39-42).  
73 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight, 17. 
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of language [is] prior to the meaning it produces‖; ―all language is 
about language,‖ the conceptual power of language ―consists first of all 
of a wild, spontaneous metaphor,‖74 etc. This hermetically sealed, but 
infinitely protean (because figural), world of language authorises an 
indefinite number of meanings or readings, with none proffering a 
more or less accurate reference to the external world. I will take as 
exemplary of de Man‘s theory of reference his commentary on William 
Empson‘s analysis of the first type of ambiguity.75 De Man argues, 
with respect to Shakespeare‘s ―Bare ruined choirs, where late the 
sweet birds sang‖ that the ―‘meaning‘ of the metaphor is that it does 
not ‗mean‘ in any definite manner,‖ rather, it leads to ―an infinity of 
valid readings.‖76 Empson lists a dozen possible experiences the line 
can support and de Man sees ―many others,‖ leading him to conclude 
that far from ―setting up an adequation between two experiences‖ the 
metaphor does the very ―opposite.‖ And this grounds for de Man the 
impossibility of reference and, so, of the absolute indeterminacy of 
literary language. It is not only that literary language leads to a 
plurality of meanings, but that they are not distinct meanings, and 
what is more, they are mutually exclusive. In other words, since the 
text cannot mean one thing without meaning another/others which 
is/are contradictory, there can be no meaning; the text cannot say any 
experience. If this is always the case, then certainly we can only end 
up with the very abstraction of history that de Man ostensibly opposes. 
                                       
74 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke 
and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 153. 
75 See William Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity (New York: New Directions 
Publishing, 1966), contents page. 
76 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight, 236. 
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Perhaps it is an incipient awareness of this untenable result that 
compelled his late call for a return to philology—the discipline that 
studies cultures through the historical analyses of their languages—
and thus a return to the social origin and productivity of language for 
access to history and its varied, complex experiences. 
 
Conclusion: Specifying Morrison’s Locus of Referentiality 
 
As I hope to have more than indicated, Morrison intended a more or 
less clear historical referent for her narrative, notwithstanding the 
complication of the plot with a ―ghost story.‖ She does so, however, not 
to imply that language—a wrought and delicately handled thing in her 
hands—can ever be a mirror of nature that guarantees a one-to-one 
correspondence between sign and object. And she is indeed careful to 
point to the unsayable-in-language dimension of the story she tells 
through her narrative strategy and the caveat carefully placed (and 
repeated for emphasis) at the very end: ―It was not a story to pass on‖ 
and ―This was not a story to pass on‖ (324). Yet, if Morrison 
acknowledges the inherent ambiguity of language, she tries 
nonetheless to be explicit about the referential reality, the epistemic 
valence, of her narrative by foregrounding it in the psychic life of the 
slave family as lived within the ―house/home antagonism.‖77 But here 
is Morrison‘s image in Beloved of what she calls the ―racial house‖ 
occupied by the slave/ex-slave: 
                                       
77 Toni Morrison, ―Home,‖ in The House that Race Built, ed. Wahneema Lubiano (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1998), 5. 
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a real house, not a cabin. One with an address, one where 
former slaves lived on their own. There would be no lobby into 
this house, and there would be no ―introduction‖ into it or into 
the novel. I wanted the reader to be kidnapped, thrown 
ruthlessly into an alien environment as the first step into a 
shared experience with the book‘s population—just as the 
characters were snatched from one place to another, from any 
place to any other, without preparation or defense.‖78 
 
The ―shared experiences‖ of the novel‘s characters are referred to their 
historical cause, the original traumatic event. The victims were 
kidnapped, snatched and thrown into an alien environment ―without 
preparation or defense.‖ As has been noted, the debates that raged in 
the eighties about the ―dysfunctional,‖ ―pathological‖ black family, up 
to the (in)famous Moynihan Report, formed a specific context for 
Morrison‘s narrative. 79 Authorial intentions aside, we see Sethe, in the 
passage discussed early on, also express a firm sense of the link 
between traumatic experience and the historical site—―where I was 
before‖— of its occurrence. Similarly, Paul D establishes a connection 
between the experiences that drive him to the brink of total 
disintegration and the Middle Passage, a consciousness of which spells 
the beginning of his healing. But, perhaps, it is Baby Suggs who 
makes clearer the relationship between trauma and its referential 
                                       
78 Toni Morrison, Beloved, xviii. 
79 See the section, ――Ghosts of Liberalism: Beloved and the Moynihan Report‖ in 
Berger‘s After the End: Representations of Post-Apocalypse, 188-216, and Hortense J. 
Spillers, Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature and Culture, 203-
06. 
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reality with particular regard to the shattering impact the former had 
under slavery on the black family. The invasion of her house, which 
prompts Sethe‘s defiant act of infanticide, shatters Baby Suggs‘s body 
and mind, and in her response to Stamp Paid‘s fervent plea that she 
return to her exhortatory sermons, she betrays an understanding of 
her trauma linked directly to the unrelenting violation of her person, 
this time by way of trespass on her property even after she has been 
manumitted. To each and every argument Stamp Paid makes to 
convince her, Baby Suggs responds merely, ―They came in my yard,‖ 
echoing Sethe‘s earlier response in a different but related setting to 
Paul D: 
 
―You saying the whitefolks won? That what you saying?‖ 
―I‘m saying they came in my yard.‖ 
―You saying nothing counts?‖ 
―I‘m saying they came in my yard.‖ … 
―You saying God give up? Nothing left for us but pour out our 
own blood?‖ 
―I‘m saying they came in my yard.‖ (211) 
 
―They,‖ of course, stands for Schoolteacher and the legal code that 
empowered his tragic ―trespass‖— the external reality of slavery—thus 
creating the outside/inside dichotomy that must be referred to each 
other in the effort to uncover the meaning of a traumatic experience.  
But what meaning, what knowledge, any careful analysis of a trauma 
yields need not be ―unassailable‖— another word for foundational—as 
Scott curiously suggests. Indeed, it is the positivist hankering after 
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unassailable knowledge, bound to be frustrated by the sheer structure 
of scientific knowledge,80 that leads to denials of the cognitive 
dimensions of experience and reference. Yet, in the complexity of their 
reflections on their experiences and the gradual eradication of 
erroneous reasoning for more accurate views that reflect the 
constitutive features of their world, Morrison‘s portrayal of Sethe and 
Paul shows us that trauma is not beyond, but only a form of, 
experience—albeit, a kind that is resistant to schematisation. Through 
their layered exploration of the original and subsidiary causes of their 
trauma, its effects, and the viable modes of working it through, 
Morrison helps us to see a way of talking about experience as a 
cognitive category without denying that the identities it enables are 
social constructs. 
                                       
80 I am, of course, echoing the title of Thomas S. Kuhn‘s well-known work, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996).  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
―TILL THE WOUND AND THE WORD FIT‖: HEALING THE 
POSTCOLONIAL BODY-POLITIC IN DEREK WALCOTT‘S OMEROS 
 
A Free-Floating Wound? Hybridity, Social Complexity and Identity 
 
Six years before Omeros Derek Walcott had written in Midsummer of 
his quest for a transformative healing of the Caribbean‘s wound of 
history in the following words: ―Who next should pull his sword free of 
its mesh / of weeds and hammer at the shield / of language till the 
wound and the word fit?‖1 The emphasis here would appear to be 
aesthetic; healing possible only through linguistic agency, by 
―purifying the language of the tribe‖ as he put it—echoing T. S. Eliot—
in the essay, ―What the Twilight Says.‖2 But in the forty-first canto of 
Midsummer, Walcott gives indication of a search that transcends the 
merely linguistic by linking it to the larger struggle to ―appease the 
past.‖ Although it is not the first time that Walcott would deploy the 
trope of the Caribbean‘s wound of history—we have already noted the 
much earlier 1965 poem, ―Laventille,‖ in the preceding chapter where 
he likens it to a trauma—there is here a conscious effort to historicise 
the metaphor and trace the path to healing: that of reconciliation with 
ancestral origins. Addressing his fictional victim, Walcott says, ―You 
                                       
1 Derek Walcott, Collected Poems 1948-1984 (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 
1986), 490; further reference within the text. 
2 Derek Walcott, What the Twilight Says: Essays (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1998), 8. 
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were distressed by your habitat, you shall not find peace / till you and 
your origins reconcile; your jaw must droop / and your knuckles 
scrape the ground of your native place.‖  The wound, the word or 
language adequate to its pain, a hurtful past with which there must be 
a reconciliation, which in turn is possible only by reconciliation with 
the ex-slave‘s ancestral homeland— all of which form the plot of the 
―deep hymn of the Caribbean‖3 he would later write.  
To delineate more clearly the wound: it is the open sore of the 
transatlantic slave trade and its trans-generational post-traumatic 
syndrome manifested in what later became colonial possessions and 
the nominally free nation-states that succeeded the colonies at 
independence. It is also the wound of genocide against the native 
Indian populations of the West Indies. For Walcott, the wound 
symbolises a horror of the past that every denizen of the New World 
lives with, ―whether his ancestor was torturer or victim,‖ leaving him 
or her ―in the depth of conscience, silently screaming for pardon or 
revenge.‖4 In Omeros, it is the wound literally and symbolically caused 
by ―a rusted anchor‖5 and festering in Philoctete‘s leg; it is also the 
psychic head-wound of Major Plunkett (27).  Walcott, however, 
portrays the gash on Philoctete‘s shin as the representative wound of 
Caribbean history and on this point we need go no further than note 
that Plunkett ‘s wound is artificial. The swelling in Philoctete‘s shin, 
we are told, ―came from the chained ankles / of his grandfathers,‖ 
                                       
3 Derek Walcott, Omeros, (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1990), 321. 
4 Walcott, ―The Muse of History,‖ in What the Twilight Says, 39; subsequent reference 
to this volume of essays by page number where the context permits within the text. 
5 Derek Walcott, Omeros, 4. 
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which was why early on, before the reconciliation with origins, it defied 
Ma Kilman‘s ministrations and seemed to lack a cure. Walcott casts 
Philoctete as a martyr, saying of him that ―the cross he carried was not 
only the anchor‘s / but that of his race‖ (19). Plunkett‘s wound, on the 
other hand, had to be ―stitched‖ into his character‖; he had to be 
intentionally wounded, ―affliction [being] one of the themes of this 
work‖ (28). We are introduced to the narrative through the Ur-trope of 
the wound when Philoctete shows off his scarred shin to tourists; 
although, it should be noted, Walcott is very quick to place his 
affliction in the context of the other manifestations of the Caribbean 
trauma. In particular, the necessary wounding of the ancient trees—
metonymically, the gods of the autochthonous Caribs and Arawaks—
that, as fishermen, Philoctete and his mates are condemned to inflict 
in order to build the canoes of their trade, and the psychic wounds of 
the transplanted Plunketts. But the point is that every major character 
in—indeed, every Antillean addressee of—Omeros is wounded, and this 
is what gives purchase to Ma Kilman‘s declaration at the end, ―We 
shall all heal‖ (319). Walcott traces their suffering to a common tie to 
the Caribbean.  On this score, it is significant that Walcott casts 
Plunkett as a nominal representative of the rump of Empire who has 
renounced his white privileges and cross-identified with the 
Caribbbean to the extent of claiming indigeneity rights equal to 
anyone‘s—much like his distant forebear, Crusoe. Thus, with a 
wounded veteran‘s bravery and rage, Plunkett stands his ground 
against Hector to stake a non-negotiable claim to the land: ―I haven‘t 
spent / damned near twenty years on this godforsaken rock / to be 
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cursed like a tourist,‖ he heatedly declares when heckled as a white 
―honky‖ (256). Plunkett‘s claim is not to be taken lightly as the 
ecumenical vision Walcott elaborates in Omeros has a long genealogy. 
In ―What the Twilight Says,‖ an essay in which he seeks to construct 
an Antillean identity founded on the full range of the islands‘ 
experiences, Walcott asserts that the Caribbean cannot be claimed 
exclusively by any one of the races that now populate it: neither the 
descendants of African slaves, nor of Asian indentured workers, nor of 
the White plantation owners. To him, the legitimate claim to a pre-
eminent suffering and identity put forward by Africans is not an 
―inheritance but a bequest, like that of other races, a bill for the 
condition of our arrival as slaves.‖ Walcott adds, ―We have no more 
proprietorship as a race than have the indentured workers from Asia 
except the claim is wholly made. By all the races as one race.‖6 Walcott 
finds a fellow traveller from the Francophone side of the Caribbean in 
Edouard Glissant whose pluralist ―poetics of relation‖ proffers the view 
that following the extermination of the Caribs and Arawaks, the 
original possessors of the land, Antillean soil could no longer ―belong 
as a rooted absolute either to descendants of deported Africans or to 
the békés or to the Hindus or to the mulattoes.‖7 Lastly, Walcott‘s 
trope evokes the physical wound suffered by the land as it was forcibly 
taken from its original owners and made to suffer the ignominy of 
plantation economy: ―every cove‖ of the island, he asserts, is ―a 
wound‖ (249).  
                                       
6 Derek Walcott, What the Twilight Says, 10. 
7 Edouard Glissant, The Poetics of Relation, trans. T. Betsy Wing (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1997), 146-7.  
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Walcott thus evinces a clear sense of location and the unique 
social determinants of the wound borne by its inhabitants; what, in a 
nutshell, constitutes the horizon of meaning of his metaphor. Short of 
a direct invocation of the word, one would think that there can hardly 
be a more vigorous but complex assertion of Caribbean ―identity‖ than 
in Walcott‘s work, particularly in Omeros. To be sure, he has been 
vociferous, ferocious even, in denouncing a certain kind of identity 
politics in West Indian8 writing, but no careful reader would mistake 
the object of his acerbic criticism, itself a reaction in kind to being 
―jumped on ... for pretentiousness and for playing white‖9; to wit, the 
perceived soft aesthetic—as opposed to ―the truly tough aesthetic‖ that 
he advocates—of his traducers, which in his view is an essentialism 
that thrives on ―the glamour of simplifications‖ (8) in ―servitude to the 
muse of history‖ (37). The key word here is ―servitude,‖ a helpless 
bondage that seemingly justifies a wallowing in self-pity, recrimination 
and paralysing desire for revenge rather than a transcending of 
                                       
8 Needles to say, I use the terms the Caribbean, the Antilles and the Islands 
interchangeably but only descriptively in order to avoid the inevitable monotony of 
staying with one. 
9 Derek Walcott, What the Twilight Says, 8-9. It should be pointed out, however, that 
Walcott made himself vulnerable to this charge. He had not only willed himself, at 
the very beginning of his career, to ―suffer / In accurate iambics‖ (―Prelude,‖ 
Collected Poems, 3) but had at every turn also taken what might be described as 
inordinate delight in his colonial education whose ―grounding was rigid—Latin, 
Greek, and the essential masterpieces‖ (―Meanings,‖ Critical Perspectives 50) and in 
seeing himself as legitimately prolonging ―the mighty line of Marlowe and Milton‖ 
when describing his early ambition (see ―The Art of Poetry,‖ interview with Edward 
Hirsch, Critical Perspectives 71)—though not without the usual self-cancelling 
contradiction that is de rigueur with him. On the last point, see for instance the 
essay ―Leaving School,‖ where he speaks of his early struggles to discover who he 
was and in the process ―discovering the art of bitterness‖ as well as that he was ―a 
knot of paradoxes: hating the Church and loving her rituals, learning to hate 
England as I worshipped her language ... a Methodist-lecher, a near Catholic-ascetic, 
loving the island, and wishing [I] could get the hell out of it.‖ (Critical Perspectives, 
31-32). 
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despair. No doubt, Omeros marks a growth and refinement of Walcott‘s 
sensibility from the polemical note of internecine literary quarrels and 
the paralysing conundrum of ―A Far Cry from Africa‖ where he is so 
―divided to the vein‖ he cannot ―choose‖ between Africa and the 
English tongue, even when aware that he cannot ―turn from Africa and 
live.‖10 Apparently, for Walcott it wasn‘t so much a question of 
choosing sides—which presupposes self-evident truths—but a 
question of how to engage the bitterness of the history of slavery and 
colonialism that justified an essentialist identity politics.  As a defence 
of his poetic vision, then, it is difficult to disagree too forcefully with 
the view that a literature produced in servitude to history ―yellows into 
polemic or evaporates in pathos‖ while that sired by a putative tougher 
aesthetic, not driven to explain or forgive history but embracing social 
contradictions, is more likely to achieve the teleological goal of healing.  
In other words—and to adapt the Caribbean novelist and critic, Wilson 
Harris—that it is unlikely to produce an original or authentic gesture 
of freedom, but more on this below. Walcott‘s self-styled mulatto 
aesthetic, scornful of simplifications even for good reasons, refuses to 
accord history the distinction of ―a creative or culpable force‖ the 
better not to fall prey to its [history‘s] ―shame and awe,‖ and, 
ultimately, to cause the postcolonial poet to ―think of language as 
enslavement and ... in a rage for identity, respect only incoherence or 
nostalgia.‖11 Admittedly, this is stating the case from Walcott‘s 
perspective, and although the narrow point I am making here does not 
                                       
10 Derek Walcott, ―A Far Cry from Africa,‖ Collected Poems 1948-1984, 18. 
11 Derek Walcott, What the Twilight Says, 37. 
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require a more extended and even-handed discussion without the risk 
of being drawn too far afield, one can do worse than point to Patricia 
Ismond‘s critical evaluation of Walcott‘s poetics alongside the other 
prominent Caribbean poet, Edward Kamau Brathwaite, with whom he 
is often compared (for the most part, wrongly, in my view). While 
noting the highly ―positive and timely contribution‖ of Brathwaite‘s 
radical Afrocentric aesthetics, Ismond nevertheless concludes that ―in 
the final analysis‖ Walcott‘s form of assertive ―protest‖ is a stronger 
mode of consciousness.12  
But to read most of the recent exegeses on Walcott‘s work, even 
those that have focussed deservedly on Omeros, is to come away with 
the sense of a determined effort to make a postmodernist writer with 
                                       
12 See Patricia Ismond, ―Walcott versus Brathwaite‖ in Critical Perspectives on Derek 
Walcott, ed. Robert D. Hamner (Washington: Three Continents Press, 1993), 220-
236, at 236. I must be quick to point out, however, that I agree with the view that 
the comparison is a needless one, based as it is on a stark reductionism that does a 
great discursive injustice to both poets. The critic, John Thieme, has advanced two 
reasons why this is the case: the investment of both poets in highlighting the 
emergence of a creole or composite Caribbean culture and their common Western 
influences. Of particular note in Thieme‘s argument regarding the latter is the 
influence of T. S. Eliot‘s ―The Wasteland‖ in Brathwaite‘s celebrated trilogy, The 
Arrivants. Obviously, viewing Walcott as Eurocentric and Brathwaite as Afrocentric 
only tells a ―half-truth.‖ See John Thieme, Derek Walcott (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999), 3-4. I would like to point to one more instance of their 
substantive resemblance. It seems to me that Walcott‘s portrayal of Ma Kilman, the 
obeah woman who occupies the critical nexus of reconciliation with Africa (the native 
place, the past) and, so, healing, echoes Brathwaite‘s ―Negus‖ in the concluding 
trilogy of The Arrivants. The speaker of the poem, possibly a vodoun priestess, having 
listed what is not enough or adequate to a New World subjectivity, insists: ―I / must 
be given words to refashion futures / like a healer‘s hand‖ and adds, ―fill me with 
words / and I will blind your God.‖ As, it can be said, Ma Kilman, after learning the 
language of her grandmothers, the African babble she had earlier derided, learns to 
say the words—the names of the African gods—and so blinds the Catholic God (to 
whom she had been praying) before the secret curative herb is revealed to her (see 
below for my discussion of healing in Omeros). See Edward Brathwaite, The 
Arrivants: A New World Trilogy (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 224. And, 
arguably, Walcott makes a vicarious return to Africa through Achille (and, to some 
extent, Ma Kilman), the same journey that Brathwaite had made in person much 
earlier. 
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no ascertainable filial loyalties out of him. And, consequently, to 
ascribe to him a highly attenuated, if not indeterminate, poetics of 
place that can concede him only a hybrid, cosmopolitan, or 
transnational identity.  Walcott‘s powerful engagement with the 
traumatic history of the Caribbean is held then to lack historical 
specificity on the ground that the experiential uniqueness of his 
wound metaphor is ―energetically‖ deconstructed by the utter 
rhetorical force of resemblance and difference. Thus, although the 
main theme of this chapter is healing, it is worth pausing for a while to 
clear the path to that goal by examining this tendency, for identity—to 
parody Walcott himself—is a major theme of this dissertation. The 
social referents of the wound to be healed ought, then, to be 
established. In other words, if Philoctete‘s representative wound is not 
to be deemed a free-floating, non-referential mark on a random 
victim‘s body, then its specificity—what in the previous chapter we 
called the ―locus of referentiality‖—must be ascertained. Implicit to the 
quest for healing are the questions: who is/are to be healed, and 
where and how was the wound sustained in the first place? As 
Tejumola Olaniyan, in a critical examination of the poetics of Walcott‘s 
theatre asserts, ―there is no such thing as hybridity qua hybridity ... 
unanchored to a particular source.‖13 In the course of establishing the 
social referents of the wound, I will propose a framework for reading 
Walcott‘s apparently confounding identity politics against the readings 
that portray him as a hybrid postcolonial subversive of identity. After 
                                       
13 See Tejumola Olaniyan, Scars of Conquest/Masks of Resistance (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 114. 
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that, and as prelude to a detailed discussion of healing, I will briefly 
outline the psychoanalytic concepts of acting-out and working-through 
that I will be drawing from as essential components of any strategy for 
dealing with the historical trauma metaphorised as ―the wound‖ by 
Walcott. 
The anti-identitarian evaluations of Walcott I refer to above tend 
to fix upon the self-reflexive and highly allusive dynamics of the other 
powerful trope of his work—that of travel and discovery, or what John 
Thieme calls ―a poetics of migration‖14—to the detriment of the even 
more pervasive and strongly enunciated moments anchored to what 
Paul Breslin has described as a ―powerful homing instinct.‖ Breslin is 
careful to note, though, that this homing instinct often comes into 
―poignant conflict‖ with Walcott‘s ―continuing awareness of his status 
as traveler even in his own country.‖15 Proponents of views that 
schematically fit into this category seem to be driven to their 
conclusions by ―a propensity to read Postmodernly,‖ 16 as Rei Terada 
aptly put it. Yet Terada‘s 1992 study, Derek Walcott’s Poetry: American 
Mimicry, in which she made the above observation, is, ironically, an 
illustration of this trend. Terada acknowledges that Walcott does not 
                                       
14 John Thieme, Derek Walcott, 4; original emphasis.  
15 Paul Breslin, Nobody’s Nation: Reading Derek Walcott (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), 233. Breslin makes this observation with respect to The 
Arkansas Testament which contains the poem, ―The Light of the World,‖ that Rei 
Terada analyses to ground her appraisal of Walcott as a postmodernist but which 
Breslin gives a contrary reading in partial rebuttal of that claim. I say ―partial‖ 
because as I have merely obliquely indicated but will show below, Breslin stops short 
of naming his own doubts, his propensity to privilege open-endedness even in 
Omeros on the question of Walcott‘s identity politics, postmodern.   
16 See Rei Terada, Derek Walcott’s Poetry: American Mimicry (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1992), 226; subsequent reference within the text where the context 
permits.  
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perfectly fit the mould of postmodernism into which ―a vast majority‖ 
of the criticism concerned with his poetry seeks to press him. In fact, 
Terada further describes critics of this stripe as ―straining to reconcile 
the subversive postcolonial with the relatively conventional versifier‖ 
(213). Nevertheless, Terada devotes an epilogue to further strengthen 
this claim for no stronger reason than Walcott‘s  alleged obsession ―as 
a late twentieth-century postcolonial‖ with ―cultural and linguistic 
displacement,‖ a concern she can only softly say is ―sometimes held to 
be a hallmark of Postmodern literature‖ (ibid). If this is the condition 
for entry into the club of literary postmodernism, then virtually all 
postcolonial writers, it might be said, would be card-carrying 
members, given the necessarily destabilising relationship they must 
have with the imperial languages they are constrained to adopt as 
their medium of expression,17 to say nothing of the inevitably Janus-
                                       
17 That the postcolonial writer is unavoidably saddled with a relationship of ―cultural 
and linguistic displacement‖ with respect to the imperial language and culture and 
that she must therefore subvert the colonial language in order to make room for ―a 
new English‖ that will bear the burden of her experience is demonstrated by the 
following well-known formulation of the issue by Chinua Achebe—a writer not even 
Terada would accuse of linguistic postmodernism—in which, for good measure, he 
cites another ―postcolonial‖ writer, James Baldwin: 
 
The real question is not whether Africans could write in English but 
whether they ought to. Is it right that a man should abandon his mother 
tongue for someone else‘s? It looks like a dreadful betrayal and produces a 
guilty feeling. But for me there is no other choice. I have been given this 
language and I intend to use it. I hope, though, that there always will be men, 
like the late Chief Fagunwa, who will choose to write in their mother tongue 
and insure that our ethnic literature will flourish alongside with the national 
ones. For those of us who opt for English, there is much work ahead and 
much excitement.  
 
Writing in the London Observer recently, James Baldwin said: 
 
My quarrel with the English language has been that the language 
reflected none of my experience. But now I began to see the matter 
another way. Perhaps the language was not my own because I had 
never attempted to use it, had only learned to imitate it. If this were 
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faced and cross-cultural nature of postcolonial society. All doubts 
apart, however, Terada portrays Walcott as a postmodernist with an 
admittedly forceful reading of the poem, ―The Light of the World‖ from 
The Arkansas Testament. Terada likens Walcott to Paul de Man in his 
―turns of thought regarding figuration‖ (214) and over the next  twelve 
pages strains—it is difficult to avoid the word—to show how Walcott‘s 
multi-layered deployment of image and metaphor, in short the play of 
language in the poem, proves his postmodernism. But if the premise of 
Terada‘s reading is the de Manian location of ―the poetic by means of 
figuration‖ in ―opposition to nonpoetic language,‖ a matter in which 
rhetoric and figurality are equated ―with literature itself‖ (215), then 
what are we to make of her admission towards the end—encouraged 
by her unconvincing comparison of Walcott with Bob Marley—that all 
language is after all figural?  ―In the end,‖ Terada says, ―the poem 
suggests that the ‗poetic‘ language of metaphor cannot be held apart 
from Bob Marley‘s language, from the old woman‘s [of the poem‘s] 
language, from all language‖ (223). We are not in brighter light either 
when, concluding by way of a return to the problematic of a precise 
definition of postmodernism, Terada ends with a statement that goes 
so far as to make the striking observation already referenced above: 
                                                                                                              
the case, then it might be made to bear the burden of my experience if 
I could find the stamina to challenge it, and me, to such a test. 
 
I recognize, of course, that Baldwin‘s problem is not exactly mine, but I 
feel that the English language will be able to carry the weight of my African 
experience. But it will have to be a new English, still in full communion with 
its ancestral home but altered to suit its new African surroundings. See 
Achebe, Morning Yet on Creation Day (New York: Doubleday, 1975). I should 
point out that the quotation from Baldwin is incorporated in Achebe‘s 
statement. 
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that postmodernism is best defined ―not as a set of attitudes or a 
grammar of rhetoric, but as inseparable from the propensity to read 
Postmodernly‖ (226). But this very propensity, one might say, is 
precisely what defines her reading of the poem, propelled as it is by an 
impulse towards linguistic indeterminacy making it possible for her to 
conclude that the poem‘s rhetorical force puts Walcott ―in the realm of 
undecidability.‖ Citing Derrida with particular reference to what she 
sees as the double metaphorisation of the poem as a ―thing,‖ Terada 
argues that since the title of the poem comprises a proper name,  
 
we cannot, as when Derrida writes of Ponge, ―know with any 
peaceful certainty whether [it] designates the name of the thing.‖ 
The reader cannot stand between these two interpretations to 
choose one. Neither can we decide whether ―The Light of the 
World‖ actively produces and undoes these contradictions or 
whether these contradictions actively produce and undo it, for 
the process of disclosing the ubiquity of rhetoric also begins in 
self-knowledge and moves towards generalization, following the 
route of the universalizing impulse it queries. (square brackets 
original)  
 
Thus, although Terada, once again speaking provisionally, goes on to 
say that if Walcott is at all postmodern, his postmodernity ―trails 
behind it Modernism‘s tendency to universalize‖ (225) she appears 
nonetheless more clearly inclined towards a postmodernly reading for 
the aporetic than towards that which might privilege a particular 
meaning.  For her, there can be no choice between competing 
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readings; no interpretation which might be more convincing because it 
refers more (or less) accurately to the environing world of the poem. 
We can take as an instance of this claim the differing interpretations 
by Terada and Breslin of Walcott‘s misunderstanding of the Marley 
lyrics he chose as epigraph for the poem —―Kaya now, got to have 
Kaya now. ... / For the rain is falling.‖ For ―kaya,‖ as both critics note, 
Walcott mistakenly substitutes ―Zion-ah‖ in an earlier version of the 
poem. For Terada, this substitution of Zion for marijuana (kaya) 
―magnifies the apocalyptic character of transport‖ for the poor St 
Lucian passengers of the city transport, singing and rocking to Marley 
playing on its stereo. In consequence, Walcott, Terada maintains, does 
more than delineate ―concurrent desires‖ and goes even further to ask 
―whether metaphorical transport, in its ecstasy, either leaves its 
supposed subject behind to unecstatic life and death, or carries them 
to oblivion by sweeping them up with it‖ (219). Either of Terada‘s 
binary oppositions here possesses equal valence and so cancels the 
other out, which is why she leaves the matter there. To the contrary, 
Breslin in Nation or Nobody sees in Walcott‘s substituted word for kaya 
corroboration of his suspicion that ―despite its decentering gestures, 
this poem harbours a longing for an earthly and transcendent center, 
a ‗Zion‘‖ (239). As he points out, the lyrics of the song were printed on 
the 1978 album by Marley and the Wailers entitled Kaya. Thus, while 
it is possible that Walcott may indeed not have been ―an avid Marley 
listener,‖ it is also possible that the ―longing‖ Breslin senses may have 
led him to shape his replacement word as Zion-ah—which, for good 
measure, rhymes with ―kaya now.‖  
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What Terada does not entertain, due to her investment in 
reading postmodernly, is the possibility that there might be more than 
mere rhetorical play at issue here and that a related, if not different, 
aesthetic could be what Olaniyan, following Allan Weis, calls ―coherent 
deformation‖ for an ―enabling Caribbean cultural identity.‖ Seen this 
way, rhetoric is both a subversive and a reconstitutive force, providing 
a way beyond a merely deconstructive and disabling aporia. ―Coherent 
deformation,‖ Olaniyan explains, ―is subversive in its undermining the 
stability of signs, the destruction of the established order of meaning 
and classification, and the suggestion of the possibility of a 
realignment of forces.‖18 It is important to note that Terada seizes a 
telling moment obviously susceptible to a different interpretation to 
clinch her argument—the moment when the poet-persona of the poem, 
presumably Walcott, moves from being a distant observer and 
commentator on the progress of the transport as it picks up and drops 
passengers to a more neighbourly attitude.  The closing scene is quite 
telling. On disembarking, Walcott drops a pack of cigarettes. One of 
the passengers calls him by his name from inside the transport by the 
window and Walcott walks towards him as he holds out the pack. This 
is a pivotal moment for Terada because Walcott, who in the 
locutionary stance of the poem describes himself as a ―transient,‖ then 
cries tears of rejection since there was nothing, it seemed, they wanted 
from him nor that he could give them.‖19 Terada concludes that ―the 
poet [Walcott] and his counterpart, representing his community, 
                                       
18 Tejumola Olaniyan, Scars of Conquest/Masks of Resistance, 114. 
19 Derek Walcott, The Arkansas Testament (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 
1987), 51; further reference within the text. 
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exchange virtually ‗nothing‘‖ (223) and that nothing is everything in 
the figurative economy of the poem. But to so aver requires that 
Terada make nothing of the fact that the poet [Walcott] does indeed 
have something he can give and which the man, as well  as the 
community, might want, for the maudlin line ends more optimistically: 
―nothing I could give them / but this thing I have called ‗The Light of 
the World‘.‖ That they would want his poem is within the ambit of 
Terada‘s reading, since she admits that the man‘s gesture of alerting 
the poet to his dropped cigarettes ―embodies‖ neighbourliness, 
consideration, and polite partings, attributes of his society ―that have 
moved the poet to write about it.‖ Indeed, that Walcott ―gives that 
society what he loves most, his lux mundi, beauty, poetry,‖ but not to 
concede too much, Terada insists that this prized gift amounts to 
nothing and is ―even a repetition of abandonment‖ (224). Yet, there is 
no evidence that the man or the community that rocks to Marley, 
whose language is as figurative as theirs (by Terada‘s own admission), 
thought or would think nothing of Walcott‘s gift of poetry. If anything, 
it can only be presumed that they would indeed value it, for how else 
would the man have known the poet/Walcott by name? If the 
propensity to read postmodernly is suspended for a moment, then we 
see that the poet, as Terada correctly notes, ―aims for communal 
relevance, beauty and truth‖ (225), values at odds with the 
postmodern project, but completely at home with rhetoric, if we 
understand rhetoricity to be the inherent characteristic of all 
language. Furthermore, the driving emotion of the poem is a melange 
of the laceration of guilt arising from class difference on Walcott‘s part 
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(he can simply catch the plane and leave for a better life anytime),  
helplessness (changing the material conditions of his poor fellow 
citizens is beyond his power), and pity for their lot (sheer empathy or 
fellow feeling, an indispensable quality for a poet)—which Terada also 
sees, though she chooses to emphasise what she calls ―mutual 
abandonment‖ and Walcott‘s alleged ―jealousy‖ of Marley, ―an apter 
and stronger competitor‖ (222). Walcott alludes to the emotional centre 
of the poem, what Breslin sees as a Platonism, in the following 
response to Edward Hirsch‘s question whether or not he still felt ―the 
old tugs between home and abroad‖ and is worth quoting in extenso:  
 
I‘ve never felt that I belong anywhere else but in St. Lucia. The 
geographical and spiritual fixity is there. However, there‘s a 
reality here as well. This afternoon I asked myself if I would stay 
here for the rest of my life if I had the chance of leaving. The 
answer really is, I suppose, no. I don‘t know if I‘m distressed by 
that. One is bound to feel the difference between these poor, 
dark, very small houses, the people in the streets, and yourself 
because you always have the chance of taking a plane out. 
Basically you are a fortunate traveller, a visitor; your luck is that 
you can always leave. And it‘s hard to imagine that there are 
people around you unable, incapable of leaving either because of 
money or because of any number of ties. And yet the more I 
come back here the less I feel that I‘m a prodigal or a castaway 
returning. And it may be that as it deepens with age, you get 
more locked into what your life is and where you‘ve come from 
and what you misunderstand and what you should have 
understood and what you‘re trying to reunderstand and so on. 
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I‘ll continue to come back to see if what I write is not beyond the 
experience of the person sitting next to me on the bus—not in 
terms of talking down to that person, but of sharing that 
person‘s pain and strength necessary in those pathetically cruel 
circumstances in which people have found themselves following 
the devastations of colonialism.20 
 
The passage hardly needs commentary, except to say that while 
Walcott may have said that he didn‘t know if he was distressed by the 
necessity, as well as choice, of leaving, he seemed to be expressing the 
opposite feeling at just about the same time: his interview with Hirsch 
took place in mid-June 1985 while he was still working on the poem, 
the first published version of which appeared the following year in The 
Paris Review.21 The passage offers additional refutation of the notion of 
Walcott‘s radical subversion of ethnic and national loyalties, as we 
shall see below. Indeed, the specific concern about not writing 
anything ―beyond the experience of the person sitting next to me on 
the bus‖ suggests that the poem he eventually wrote is a poetic 
rendition of the heart-felt emotion he expresses here. In his head-note 
to the interview, Hirsch describes that early draft of ―The Light of the 
World‖ as ―a large poem of guilt and expiation,‖ adding that it ―gives a 
good sense of Walcott‘s inner feelings.‖ But in line with a protocol that 
emphasises, often exclusively, only those implications—as Breslin 
                                       
20 See Edward Hirsch, ―The Art of Poetry XXXVIII: Derek Walcott,‖ in Conversations 
with Derek Walcott, ed. William Baer (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1996), 
95-121, at 115. 
21 In Issue 101 of Winter 1986; it would seem Breslin wrongly cites Partisan Review. 
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observes—―that pertain to writing,‖22 Terada dwells on Walcott‘s 
punning on the word ―abandonment,‖ since for her the word 
―inevitably accompanies figuration‖ and ―writing ... marks the site of 
perpetually abandoned presence‖ (220).  
Breslin describes Terada‘s reading as telling only ―half the truth‖ 
because it ―thins out the social complexity of the poem‖23 and provides 
an alternate interpretation. With respect to modes of apprehending 
beauty in the (non)light of the difficulty posed by the poem‘s setting (a 
minibus at dusk) and which Terada presses to her argument about its 
inderterminate meaning, Breslin sees not the language of 
postmodernism but that of Platonism (236), yet even he seems to 
dither in answering the question whether or not Walcott‘s ―longing for 
a transcendent center [is] related to the longing for an earthly center, 
for ‗home‘‖ (235).  Breslin seems to want to answer yes, especially 
given the persuasive way he counters Terada by highlighting the 
social, as opposed to the merely textual, with a folksy interpretation of 
the narrator‘s sense of alienation—abandonment in the poem—that 
Terada sees as proof of a postmodernist sensibility.  But the closest 
Breslin comes to affirming that intimation is in asserting Walcott‘s 
divided identity: ―both grounded in and estranged from his St. Lucian 
origins‖ (237), which, though true, does not move the reader closer to 
                                       
22 Paul Breslin, Nobody’s Nation, 237. Michael Dash ploughs the same postmodernist 
furrow as Terada in The Other America: Caribbean Literature in a New World Context 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998, at page 105) by claiming that 
Walcott ―enacts the drama of displacement and the impossibility of possessing any 
ultimate truth.‖22 Dash thus underlines the shibboleth of epistemological scepticism 
which, as evident in the ensuing discussion of Jahan Ramazani‘s poetics of 
hybridity, brings the argument closer home on the specific question of identity. 
23 Paul Breslin, Nobody’s Nation, 237. 
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the longing for home he aptly discerns. And it is this theme of 
dividedness, of an ambiguous or indeterminate identity, cited as 
evidence of Walcott‘s postmodernism, that Jahan Ramazani celebrates 
under the well-known sign of hybridity, the import of which is that the 
historical wound of slavery and colonialism as experienced in the 
Caribbean can somehow be a free-floating signifier.  
In The Hybrid Muse: Postcolonial Poetry in English, Ramazani 
seeks primarily to correct the neglect, often tending towards outright 
exclusion, of English language poetry written on the periphery from 
the canon of contemporary poetry, and, surprisingly, from postcolonial 
discourse as well.24 For the task, Ramazani focussed on the poetry of 
four indisputably postcolonial writers—Walcott and his fellow 
Caribbean, Louise Bennett; the Indian A. K. Ramanujan; and the late 
Ugandan poet, Okot p‘Bitek—as well as on W. B. Yeats, doing so by 
joining the trend of reading Irish literature as postcolonial, popularised 
by Edward Said.25 The critical consensus is that Ramazani‘s book 
succeeds immensely in making the case for postcolonial poetry in the 
curriculum and the canon-making anthologies of the Western cultural 
institution. For instance, a reviewer described The Hybrid Muse as a 
―brilliant and groundbreaking book that eloquently challenges and 
creatively complicates our understanding of the scope of modern 
poetry in English.‖26 But if there is universal praise for Ramazani‘s 
                                       
24 Jahan Ramazani, The Hybrid Muse: Postcolonial Poetry in English (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001), 3; subsequently within the text. 
25 See Section III, entitled ―Yeats and Decolonization‖ in Chapter Three of Said‘s 
Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1994), 265-288. 
26 See Lee M. Jenkins, ―Hybrid Muse or Mulatto of Style: ‗Contact Zones of 
Postcoloniality,‘‖ Contemporary Literature XLIII, (3) 575-585, at 580. 
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achievement with respect to his primary goal, there seems nonetheless 
discernible unease with the claims he makes about the essence of 
postcolonial poetry and its poetics of identity. Thus, Lynn Innes begins 
her review by remarking that The Hybrid Muse is a ―thoughtful‖ but 
―challenging, and often challengeable book,‖ and seems to reiterate 
this view when she says that Ramazani‘s effort to ―rescue‖ Yeats and 
Walcott from the attacks of nationalist and postcolonial critics is ―not 
always‖ convincing.27 In his review, Steve Burt also appears to make 
the same point, even if obliquely, with the repeated use of the phrase 
―largely convincing‖ to describe the essays in the book.28 Regrettably, 
neither Innes nor Burt offers a specific challenge or gives any detail of 
their misgivings, the source of which, it is possible to speculate, might 
not be too far from Ramazani‘s vigorous positing of hybridity or 
cultural in-betweenness as the defining characteristic of postcolonial 
writing, with Yeats as the paradigmatic postcolonial poet. Yeats is the 
subject of the first individual chapter, which serves to underline his 
ascribed representativeness. ―Too anglicized to be Irish and too 
‗gaelicized‘ to be English, the Anglo-Irish Yeats typifies the intersticial 
(sic) writer of the postcolonial world‖ (37), Ramazani asserts. Regarding 
this claim, Burt comments that it may be ―common sense for 
confirmed Yeatsians; other readers may be shocked, or pleased.‖ My 
suspicion is that shock might be the readier response to a similar 
formulation with a writer whose postcoloniality is less debatable than 
Yeats‘s. Consider: ―Too anglicised to be Yoruba and too Yoruba-ised to 
                                       
27 See Lynn Innes‘s untitled review in Research in African Literatures, 35.3 (Fall 
2004): 178-179. 
28 See Steve Burt‘s review in College Literature 30.3 (Summer 2003): 157-59. 
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be English/Western, Soyinka. ...‖ Or say, Achebe, Ngugi, Brathwaite, 
etc.  
What is troubling about Ramazani‘s paradigm is precisely what I 
have been discussing: the propensity to read postmodernly. Ramazani 
is aware of the hotly contested notion of hybridity within postcolonial 
studies on the ground—quoting his own summary of the debate—that 
it ―depoliticizes‖ the condition it supposedly describes ―by suppressing 
asymmetries of power‖ (38) and for ―presupposing a false antithesis of 
purity.‖ Yet Ramazani mounts his argument ―notwithstanding‖ these 
demurrals for purely aesthetic reasons, because unlike what he 
reductively characterizes as  
 
baldly political conceptualizations of postcoloniality as 
anticolonialism, nationalism, and Third-Worldism, hybridity is 
potentially more responsive to the aesthetic complexity of 
literary texts. Whereas an idea like anticolonialism or 
nationalism can barely account for the intricate texture of a 
literary work, an idea like hybridity or creolization invites the 
exegete to attend to the intercultural tensions and fusions at the 
level of language, style, concept, and genre. (36) 
   
At least two assumptions inform this view: one, that the concepts of 
anticolonialism, nationalism and Third-Worldism—irrespective of how 
they are mobilised as mediating theories—are necessarily ―bald,‖ that 
is, vulgar and unsophisticated; and, two, that there is, presumably, no 
other theoretical framework outside hybridity adequate to the formal  
challenges posed by the postcolonial text. Ramazani seems to be 
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suggesting that it is only under the prism of linguistic indeterminacy 
that the text can yield its intricacy or complexity. But this, quite 
simply, is not the case. When the Caribbean novelist and critic, Wilson 
Harris, reflects on the dialectical entwining of ―freedom and 
complexity‖ in ―the march of events‖29 that shapes the critical 
imagination of the postcolonial writer, he certainly does so with a mind 
to laying bare the intercultural tensions and fusions at the level of 
language, style, concept, and genre with specific reference to Soyinka‘s 
The Road. Harris may not have done so as a poststructuralist theorist 
preoccupied with the non-referentiality of the play‘s language —that is, 
at the simplistic level of a naturalistic sign-object correspondence—or 
of the (post)colonial malaise that forms its plot, but his desire to 
―penetrate partial images‖30 is surely another way of avoiding the 
pitfalls of essentialist identity constructs through unproblematic 
referentiality. For Harris, this interpretive move —which seems to me 
as aesthetic as it is hermeneutic—―evoke[s] inner links and 
correspondences with stranger cultures‖ that leads ―towards a goal of 
profound self-awareness.‖ Indeed, the resultant open-endedness or 
fluidity of the image of self and society that emerges from Harris‘s 
insight is couched in diction that would be recognisable to the 
poststructuralist. The goal of profound self-awareness, he says, 
―remains ceaselessly unfinished or drawn towards futurity in an 
intricate play of partial image upon partial image open to mutual re-
                                       
29 Wilson Harris, ―The Complexity of Freedom‖ in Perspectives on Wole Soyinka: 
Freedom and Complexity, ed. Biodun Jeyifo (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 
2001), 51-61, at 52. 
30 Wilson Harris, ―The Complexity of Freedom‖ in Perspectives on Wole Soyinka: 
Freedom and Complexity, 54. 
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visualizations, intricate exploration backwards and forwards within a 
world that alters to re-educate itself into flexible limits in the living we 
take for granted as exploiter and exploited‖ (54-55). What 
distinguishes Harris‘s critical vision is that his acceptance of such 
mutual imbrications, of the postcolonial writer‘s evocation of inner 
links and correspondences with stranger cultures—in a word, social 
complexity—is not at the expense of the uniqueness of her historical 
experience and that of her audience, which is why for him the 
penetration of partial images is a condition for the ―evolution of 
community‖ (ibid). Partiality, which must rely for completion on the 
other, becomes a given of postcoloniality; thus, any authentic gesture 
of freedom is necessarily masked by the historical restrictions that it 
sets out to break. I can think of no better formulation of the dialectic 
of freedom and complexity in the postcolonial text than the following: 
 
There is no decision or originality of gesture and freedom of 
movement that can be authentic unless as it arises to 
consciousness it confesses to how it is still masked, in some 
degree, by the very conditions from which it arises, by past 
education or propaganda, past or present insecurities and 
anxieties, by the historical restriction it partially breaks. And as 
it so confesses it points intuitively to the reality of freedom, the 
complexity of freedom, as an unfathomable decision that varies 
with the cloak of age or biased history it unravels. (53)  
 
What all of this speaks to is the unique historical experience that the 
postcolonial text both re-presents and seeks to transform without 
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giving up its particular horizon of meaning, and it would seem 
incapable of being fully penetrated or exhausted by a mere aesthetic 
approach—as indeed all baldly political conceptualizations.31 Any 
predisposition to privilege the writing or linguistic aspects of the text 
runs the considerable danger of thinning out its social dimensions, as 
Breslin has noted. 
 Beyond the general postmodern proclivity to the instability of 
the sign, however, is a certain logic imposed by Ramazani‘s goal, and 
hence his valorisation of the purely aesthetic. The neglect of poetry 
and the elevation of narrative fiction as the exemplary postcolonial 
genre of self-representation has been mostly justified on the ground 
that poetry ―is a less transparent medium by which to recuperate the 
history, politics, and sociology of postcolonial societies.‖32 Ramazani 
rightly claims, however, that precisely because poetry is defined by 
―paradox and multivalent symbols, irony and metaphor‖ it is the genre 
―well-suited to mediating and registering the contradictions of split 
cultural experience ... of living after colonialism, between non-Western 
traditions and modernity, at a moment of explosive change in the 
relation between Western and ‗native‘ cultures‖ (6). The point to make 
here is that an application of the concept of hybridity to the poetic 
postcolonial text qua text, that is, as a purely aesthetic exercise, does 
in fact yield many of the insights and pleasures that Ramazani 
brilliantly highlights in each of his cases; enough to show that 
                                       
31 For more on how the complexity of the postcolonial text can be critically realized 
outside Ramazani‘s hybridity framework, see in general all the essays in Perspectives 
on Wole Soyinka, but in particular Jeyifo‘s Introduction and featured essay, ―Wole 
Soyinka and the Tropes of Disalienation.‖ 
32 Jahan Ramazani, The Hybrid Muse, 4. 
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postcolonial poetry is the equal of English poetry wherever written. As 
the quoted passage in which he contrasts the concept of hybridity to 
other conceptualisations suggests, however, this leads to an evaluative 
stance that tends to deny the postcolonial writer an interpretive 
horizon, a locus of referentiality, on the ground that hybridity puts 
him or her ―beyond identitarian boundaries‖ (ibid). The focus on 
figurality, as we saw with Terada, tends, then, to gesture towards an 
affirmation of cultural identity only to retreat in homage to the 
overriding notion of indeterminacy. Thus, in a passage where 
Ramazani remarks about the seeming incompatibility of metaphor and 
postcoloniality from ―the perspective of ... identity politics,‖ he can see 
only what he calls ―the spiralling of the wound motif in Omeros‖ which 
in turn reveals how Walcott‘s poetic imagination ―in its restless work of 
discovering and creating resemblances, confound (sic) tribal, ethnic, or 
national limits‖ (69), precisely because his poetry is ―less respectful of 
racial, regional, [and] national loyalties‖ (68). At this point, Ramazani‘s 
specific argument becomes somewhat unclear: is it that Walcott‘s 
poetry and poetics are pointedly subversive of national and ethnic 
identity, that is, beyond identitarian boundaries, or just ―less 
respectful‖ of them? In which case, it becomes a matter of degrees of 
loyalty depending on the interpreter? In further asserting that 
Walcott‘s wound motif ―exemplifies the slipperiness and polyvalence of 
poetic discourse that circulates between races, crossing lines of class 
and community, bridging differences between West Indian fisherman 
and Greek warrior (ibid),‖ Ramazani prepares the way for the major 
premise of his postmodernly reading: the instability and non-
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referentiality of a sign (here the wound) and so its lack of cultural 
specificity. Far from mirroring Jameson‘s national allegory as ―a trope 
of unproblematic referentiality‖ that would make it ―stand for the 
particular historical experience of a particular race in a particular part 
of the world,‖ Ramazani argues, Walcott‘s deployment of the wound 
metaphor privileges an energetic play on its instability. Quoting Elaine 
Scarry, Ramazani insists that the wound does not instance ―the 
perfect, unambiguous allegory of Afro-Caribean history‖ but a 
―nonreferentiality that rather than eliminating all referential activity 
instead gives it a frightening freedom of referential activity‖ (65). 
Leaving aside the apparent contradiction in the claim on reference, we 
see once again that a contentious assumption informs his view and it 
is to be found in the key phrases ―perfect, unproblematic allegory‖ and 
―unambiguous referentiality.‖ For the obvious question is what 
happens where no such assumptions underline a differing theoretical 
concept of the postcolonial text, but which yet seeks to recover from 
the maze of literary tropes and allusions a ―powerful homing instinct‖ 
or ―longing for an earthly and transcendent center,‖ as Breslin opines 
concerning Walcott? And on reference, Ramazani quotes Scarry as 
saying that the wound, far from erasing all referential activity, gives it 
even more power to refer. To what, then, does it refer, after we have 
parsed every pun, mapped every metaphor, charted the course of every 
journey beyond local or regional boundaries; when the spiralling of the 
wound is less dizzying or, even, has ceased temporarily? Would the so-
called instability of the wound as a sign still be so confounding as to 
expunge from Philoctete‘s mind the historical specificity and meaning 
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delineating both the national (the village is in St. Lucia) cum racial 
boundaries of experience that he attaches to his affliction? Can we, in 
fact, say of Philoctete (or Hector, or Achille, or Helen, or Ma Kilman 
despite her initial Catholicism) that they are respectively too 
Europeanised to be St Lucian and too St Lucian to be European? We 
here recall what Walcott‘s narrator says of Philoctete:  
 
He believed the swelling came from the chained ankles 
of his grandfathers. Or else why was there no cure? 
That the cross he carried was not only the anchor‘s 
 
but that of his race, for a village black and poor 
as the pigs that rooted in its burning garbage …33  
 
Pushing his notion of non-referentiality further, Ramazani holds that 
―by attaching the wound to the name Philoctete and to a black body, 
Walcott already contaminates and disrupts the specificities demanded 
by national allegory. ―Discourses of realist fiction and of nationalist 
politics,‖ he writes, ―might seek to control and even defeat the 
‗referential instability‘ of the wound, affixing it to a particular people, 
motive, or cause. But by attaching the wound trope to the name of 
Philoctete and to a black body, Walcott already contaminates and 
disrupts the specificities demanded by ―national allegory‖ (65). Again 
Ramazani‘s discursive premise unwittingly perpetrates a sense of the 
false antithesis of purity that critics of hybridity allege. Walcott, he 
says, ―contaminates‖ the national allegory, yet one cannot speak of 
contamination without presuming purity. But why does Ramazani, 
                                       
33 Derek Walcott, Omeros, 19. 
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who as early as the introductory chapter quotes Eliot to the effect that 
―No art is more stubbornly national than poetry‖ and understands that 
―postcolonial poets, even when staying at home, have long inhabited 
cultural spaces that are thoroughly multilingual and multicultural‖ (7) 
take this premise? He quotes from Yeats‘s essay, ―Nationality and 
Literature‖ to the same effect: ―we can learn from English and other 
literatures without loss of national individuality‖ (40), and further in 
another essay—when, as Ramazani puts it, he was attacked ―like such 
later writers as Walcott, Rushdie, Soyinka, Naipaul, and Amitaz Ghosh 
for insufficient nativism‖—thus: ―A writer is no less National because 
he shows the influence of other countries and of great writers of the 
world,‖ adding that ―No nation ... since the beginning of history, has 
ever drawn all its life out of itself‖ (47-48). This fact is reiterated in 
various forms throughout the book and seems to keep the national 
allegory alive even as he alleges its displacement by figurality.   
Moreover, by obscuring the particular historical experience of 
the wounded subjects of his study, Ramazani fails to see that the 
name Philoctete, thanks to slavery and colonialism,34 is as Caribbean 
as it is Greek. Consequently, he does not accord due weight to the 
interrogation of naming as a crucial site for mapping and recuperating 
identity in Walcott—hence, for instance, Achille‘s symbolic renaming 
as Afolabe when he returns to Africa. Walcott explains how 
commonplace the classical Greek names of Hector, Ajax, Achilles, and 
                                       
34 On the role of slavery in localizing classical or European names, in republican 
Rome as in the Caribbean, see Orlando Paterson‘s Slavery and Social Death: A 
Comparative Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 54-58.  
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Helen, are in the Caribbean in the piece, ―Reflections on Omeros,‖35 in 
a special edition of The South Atlantic Quarterly. And as he put it in an 
interview, Hector ―is a guy who drives a public taxi.‖36 In that same 
interview which he gave while still composing Omeros, Walcott 
explained that a part of what he sought to do in the poem was ―trying 
to hear the names of things and people in their own context,‖—in other 
words, a particular people in a particular part of the world—―meaning 
everything named in a noun, and everything around a name‖ (ibid). It 
cannot be in pursuance of some broadly ―transnational allegory,‖ then, 
that Walcott sets for himself the goal of revealing the real cultural 
features of a people and place buried under imperial encrustations; 
certainly not the object he describes as follows: ―You see maybe the 
whole West Indian experience is not itself—it is translated. There is a 
film over the name, Caribbean. You can see the object, but between 
the object and you there is some experience, some artifice. We look 
through a glass in which the noun on the other side has not yet been 
named. It‘s the origin of the real Caribbean nouns that I‘m after‖ (ibid; 
my emphasis). Can it be said that this experience between the real 
Caribbean object and its beholder is not unique to the Caribbean in 
some particular and significant ways? When, in the light of his pan-
Antillean vision of a fused West Indian identity, and the fact that his 
character, Achille, unlike himself, can be said to have a niche in the 
world, he was asked if he thought he did not ―fit in one world,‖ Walcott 
                                       
35 See Derek Walcott, ―Reflections on Omeros‖ in The Poetics of Derek Walcott: 
Intertextual Perspectives, ed. Gregson Davis, special issue of The South Atlantic 
Quarterly, 96:2 (Spring 1997), 238-239.  
36 See J. P. White, ―An Interview with Derek Walcott‖ in Conversations with Derek 
Walcott, ed. William Baer (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1996), 173 
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was very unambiguous in disavowing that claim. When reminded of 
his status as a professor at Boston University, he riposted with his 
preference for the beaches of the Caribbean: ―All the time I‘m teaching 
I want to be on the beach swimming.‖ Admitting the point about the 
freedom of movement—or choice of being a cosmopolitan—of a figure 
such as him, Walcott stresses that he ―would really prefer to be 
working and writing and painting in the Caribbean,‖ and concludes, ―I 
know exactly where I want to be.‖37 And even more unambiguously, 
that he had never felt that he belonged ―anywhere else but in St. 
Lucia.‖ 
This unambiguous filial identification with home, coupled with 
an instinct to return whenever he should be abroad, I argue, 
constitute the core of Walcott‘s poetic vision; it is what helps to situate 
―Philoctete‘s primacy‖ and ―the trauma of slavery‖38 at the heart of the 
narrative achievement of Omeros. Ramazani‘s aestheticist claim that 
the wound, though admittedly the ―emblem of convulsive, bodily pain‖ 
nevertheless only serves to ―poeticise‖ pain, or that because Walcott is 
open to the wounds of others who have similarly suffered under the 
imperial lash he thereby ―deconstructs experiential uniqueness‖ tells 
only one side of the story and that from a decidedly anti-identitarian 
perspective. One can be a nationalist, and also an inter- or trans-
nationalist, as Frantz Fanon made clear with his famous assertion 
that ―[i]t is at the heart of national consciousness that international 
                                       
37 See Rebekah Presson, ―The Man Who Keeps the English Language Alive: An 
Interview with Derek Walcott,‖ in Conversations with Derek Walcott, 193.  
38 Jahan Ramazani, The Hybrid Muse, 71. 
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consciousness lives and grows.‖39 The passage is worth commending 
to theorists of hybridity impelled to the aporetic ―neither-nor‖ 
formulation—for instance, Ramazani on Walcott, ―neither a 
Eurocentric nor an Afrocentric poet‖ (64)—as a premise for reading the 
postcolonial writer under the sign of hybridity or cosmopolitanism: 
 
If man is known by his acts, then we will say that the most 
urgent thing today for the intellectual is to build up his nation. If 
this building up is true, that is to say if it interprets the manifest 
will of the people … then the building of a nation is of necessity 
accompanied by the discovery and encouragement of 
universalizing values. Far from keeping aloof from other nations, 
therefore, it is the national liberation which leads the nation to 
play its part on the stage of history. It is at the heart of national 
consciousness that international consciousness lives and grows. 
And this two-fold emerging is ultimately only the source of all 
culture. (247-248)  
 
To conclude my argument here, which seeks to establish the locus of 
referentiality of the wound whose healing is critical to the health of the 
postcolonial body-politic, I will return to Walcott‘s persona in Omeros 
on the impact and effect of all the perambulations and intercultural 
parallels that are alleged to radically deconstruct national specificity. 
One motif, among many others in the book, powerfully asserts 
Walcott‘s homing instinct: that, first, of his dead father, and then the 
eponymous character, Seven Seas/Omeros, pointedly enjoining him to 
                                       
39 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: 
Grove Press, 1968), 247-48. 
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return home as a ship to its anchor after every journeying forth. 
Walcott‘s father first appears to him in that moving scene that starts 
in his grandmother‘s house from whose window he saw as a child old 
women carrying coal to ocean liners, the ant-like line of their march 
allegorised as the vital link to ancestral memory. Walcott‘s father first 
charges him to ―simplify / your life to one emblem, a sail leaving 
harbour // and a sail coming in‖40 before urging him to pay deserving 
homage through his art to the women‘s suffering. And after Walcott 
had crossed his meridian, in the midst of his reverse middle passage 
journeys to North America, Portugal and Britain, his father appears 
again to remind him of his native attachments; to ensure ―our island‖ 
is his lodestar. ―Once you have seen everything and gone everywhere,‖ 
he says, ―cherish our island for its green simplicities, / enthrone 
yourself, if your sheet is a barber-chair, // a sail leaving harbour and 
a sail coming in.‖ Crucially, and this for the symbolism of the sea-swift 
as the bearer of the seed that sprouts the healing herb and whose 
transatlantic flights suture the ancestral African homeland with the 
New World home of the (ex)slave—―I followed a sea-swift to both sides 
of this text; // ... Her wing-beat carries these islands to Africa, / she 
sewed the Atlantic rift with a needle‘s line‖ (319)—his father drives the 
message home with an image of the bird: ―The sea-swift vanishes in 
rain, / and yet in its travelling all that the sea-swift does / it does in a 
circular pattern. Remember that son‖ (187-88). Seven Seas, for his 
part, echoes this injunction with a further metaphorical flourish when 
he tells Walcott in the final book of the poem that there are two 
                                       
40 Derek Walcott, Omeros, 72. 
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journeys in every odyssey. While the one takes the voyager to places 
where he is a stranger—―cities where people speak / a different 
language, or look at him differently‖—the ―right journey‖ on the other 
hand ―is motionless.‖ In other words, you can be cosmopolitan all you 
want but never be truly removed from home, all the journeys outward 
being as motionless as the sense created by the sea as it ―moves round 
an island // that appears to be moving‖ the same way ―love moves 
round the heart.‖ In the end, ―the slowly travelling hand / knows it 
returns to the port from which it must start.‖41 Seven Seas concludes 
his exhortation with a claim that directly rebuts Ramazani‘s notion of 
a non-referentiality that deconstructs Walcott‘s national allegory:42 
                                       
41 This, Ramazani might argue, is no different from the rooted cosmopolitanism that 
he concedes, in line with the notions of ―vernacular cosmopolitanism‖ and 
―discrepant cosmopolitanism‖ advocated by Homi Bhabha (whose theoretical 
formulations of postcoloniality—indeed, of ―modern society‖ at large—as a condition 
defined by hybridity and in-betweenness, are the fulcrum of his argument) and 
James Clifford, respectively. Rooted cosmopolitanism can be distinguished from the 
sort of national consciousness that Walcott adumbrates here, clearly informed by 
actual residence (even if partially) in the home country, or a homing instinct that is 
different from the primary metropolitan identification and positioning of the 
cosmopolitan who is not only wholly domiciled in the West but does not even 
contemplate a return except as a visitor. For more on this crucial difference as well 
as the way it mediates attitudes to the nation/state (and national allegories), see for 
example Pheng Cheah, ―The Cosmopolitical Today‖ and ―Given Culture: Rethinking 
Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism‖ in Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling 
Beyond the Nation, eds. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998); and Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures 
(London: Verso, 1992), 68-69. 
42 Perhaps I should point out that I am not hereby adopting wholesale Jameson‘s 
argument. Indeed his thesis was the subject of considerable controversy, beginning 
with Aijaz Ahmad‘s strong protest at being construed as Jameson‘s ―civilizational 
Other.‖ See Aijaz Ahmad, ―Jameson‘s Rhetoric of Otherness and the ‗National 
Allegory,‖ originally published in Social Text, 17 (Fall 1986): 3-25, and reproduced in 
his In Theory, 95-122. I do, however, share—as Ahmad—in ―the general plea‖ (In 
Theory, 95) of the essay aimed at opening up the Western academy to literatures 
produced in the ―Third World,‖ a need that Ramazani also seeks to address almost 
half a decade later in The Hybrid Muse with specific reference to postcolonial poetry. 
My sympathies with Jameson‘s position lie in the confluence of what he describes in 
his response to Ahmad as ―the way we are all situated and determined socially and 
ideologically by our multiple class positions‖ [Social Text, 17 (Fall 1987): 27; original 
emphasis]. 
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―Therefore, this is what this island has meant to you, / ... why the sea-
swift was sent to you: / to circle yourself and your island with this art‖ 
(291).  
But Ramazani would push his claim as far as he can, against 
evidence presented by the text. Thus, commenting on the moment 
when, after due penance, Ma Kilman is possessed by the African gods 
prior to the healing herb being revealed to her, Ramazani writes that 
Walcott ―flirts momentarily with the concept of race-based blood 
inheritance of African belief‖ (60). But rather than a fleeting digression, 
that moment, it seems to me, constitutes the ethico-political narrative 
sinew of Omeros. That it is not a passing lapse in judgement, but, 
rather, a position arrived at after a very long period of reflection is 
underscored by Walcott‘s earlier conviction about the unviability of 
trans-oceanic memory; in particular, the ―truth‖ of the futility of 
―holding the god captive‖ [the god being Ogun] he claims dawned on 
him and members of his theatre company when they produced 
Soyinka‘s play, The Road. To Walcott and his ―Afro-Christian‖ 
company, ―the naming of the god estranged‖ them. Ogun, for them, 
was ―an exotic‖ and not a force. They could ―pretend to enter his 
power‖ but he ―would never possess us, for our invocations were not 
prayer but devices.‖43 As will be seen below, Ma Kilman completely 
reverses this view and shows Walcott now believing that they could, 
after all, actually enter into the power of, and be possessed by, the 
African gods: Ogun, Sango, and Erzulie in Omeros. Indeed, given Ma 
Kilman‘s primacy to the narrative of healing through a symbolic return 
                                       
43 Derek Walcott, What the Twilight Says, 8. 
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to the past for reconciliation with ancestral origins—and Ramazani 
admits the trope of return to Africa is ―key to healing the torn black 
body and racial memory of the Caribbbean‖—it would seem an 
instance of straining against the text to describe Walcott‘s revised view 
as a momentary flirtation with, or a case of him sinning against 
himself by ―committing, a ―cardinal Walcottian sin‖ (59). Perhaps the 
problem is with Ramazani‘s phraseology, ―race-based blood 
inheritance.‖ It may, however, be pointed out that Walcott, for good or 
bad, is not above such biologism—though he might be more inclined to 
call it a spiritual or primal thing.44 Soon after his father‘s injunction to 
him to always return home after his wanderings abroad, Walcott 
expresses his sense of national identity as he begins his ruminations 
among the Sioux in the Dakotas thus: 
 
   Men take their colours 
 
as the trees do from the native soil of their birth, 
and once they are moved elsewhere, entire cultures 
lose the art of mimicry, and then, where the trees were, 
 
the fir, the palm, the olive, the cedar, a desert place 
widens in the heart. (207-08) 
 
But if we were to agree for a moment with Ramazani, wouldn‘t such 
essentialism be argument in favour of Walcott‘s bounded identity 
politics? For as far as imagery of rootedness goes, none can be more 
concrete as that of a tree drawing its life and leafage from the soil in 
which it is planted. And it is what it means to speak of uprootedness 
                                       
44 See, for instance, the interview with Hirsch, almost a decade before Omeros, ―The 
Art of Poetry,‖ in Critical Perspectives, 65-83, particularly at 72 and 79.  
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as the very meaning of literal death (for a tree or plant) and social 
death for a human being. And this, in fact, leads to my next argument. 
 
“You all see what it’s like without roots in this world?”Acting-Out 
and Working-Through Trauma 
 
Having established the locus of referentiality and experiential 
particularity of the wound I will now turn to the question of its healing. 
A point we must note right away: prior to its healing, the wound most 
graphically manifests itself in the phenomenon of acting-out. This 
wound has been aptly described as a trauma, with Walcott providing 
one of its best poetic evocations cited in the previous chapter. On the 
surface, ―Laventille‖ is a lyrical reflection on the ―grinding poverty‖ of 
the hilltop slum of Port-of-Spain in Trinidad that gives the poem its 
title, but in tracing the cause of this poverty Walcott invokes the 
middle passage directly—―The middle passage never guessed its end‖—
and indirectly—―some open passage that has cleft the brain.‖ The 
violent uprooting Walcott describes in the last nine lines of the poem is 
so radically overwhelming as to have ―cleft the brain‖ culminating in a 
―deep, amnesiac blow‖: 
 
Something inside is laid wide like a wound, 
 
some open passage that has cleft the brain, 
some deep, amnesiac blow. We left 
somewhere a life we never found, 
 
customs and gods that are not born again, 
some crib, some grille of light 
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clanged shut on us in bondage, and withheld 
 
us from that world below us and beyond, 
and in its swaddling cerements we‘re still bound.45  
 
In the passage quoted in the Introduction, Edouard Glissant, through 
a series of rhetorical questions, underlines a similar characterisation 
of the Caribbean‘s wound as a trauma, sketching its pathological 
progress from original wound to its inherited form, and it is worth 
recalling here: 
 
Would it be ridiculous to consider our lived history as a steadily 
advancing neurosis? To see the Slave Trade as a traumatic 
shock, our relocation (in the new land) as a repressive phase, 
slavery as the period of latency, ―emancipation‖ in 1848 as 
reactivation, our everyday fantasies as symptoms, and even our 
horror of ―returning to those things of the past‖ as a possible 
manifestation of the neurotic‘s fear of his past? Would it not be 
useful and revealing to investigate such a parallel? What is 
repressed in our history persuades us, furthermore, that this is 
more than an intellectual game.46 
 
Glissant thus precedes Cathy Caruth in calling for a reading of history 
as the history of trauma47—at least, with respect to New World history. 
                                       
45 Derek Walcott, Collected Poems, 88. 
46 Edouard Glissant, Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays, trans. J. Michael Dash 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1989), 65-66. 
47 See Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience. Caruth sees the ―central question‖ of 
Freud‘s enquiry into the ―relationship between history and its political outcomes‖ in 
Moses and Monotheism—his speculative history of the Jews—as that of what it 
means ―for history to be the history of trauma.‖ See Chapter 1, ―Unclaimed 
Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History,‖ at page 15. But see also 
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In what follows, I align myself with Glissant‘s view that such an 
approach to the further exploration of the phenomenon of the 
Caribbean‘s wound of history is more than an intellectual game.  And 
in that spirit, I will now highlight Walcott‘s more explicit depiction of 
this trauma in Omeros through a brief elaboration of the concepts of 
acting-out and working-through. Shortly after the opening scene 
where he displays his wound to tourists, Walcott shows us Philoctete 
in the grip of a maddening vortex of pain caused by it. Wracked by the 
pain, Philoctete limps from Ma Kilman‘s ironically named No Pain Café 
to his yam garden where, armed with a cutlass, he maniacally cuts 
down his yams. Here is a crucial part of the resultant scene: 
 
The wind turned the yam leaves like maps of Africa, 
their veins bled white, as Philoctete, hobbling, went 
 
between the yam beds like a patient growing weaker 
down a hospital ward. His skin was a nettle, 
his head a market of ants; he heard the crabs groan 
 
from arthritic pincers, he felt a mole-cricket drill 
his sore to the bone. His knee was radiant iron, 
his chest was a sack of ice, and behind the bars 
 
of his rusted teeth, like a mongoose in a cage, 
a scream was mad to come out; his tongue tickled its claws 
on the roof of his mouth, rattling its bars in rage. 
 
He saw the blue smoke from the yards, the bamboo poles 
weighed down by nets, the floating feather of the priest. 
                                                                                                              
Dominick LaCapra‘s caveat regarding the danger of thereby not only postulating 
trauma as ―the condition of possibility of history‖ but also of its being ―generalized 
and conflated with history‖ itself. See LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: History, 
Theory, Trauma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 14n. 
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When cutlass cut smoke, when cocks surprise their arseholes 
 
by shitting eggs, he cursed, black people go get rest 
from God; at which point a fierce cluster of arrows 
targeted the sore, and he screamed in vain in the yam rows. 
 
He stretched out the foot. He edged the razor-sharp steel 
through the pleading finger and thumb. The yam leaves recoiled 
in a cold sweat. He hacked every root at the heel. 
 
He hacked them at the heel, noticing how they curled, 
head-down without their roots. He cursed the yams: 
       “Salope! 
You all see what it‘s like without roots in this world?‖48 (21-22) 
 
Philcotete‘s scream, which he manages to utter against the seeming 
impossibility of speech—his trauma is also a sort of linguistic prison 
denoted synecdochically by his mouth as a cage and his teeth bars 
that his tongue merely rattles in rage—telescopes the complex nature 
of trauma as a mode of experience cognisable only within ―a history 
larger than any single individual or any single generation.‖49 While the 
scene highlights poignantly Philoctete‘s personal crisis of identity to 
the point of total self-dissolution (into temporary madness), it also 
evokes the race-wide history that unleashed the crisis. Access to this 
larger history, Walcott suggests, is possible only by going beyond the 
pathology of individual suffering, hence Philoctete‘s loss of sustained 
speech or dialogue until the communal healing rite—itself possible 
only after the acknowledgement and working-through of the repressed 
memory of slavery. As a result, the first of two things Philoctete is able 
                                       
48 Italics original. 
49 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 71. 
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to ejaculate through the prison bars of his mouth gives expression not 
to private, but, communal, grief: ―When cutlass cut smoke, when 
cocks surprise their arseholes / By shitting eggs … black people go get 
rest from God.‖ In his second exclamation, he bemoans his 
rootlessness and parallels Paul D‘s sense of excommunication from the 
human race discussed in the previous chapter.50 Crucial to this 
moment of literal bondage to the past is Walcott‘s diagnosis of 
―rootlessness‖ as cause and symptom of Philoctete‘s agony. Enacting 
his condition, he hacks his yams at the heel and notices them curl 
head-down without their roots, mimicking his abject pose—the ―self-
hating / gesture of clenching his head tight in both hands‖ (19)—in Ma 
Kilman‘s cafe just before his pain drove him out to the yam garden. 
Echoing Walcott‘s insistence on a return to the source as the condition 
for healing in Midsummer now elaborated in Omeros, the leaves of 
Philoctete‘s yams, before he hews them down, point him to the ―native 
place‖ with which he must first reconcile:  ―The wind turned the yam 
leaves like maps of Africa.‖ 
This scene presents a striking illustration of the psychoanalytic 
concept of acting-out which, simply, means the compulsive repetition 
by the victim of a repressed traumatic memory. Its actuating condition 
is repression, coupled with resistance—an unwillingness to grapple 
with the memory whenever it should be reawakened. As Freud puts it, 
―the patient does not remember anything of what he has repressed and 
                                       
50 We will recall that Paul D was led by critical self-reflection on the real meaning of 
the status of manhood ascribed to the male slaves on Sweet Home plantation to 
conclude that the little mercies of benevolent slavery notwithstanding, ―they were 
only Sweet Home men at Sweet Home‖ and with just a step off its grounds they 
became ―trespassers among the human race.‖ See Toni Morrison, Beloved, 147-48. 
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forgotten, but acts it out.‖ In other words, he ―reproduces it not as a 
memory but as an action; he repeats it, without ... knowing that he is 
repeating it.‖51 Acting-out, or compulsive repetition, is, then, the way 
in which a victim remembers what she has forgotten. Yet, as we saw in 
the preceding chapter, it is at the same time the ironic process by 
which the mind seeks to master a situation that it was unprepared for 
and which, by-passing consciousness or the intellectual realm, had 
entered straight into the unconscious. Consequently, ―the compulsion 
to repeat,‖ Freud adds, ―replaces the impulsion to remember.‖ 
Extending his observations beyond the clinic, Freud describes 
repetition as ―a transference of the forgotten past not only on the 
doctor but also on to all other aspects of the current situation.‖ As, we 
might say, Philoctete‘s repetition of the repressed memory of his 
enslavement and ensuing rootlessness is a transference onto current 
situations in Ma Kilman‘s cafe and, particularly, his yam garden. It 
should be noted also that what is repeated, as Freud asserts, is not 
the original event itself but everything associated with it that has 
―already made its way from the sources of the repressed into his 
manifest personality,‖ say, for instance, ―his inhibitions and 
unserviceable attitudes and his pathological character-traits.‖  Equally 
important is Freud‘s observation that the victim experiences his 
condition as ―something real and contemporary‖ and that any 
therapeutic work (or social analysis) must consist ―in a large measure 
in tracing it back to the past‖ (151-52).  
                                       
51 Sigmund Freud, ―Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through,‖ The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 12, trans. James 
Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1958), 150; original emphases. 
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LaCapra quotes a definition of acting-out, synthesised from 
Freud and Jacques Lacan by Laplanche and Pontalis, as ―action in 
which the subject, in the grip of his unconscious wishes and 
phantasies, relives these in the present with a sensation of immediacy 
which is heightened by his refusal to recognize their source and their 
repetitive character.‖52 It might be pointed out that Philoctete does 
seem to be aware of the source of his suffering, but surely only 
apparently so. There is a key difference between such vague awareness 
and a conscious wish to recognise or acknowledge the past it points to. 
As LaCapra notes, Laplanche and Pontalis adopt a mainly clinical 
perspective that may not be immediately applicable to theoretical 
issues, but nonetheless finds their work relevant to the extent that 
they ―address psychoanalytic processes that may not be confined to 
clinical contexts or to the individual alone‖ (ibid). Acting-out, then, 
shows the victim seemingly immobilised within a self-defeating cycle of 
repetition, as opposed to working-through which alone points to the 
possibility of breaking that cycle as the victim comes to ―accept certain 
repressed elements‖—what is popularly known as coming to terms 
with an unhappy situation.  The ―successful‖ working-through of a 
trauma enables the victim eventually to ―free himself from the grip of 
mechanisms of repetition.‖53  
But as Adorno warned in his essay, ―What Does Coming to 
Terms with the Past Mean?‖, it is not what the perpetrators of evil tend 
to mean by it, which invariably—and with respect to the repressed 
                                       
52 See J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis (1967; New 
York: Norton, 1973), 4; quoted in  LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust, 208. 
53 Quoted by LaCapra in Representing the Holocaust, 209. 
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memory of former Nazis and current sympathisers of German National 
Socialism that is his immediate subject—is ―not ... a serious working-
through of the past, the breaking of its spell through an act of clear 
consciousness,‖ but, rather, a wish to ―turn the page, if possible, 
wiping it from memory.‖54 In other words, it is not the popular 
sentiment of forgive-and-forget or ―moving-on.‖ A true coming-to-terms 
by working-through the past puts the victim at the centre; it is a turn 
towards the subject, the ―reinforcement‖ of her ―self-consciousness‖ 
and, with that, her ―sense of self.‖55 This accords with Freud‘s view 
that the patient himself has to be allowed enough time ―to become 
more conversant with [his] resistance ... to work through it, to 
overcome it‖ (original emphasis). He warns that working-through can 
be an arduous task for the victim—as, indeed, for anyone attempting a 
social analysis of trauma—but stresses nonetheless that it is the part 
of the work of finding a cure that ―effects the greatest changes in the 
patient.‖56 This is what Laplanche and Pontalis, again from the more 
clinical perspective, highlight in their explanation of working-through: 
 
Process by means of which analysis implants an interpretation 
and overcomes the resistance to which it has given rise. Working-
through is taken to be a sort of psychical work which allows the 
                                       
54 Theodor W. Adorno, ―What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?‖, trans. 
Timothy Bahti and Geoffrey Hartman, in Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective, 
ed. Geoffrey Hartman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 115.  
55 Theodor W. Adorno, ―What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?‖ in Bitburg 
in Moral and Political Perspective, 128. 
56 Sigmund Freud, ―Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through,‖ 155. Freud 
writes in the context of clinical analysis, and so uses the word ―patient‖ in his essay; 
I have substituted the word victim when practicable. 
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subject to accept certain repressed elements and to free himself 
from the grip of mechanisms of repetition. ... 
From the technical point of view, by the same token, working-
through is expedited by interpretations from the analyst which 
consists chiefly in showing how the meanings in question may be 
recognised in different contexts.57 
 
Working-through is not to be understood, however, as a check or 
counter to acting-out but as itself repetition distinguished only by a 
growing self-consciousness or agency on the part of the victim. This is 
the critical factor that enables the victim to increasingly free herself 
from the compulsion to repeat the trauma. Nor is acting-out to be seen 
as constituting a clean and separate phase from working-through; the 
two are better viewed as a continuum differentiated by the degree of 
self-consciousness allowing the victim the crucial agency for accepting 
―certain repressed elements‖ and so to break the compulsion to repeat. 
The two terms, in other words, do not indicate a movement from one to 
the other in which, as LaCapra puts it, ―the latter is ... the dialectical 
transcendence of the former.‖ Indeed, LaCapra adds, acting-out may 
never be fully overcome and may be ―intimately bound up‖ with the 
problems of working-through.58 Walcott evinces this inter-
connectedness in the acting-out passage above by gesturing towards 
its inherent working-through possibilities in one deft line. While a fly 
quickly washes its hands off the massacre in the yam garden—let‘s 
call this a mimesis of Philoctete‘s resistance or denial—a swift, the all-
                                       
57 As quoted in LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust, 209. 
58 Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust, 205. 
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important bearer of the healing herb—is quietly perched on a branch 
above him: ―He looked up at a blue acre / and a branch where a swift 
settled without a cry.‖ Walcott further enriches the imagery by 
preceding the swift with an ant that crawls across Philoctete‘s brow‖ 
(how intimate this can be!), with ants figured as the vital link to 
ancestral memory in association with the coal-bearing grandmothers 
seen from his [Walcott‘s] childhood window.59 Both swift and ants will 
be the governing metaphors of the working-through of the Caribbean‘s 
trauma, with the Obeah-woman, Ma Kilman, as medium (in both 
senses of the word). 
Given the uncanny coincidence of Walcott‘s delineation of 
trauma at the precise moment that he is reflecting on the existential 
issue posed by slums and poverty, it is worth stressing that any 
feasible process of working-through historical trauma must be more 
concerned with socio-economic questions than the merely pathological 
or therapeutic. Fanon, who was, perhaps, the first to read colonial 
history under the prism of trauma goes beyond his ―clinical study‖ in 
Black Skin,White Masks to prescribe precisely such a procedure, as we 
have seen.60 In the view of LaCapra, social or theoretical analysis can 
achieve historical specificity only through an ―ethicopolitical approach‖ 
that extends the concept of working-through beyond a ―narrowly 
therapeutic framework.‖ For him, ―working through the past in any 
viable, durable, and politically relevant manner would itself demand a 
careful critical analysis of social and economic institutions both over 
                                       
59 Derek Walcott, Omeros, 21. 
60 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 10-12. 
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time and in contemporary life.‖ Even then, and as already noted, a 
successful working through of a traumatic experience, including its 
posttraumatic effects, requires, as a precondition, its 
acknowledgement. But what may be called a successful working 
through can really be no more than ―work on the posttraumatic 
symptoms in order to mitigate the effects of trauma by generating 
counterforces to compulsive repetition (or acting-out), thereby enabling 
a more viable articulation of affect and cognition or representation, as 
well as ethical and socio-political agency, in the present and the 
future.‖61 It does not mean ―total redemption‖ from that past or 
―healing of its wounds.‖ James Berger, who prefers the term post-
apocalyptic for post-traumatic, reiterates both views. ―Only if traumas 
are remembered,‖ he says, ―can they lose, gradually but never entirely, 
their traumatic effects.‖62 
 
“I Felt Every Wound Pass”: From African Babble through Greek 
Manure to a Language that Carries its Cure 
 
As the title and the beginning of this chapter indicate, Walcott‘s self-
confessed love of the English language has never been for its own 
sake. A product as much of his colonial education as of his social 
location at the protean nexus of several languages and cultures, his 
ear has always remained finely tuned to all the carnivalesque code 
                                       
61 See Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust at 210, 218 and 119, 
respectively; emphasis original. 
62 See his After the End: Representations of Post-Apocalypse (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1999), 212.  
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switchings in the Caribbean with a view to finding the instance that 
registers the pharmacological merger of pain and cure within the 
wounded language. In Midsummer, Walcott claims that the search for 
the language that matches wound with word must lead to ancient 
origins; in Omeros he demonstrates that claim. With the suggestive 
naming of her café, and her early ministrations over Philoctete‘s 
wound, we first encounter Ma Kilman as the putative agent of the 
desired healing. Yet she is very quick to dismiss the first hint of 
reconciliation with ancestral origins, represented by the musings of 
the blind griot Old St. Omere/Seven Seas, as ―old African babble‖ or 
Greek (18). Walcott performs here a narrative staging of amnesia and 
the acting out of the pain of unclaimed trauma. As a result, Ma 
Kilman‘s denial of her origins by this glib dismissal of the African 
language that encodes it stands in her way to finding the cure for 
Philoctete as for all the wounded denizens of the Caribbean, the 
individual wound being at the same time a social laceration.63 
                                       
63 On this point, Hortense Spillers poses the question whether or not the 
―phenomenon of marking and branding‖ the captive body ―actually ‗transfers‘ from 
one generation to another, finding its various symbolic substitutions in an efficacy of 
meanings that repeat the initiating moments.‖ See her Black, White, and in Color: 
Essays on American Literature and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003), 207; emphasis original. The answer proffered by trauma studies would seem 
to be, Yes, suggesting that the aftermath of a trauma‘s founding event or series of 
events, especially where it concerns a collective, an ethnic or racial group, includes a 
‗postmemory,‖ or a historical transmission of its memory to individuals and groups 
living with its ―fraught heritage,‖ as for instance the inheritors of the heritage of 
slavery and the Jewish holocaust. Among scholars who believe in a trans-
generational inheritance of trauma is LaCapra, who explains that postmemory ―is the 
acquired memory of those not directly experiencing an event such as the Holocaust 
or slavery, and that intergenerational transmission of trauma refers to the way those 
not directly living through an event may nonetheless experience and manifest its 
posttraumatic symptoms.‖ See History in Transit, 108. For the view that there can be 
no trans-generational transfer of traumatic memory except perhaps as an instance of 
an unreflective identity project, see Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), and Walter Benn Michaels‘s ―‘You Who Never Was 
There‘: Slavery and the New Historicism—Deconstruction and the Holocaust‖ in The 
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Recognising the impotence of ―the usual medicine‖ consisting of a flask 
of liquor, petroleum jelly and ice, she wonders about the true remedy: 
It have a flower somewhere, a medicine, and ways 
my grandmother would boil it. I used to watch ants 
climbing her white flower-pot. But, God, in which place? 
 
Where was this root? What senna, what tepid tisanes, 
could clean the branched river of his corrupted blood ...?                  
(18-19) 
 
Ma Kilman‘s potions only achieve the result of mummifying her patient 
because she is as yet unwilling to seek knowledge of ―the old African 
babble‖ in which is buried the secret cure for the pain she first 
dedicates her café to forgetting, and now, healing. And so try as she 
may, she is unable to recall the name of the curative herb she seeks. 
As if to give Ma Kilman enough time to come to terms with her 
repressed past, Walcott begins the needed reconciliation with ancestral 
origins with a vicarious return to Africa through Achille. In a 
sunstroke, the ubiquitous sea-swift drags Achille‘s boat to Africa so he 
can retrieve his identity, ―his name and his soul‖ (154). It is a sort of 
reversed middle passage journey in the course of which Achille 
encounters his history and the ―tribal / sorrow that Philoctete could 
not drown in alcohol‖ (129), and, significantly, ―the ghost of his 
                                                                                                              
Americanization of the Holocaust, ed. Hilene Flanzbaum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 181-97, whose more nuanced argument seems nevertheless 
to cut both ways. To the extent that Stanley Crouch‘s unconvincing grievances 
against Beloved include the notion that Morrison‘s tone calls on the reader to feel an 
unjustified emotion and that she lacks a true sense of the tragic because she has no 
true knowledge of the horrors of slavery—even going so far as to describe the novel 
as a ―blackface holocaust novel‖—he may also be cited among those who do not 
believe in the trans-generational transfer of traumatic memory. See his ―Aunt 
Media,‖ in New Republic, Vol. 197, No. 16, of 19 October 1987, 38-43. 
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father‘s face‖ (130). In Africa, Achille feels ―the homesick shame / and 
pain‖ of ―the kingdom from which he had been captured‖ (136). His 
father tells him that his name is ―Afolabe,‖ not Achille, and instructs 
him on the significance of naming: ―A name means something,‖ and if 
the ―sound‖ of one‘s name means nothing, then ―you would be 
nothing‖ (137). Despite his father‘s counsel, Achille says of his new 
name that it is ―the gift / of a sound whose meaning I still do not care 
to know,‖ causing his father to warn him, ―if you‘re content with not 
knowing what our names mean / then I am not Afolabe, your father, 
and you look through / my body as the light looks through a leaf … 
/And you nameless son, are only the ghost // of a name‖ (138). 
Earlier, Afolabe, the father, had asked the son if those who renamed 
him Achille thought him to be ―nothing in that other kingdom‖ (137). 
Achille, yet to accept his tribal name, first withdraws to brood by a 
river then slowly learns to ―listen to the moan of the tribe‘s triumphal 
sorrow‖ (139) and accept that the language, the ―joined babble‖ (136) 
of his distant kin which he did not understand ―was his also‖ (141). 
Achille inches closer to reconciliation with his lost culture and 
language during the feast given to celebrate his return. At the dances, 
the villagers don the same costumes of ―plantain trash‖ as he recalls 
Philoctete wears at Christmas, and a bannered mitre of bamboo is 
placed on his head. This reminds Achille of ―the same dances // that 
the mitred warriors did with their bamboo stick / as they scuttered 
around him‖ back in the Caribbean, and he cries, ―The same, the 
same‖ (143).  He witnesses a slave raid that leads to the capture of 
fifteen slaves and in a rage he brains one of the slave-raiders, and by 
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the time he hears a griot mutter ―his prophetic song / of sorrow that 
would be the past‖ (148), he has come to terms with ―the laceration‖ of 
his shame and is able to praise ―the epical splendour‖ of the bare fact 
of surviving the crossing: ―But they crossed, they survived. There is 
the epical splendour‖ (149). 
Achille‘s recuperation of his name and soul after an 
acknowledgement of the joined babble of his distant kin sets the stage 
for Ma Kilman‘s own conversion from cynical doubt to faith—from 
denial or repression to acknowledgement of her past. But this quasi-
religious conversion, if it is to be salvific, requires total renunciation of 
previous beliefs that nurture doubt and surrender to new gods 
through a personal act or oath of allegiance. For, although by chapter 
forty-seven Ma Kilman can now recall the names of the herbs to heal 
an array of ailments, she still cannot tell ―what path / led through 
nettles to the cure‖ and when she reaches to pluck a plant it ―keeps its 
secret‖ from her‖ (237). Walcott suggests that Ma Kilman remains 
barred from the cure because consciousness of self is as yet occluded 
by her persisting denial of the past, now reinforced by a lingering 
Catholicism. As she lists several herbs and their healing properties, 
she is preparing for mass by reciting Hail Mary‘s and even when she 
curses it is ―a soft Catholic / curse‖ (236). That the conflict resulting 
from her repressed memory can be resolved only in one way is first 
hinted at by Walcott‘s narrator who informs us that Ma Kilman is led 
―by the nose‖ from the pews to the forest by the ―the reek‖ of a weed 
whose power is ―rooted in bitterness‖ (237) and which stood on mulch 
that had the same smell as Philoctete‘s gangrened wound. She is 
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eventually led to the plant itself by a line of ants ―following her from 
church‖ (238) ―talking,‖ remarkably, ―the language of her great-
grandmother.‖ By this time, however, Ma Kilman ―understood‖ their 
mission (244), even if the great-grandmothers‘ language they spoke 
must necessarily be the same African babble she had earlier scorned.  
But Walcott aptly discerns that langue and parole must coincide 
in the would-be healer: Ma Kilman must pull the word (her symbolic 
sword) from the mesh of weeds to strike at the shield of the forgotten 
African language. So once in the thicket, the deities demand to be 
―known by name.‖ Propitiously, she is genealogically positioned to 
(re)learn their names as ―their sounds are within her / subdued in the 
rivers of her blood.‖ Learning the names of the gods is the 
fundamental act of acceptance of the repressed past. And here we 
recall how in the preceding chapter, in which Toni Morrison‘s Beloved 
is discussed, the character, Beloved, as avatar of the African gods, 
demands to be called her name and once Paul D does so he regains 
access to his buried past, thus inaugurating his healing. Underlining 
the critical importance of this moment, we are informed that the power 
of the deities (Ogun, Shango, Erzulie), though fading, is now 
―concentrated / in the whorled corolla‖ (242) of the stinking flower Ma 
Kilman needs for the cure. But when she calls out to the gods, she 
gets no answer, as they have ―knotted the shouts‘ in her throat like a 
vine‖; in other words, she is yet unable to utter the sounds of an 
African babble buried in her blood.  It is as if Walcott has brought the 
unresolved dilemma of estrangement from the African gods he had 
grappled with and written about in ―What the Twilight Says‖ to the 
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forest of Ma Kilman‘s search for the cure to the racial wound. Unlike 
then, however, and as already noted above, Walcott now believes that 
―the naming‖ of the African gods, far from estranging the New World 
denizen, would lead to benediction and protection. Consequently, 
Walcott makes Ma Kilman complete her own symbolic return to the 
past for reconciliation with the native place. But before she can 
remember the names of the deities so ―the cure can begin,‖ she must 
first undergo penance. Consequently, Ma Kilman thrashes herself ―for 
the sin / of doubting their names‖ (243). She performs a ritual of 
submission that enables her body to be possessed by the spirit of the 
deities. Indeed, if we follow Loretta Collins‘s reading, this moment 
marks Ma Kilman‘s literal embodiment of the cure. When she ―is 
possessed through obeah,‖ Collins writes, ―her body enacts the 
cure.‖64 Ma Kilman ―unbuttons‖ her church dress, bays like a moon-
crazed dog ―at the lights moving in the high leaves of the trees,‖ rubs 
dirt ―in her hair‖ and, crucially, prays ―in the language of ants and her 
grandmother.‖ Finally, she speaks the ―African babble‖ and as a result 
is able at last to ―lift / the sore from its roots in Philoctete‘s rotting 
shin‖ (244) by the very act of speaking. By a sleight of narration, we 
are informed that it is at the precise moment when Ma Kilman 
performs this ritual that Philoctete, as the entire wounded race, is 
cured: ―Philoctete shook himself up from the bed of his grave, / and 
felt the pain draining, as surf-flowers sink through sand.‖ And 
Walcott, in yet another authorial intrusion, reflects, ―Feel the shame, 
                                       
64 See Loretta Collins, ―We Shall All Heal‖: Ma Kilman, the Obeah Woman, as 
Mother-Healer in Derek Walcott‘s Omeros,‖ Literature and Medicine, vol. 14, no. 1 
(1995), 146-162. 
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the self-hate // draining from all our bodies. ... There was no 
difference between me and Philoctete‖ (245) and that they ―shared the 
one wound, the same cure‖ (295). To that extent, then, Collins‘s claim 
that Ma Kilman‘s body enacts the cure seems legitimate. What 
follows—Ma Kilman bathing Philoctete ―in the brew of the root‖ in an 
old sugar-mill cauldron—is, then, merely the closing act of the ritual 
intended to affirm the communal dimensions of the healing. Walcott 
suggests this reading when he asks, after the corolla of Philoctete‘s 
wound has closed, ―What else did it cure?‖ and answers that it was a 
cure also ―for their tribal shame. / A shame for the loss of words, and 
a language tired // of accepting that loss‖ (248).  
But if Ma Kilman finds the cure only after accepting and 
learning to speak a ―meaningless‖ African babble that is all the more 
meaningful as it encodes her access to the traumatic, but liberating, 
past, thereby underscoring the horizon of meaning (and healing) 
descried by language, in what way can it be said that Major Plunkett‘s 
―language‖ has, too, to dissolve itself in the ―joined babble‖ before he is 
healed? For Walcott‘s vision is a syncretic pan-Caribbean one, leading 
to the deliberate wounding of Plunkett. And when he speaks of shame 
and self-hate draining ―from all our bodies,‖ he clearly includes the 
descendants of slave-masters, symbolised by Plunkett, among those 
bodies. Hence, his making Plunkett a pig-farmer because he is the 
rump of empire and ―Empires are swinish‖ (21). Does Plunkett also 
make a symbolic return to the past? If so, to which past? Before 
attempting an answer, a definition of terms is called for. By language 
here, I obviously do not intend its sense as a formal or conventional 
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system of signs and symbols but, rather, as the understanding 
suggested by objects, actions, or conditions of associated ideas or 
feelings; in other words, by gesture. In this sense, then, Plunkett‘s 
unpurged imperialist mission of giving a history to the Caribbbean—of 
historising Helen (both as her maidservant and as St Lucia/the 
Caribbean)—brings him very close to viewing, just like Ma Kilman, the 
past of the descendants of slaves as some sort of ―African babble,‖ or a 
meaningless and so irrelevant identity-shaping part of New World 
culture. His ambition, and the language in which it must necessarily 
be realised, is further tainted by his obsession with Helen, the proud 
and beautiful black maid that keeps house for him and his wife, 
Maud. ―Helen of the Antilles,‖ as the narrative makes clear, is the 
colonial endearment by which the natural deep harbour Island of St. 
Lucia, over whose possession several European powers fought 
ceaseless wars, is also known. Without any sense of irony, Plunkett 
rationalises his lust for his maid, depicted by Walcott as the swinish 
master‘s lust for his slave, to himself thus: ―Helen needed a history, / 
that was the pity that Plunkett felt towards her. / Not his, but her 
story‖ (30). But if it is herstory (Caribbean history) and not history (a 
continuing narrative of the European civilising mission), that is his 
goal, why, then, does he envision it within a European narrative 
paradigm of wars of conquest over lands always figured as a female? 
Plunkett‘s obsession with Helen is so strong that she holds a 
transfixing power over him likened to that of Circe. As a result, at the 
very moment that his ―book-burdened heart‖ ruminates on the 
―parallels‖ and ―coincidences‖ with the Antilles in the books he is 
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reading in preparation for his history, Plunkett recalls the time he 
came into the bedroom to pick up his chequebook and  
 
 
he was fixed by her glance 
 
in the amoire‘s full-length mirror, where, one long arm, 
its fist closed like a snake‘s head, slipped through a bracelet 
from Maud‘s jewel-box, and, with eyes calm as Circe, 
 
simply continued, and her smile said, ―You will let 
me try this,‖ which he did. He stood at the Mercy 
of that beaked, black arm, which with serpentine leisure 
 
replaced the bangle. When she passed him at the door 
he had closed his eyes at her closeness, a pleasure 
in that passing scent which was both natural odour 
 
and pharmacy perfume. That victory was hers, 
and so was his passion; but the passionless books 
did not contain smell, eyes, the long black arm, or his 
 
knowledge that the island‘s beauty was in her looks, 
the wild heights of its splendour and arrogance. 
He moved to the coiled bracelet, rubbing his dry hands (96). 
 
Earlier, Plunkett had remarked that it was for Helen (maid and island) 
―Gaul and Briton / had mounted fort and redoubt, the ruined 
barracks // with its bushy tunnel and its penile cannon‖ (31), 
underlining the imperial longing—for sexual through discursive 
domination—that drives his mission and situates it within master 
narratives of colonial power. Collins drives home the point: 
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Plunkett conflates Helen‘s sexual body with the land, ready for 
plunder by cannons. He compares Helen‘s breasts to the pitons, 
the island mountains. By imposing the Greek myths on the 
Caribbean, Plunkett can only envision two cultures slaughtering 
each other for the sexual rights to a woman. He can only see the 
island as a black, sexually vulnerable, female slave. Even though 
Plunkett‘s reference to booty-seeking ancestors is ironic in view 
of his own inability to take Helen or the land, this is the 
colonizer‘s view of history. Early plantation owners and explorers 
of the New World envisioned the land as a receptive native 
woman … Wounded by the loss of Empire, his participation in 
colonial battles, his doomed repetition of colonial relationships 
with Afro-Caribbean St. Lucians, Plunkett wanders through his 
historical documents like a lost Odysseus, tormented by the 
siren lure, Helen. (156) 
 
 Plunkett‘s imperialistic hubris, then, supplies the language of his 
putative history and signs more visibly his wound. Yet, it ingrains in 
him a doubt which, like Ma Kilman, he must resolve before his 
healing, for by the time he acknowledges his need for a cure he has 
lost his wife and is in grief. As Plunkett tours the island in preparation 
for his history, he comes to a mountain which he calls ―La Sorcière‖ or 
―the sorceress mountain‖ after Ma Kilman. Plunkett betrays his 
arrogance in the explanation he gives of Ma Kilman‘s name. ―They 
called her Ma Kilman,‖ he says, ―because the village was darkened by 
their belief / in her as gardeuse, sybil, obeah-woman / webbed with a 
spider‘s knowledge of an after-life // in her cracked lenses.‖ Not 
unremarkably, it is through Plunkett we learn that Ma Kilman 
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sometimes took holy communion with ―an old African / doubt that 
paused before taking the wafer‘s white leaf‖ (58). As we have seen, Ma 
Kilman had to shed that doubt before the herbal cure she sought 
would be revealed to her. It is to this same obeah-woman, however, 
that Plunkett would turn for his cure. Can this be read as a ―return?‖ I 
wish to hazard a yes. If the (re)turn to Africa is key to healing and the 
recuperation of the collective Caribbean memory; if, as Ramazani 
points out, Walcott turns the wound into ―a resonant site of 
interethnic connection‖ (50); and if Ma Kilman, when possessed, does 
in fact become a vessel of the African gods65 that reveal the secret 
healing herb, then there is good warrant for an affirmative answer. 
Besides, Plunkett‘s healing comes only after he has shed his ―imperial‖ 
conceit. As Ma Kilman prepares for the séance that would summon his 
dead wife, Plunkett can only think of how much he ―hated / the smell 
of fuming incense and everything else,‖ even if the ―everything else‖ 
that he hates includes ―his doubt‖ (306). But when Ma Kilman sees 
Maud and tells Plunkett that his wife is ―happy,‖ he says to himself, 
―Like you oracles, / so would I be.‖ The oracles are not only African 
but also represented by the very obeah-woman belief in whose power 
to summon the dead he had claimed ―darkened‖ the village. But then 
Ma Kilman actually summons Maud, giving Plunkett the chance to beg 
                                       
65 Walcott, returning to the organic image of the tree—redolent as much of the 
ancient tree-gods we encounter in the opening scene as of the ―tree‖ of healing whose 
seed was carried across the Atlantic by a swift—describes the African gods as 
sprouting through Ma Kilman‘s body during her trance: ―All the unburied gods, for 
three centuries dead, / but from whose lineage, as if her veins were their roots, // 
her arms ululated, uplifting the branches / of a tree carried across the Atlantic that 
shoots / fresh leaves as its dead trunk wallows on our beaches. // They were there. 
She called them. (242-43) 
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forgiveness of his deeply wronged wife, an act that compels him to 
relinquish his imperial disdain. Subsequently, Plunkett‘s ―wound 
healed slowly,‖ but heal it did nevertheless, for soon he ―lost any guilt 
/ for her absence.‖ More remarkable, however, is the ideological 
change that Plunkett undergoes and its effect on his history project: 
 
He learned how to pause 
in the shade of the stone arch watching the bright red 
flowers of the immortelle, he forgot the war‘s 
 
history that had cost him a son and wife. He read 
calmly, and he began to speak to the workmen 
not as boys who worked with him, till every name 
 
somehow sounded different; when he thought of Helen 
she was not a cause or a cloud, only a name 
for a local wonder. (309) 
 
It is useful to read this passage in the light of the moment when, 
before Maud is summoned, Plunkett tries to send messages to her 
through Ma Kilman, but only succeeds in making her (Kilman) his 
confessor. As the narrator informs us, ―That moment bound him for 
good to another race‖ (307). Quite rightly, it is Ma Kilman who has the 
last word on healing. Plunkett, Ma Kilman tells Seven Seas, will, like 
Philoctete, ―heal  in time,‖ and quickly adds, ―We shall all heal‖—
though, it must be mentioned, Walcott does not fail to remind the 
reader that the traumatic wound of the Caribbean is, ultimately, an 
―incurable / wound of time‖ (319) that can be assuaged enough to 
recover conscious agency but never fully healed. By so linking 
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Philoctete and Plunkett—whose two names are a feminine rhyme66—
she suggests that the language of their healing must itself be the 
joined babble of the wounded language that Walcott declares ―carries 
its cure‖ like Philoctete‘s wound (323.)  
 
Conclusion 
I would like to conclude on the note with which I began this 
chapter: the view that there cannot be any such thing as a free-floating 
wound—whether or not read as a language—never mind a historical 
trauma. A good place to return to the historical specificity, experiental 
uniqueness, and horizon of meaning of the wound in Omeros might be 
the very penultimate closing chapter to which I have just been making 
reference. The first two sections of that chapter mark, in a sense, the 
end of the narrative. The remaining section and the three sections of 
the last chapter are merely Walcott‘s peroration, a formal closing 
epilogue that merely restates the theme of his epical song. Ma Kilman 
is the speaker of the second section of the penultimate chapter and the 
setting is her No Pain Café. There she brings all the major wounded 
characters together preparatory to the climactic statement, ―We shall 
all heal.‖ Helen, over whom Achille and Hector had fought—paralleling 
the fought-over Helen of Troy and the Helen of the Antilles (St Lucia)—
comes into the Café to buy margarine, and on leaving, we are told that 
―the dividing air‖ (of the battles for and over her, and of the ensuing 
                                       
66 I am, perhaps imprecisely, calling this a feminine rhyme because of the unstressed 
last syllable of each name—―-kett‖ and ―-ctete‖—but owe the insight concerning how 
Walcott rhymes the two names, including the other parallels he draws between them 
but which I have not dwelt on, to Ramazani. See Hybrid Muse, 64-65. 
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wound) ―closed in her wake.‖ Then Ma Kilman announces that Helen is 
―making child.‖ What is significant about this otherwise trivial bit of 
gossip is that Walcott chooses this moment at the end of his narrative 
to return to the question of language by way of the weighty matter of 
naming. The child Helen carries apparently belongs to Hector, but with 
Hector dead and Helen returned to Achille, Ma Kilman shows us Helen 
occupying the place where she herself had been in relation to the 
forgotten African symbolic system before her own return to the past to 
retrieve the lost language and to reconcile with the native place. 
Achille, Ma Kilman says, wants to give the child ―an African name‖ but 
Helen ―don‘t want no African child.‖ Remarkably, she would leave the 
question of the child‘s name ―till the day of christening.‖ In her new 
role, Ma Kilman is once again ancestor as, sounding like Achille‘s 
father in Africa, she says that Helen ―must learn / where she from‖ 
(318). Thus, although the argument that posits Walcott‘s poetics as 
being beyond identitarian bounds, as lacking experiential specificity in 
that it does not refer outward to ―the particular historical experience of 
a particular race in a particular part of the world‖ relies on the 
figurality of language, we have seen that same argument concede that 
all language is after all figural, whether spoken by Ma Kilman or by 
Seven Seas the oral poet. Furthermore, we saw Walcott make his 
European parallels pointless (312)—as he urges the reader and 
himself—and as it were, truly turn them into mere Greek manure for 
the language to match wound and word: the healing herb grows on 
mulch that smells like Philoctete‘s wound (239-30). Even more 
important, I showed how Walcott, both in Omeros and in interviews 
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pre- and post-Omeros, disavows notions of a cosmopolitanism that 
thrive in an indefinite or unanchored—for which we really should read 
metropolitan67—trans-national space. The strong injunction of his 
father to him to simplify his life to the one emblem of a sail leaving 
harbour and a sail coming in—that is, to always return to the islands 
after his travels—an injunction echoed by Seven Seas, the poet of folk 
memory within the text, stresses a powerful poetics of place that 
locates Walcott‘s vision not beyond, but squarely within, identitarian 
                                       
67 S. Radakrishnan, in his essay, ―On ‗Post-Colonial Discourse,‘‖ Callaloo 16.4 
(1993), 750-771, mounts a perceptive critique of the very influential anti-identitarian 
current within postcolonial literary and cultural studies, dubbed by him as ―certain 
forms of avant-garde Eurocentric cultural theory.‖ Among several questions that 
define his critique, I take the following as striking at the core of the problematic:  ―Is 
‗postcoloniality‘ … a general state of being, a powerful shorthand for an intense but 
traveling human condition, or is it a more discrete and circumstantial experience 
taking place within specific geopolitical boundaries?‖ His answer affirms the latter 
proposition, believing as he does that the anti-identitarian, cosmopolitanist or 
hybridity-championing theorists tend, methodologically, to be obsessively focussed 
on a culturalist approach to their subject and to elide ―postcolonial economies, 
histories, or politics.‖ In other words, the very questions that should give referential 
specificity to any mode of representation and agency, whether literary or otherwise. 
Culture, Radakrishnan usefully explains, ―is set up as a non-organic, freefloating 
ambience that frees intellectuals and theorists‖—which, of course, includes writers—
―from their solidarities to their regional modes of being.‖ It is, he says, a way of 
sacrificing postcoloniality ―as a potential politics or activism at the altar of 
postcoloniality as metropolitan epistemology,‖ a product of the semantics of the 
prefix, ―post-‖ that tends to read it exclusively as ―beyond‖ in the manner that, citing 
Ella Shohat‘s well-known essay, ―Notes on the Post-Colonial,‖ apes the fascination 
with ―posts‖ in the academy. Consequently, subaltern expressions of discontent with 
the nation or interrogations of nationalist regimes at home, which are invariably 
premised on the notion of a return, are not often distinguished from projects of 
would-be ―capitalist de-territorialization of the nation-state.‖ Obviously, I am in 
agreement with Radakrishnan, and have here focussed on those very strategies of 
anti-identitarianism that he scrutinises in specific relation to critical appraisals of 
Walcott. I believe that a genuine and productive transcendence of nationalism—say, 
for instance, a project in the Fanonian mould that both looks to but sees beyond the 
nation-state or nationalism—must be ―differentiated from an elitist transnationalist 
configuration,‖ and that metropolitan deconstructions of identity, should be 
―understood differently from ‗indigenous divestments from nationalist identity.‖ 
Radakrishnan thus provides a useful frame for understanding the complex poetics of 
place and identity that Walcott evinces in his copious primary and secondary 
writings pre- and post-Omeros. For in that complex space circumscribed by 
nationalist boundaries lie the crucial issue of effective representation and agency. 
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borders. And this, notwithstanding the undoubted paradoxical force 
field that constitutes postcolonial space, the antinomies of a socially 
complex historical condition that Wilson Harris elucidates brilliantly 
and that defines the work of the most fecund artistic imaginations in 
the postcolony. Not only Helen, but all the denizens of the New World, 
Walcott seems to insist, must ―learn where they from.‖ This is the 
ultimate referential meaning of his quest for the language that carries 
the cure of the wound it inflicts. Ramazani, building on Ma Kilman‘s 
return to Africa, says that the poets he examines in The Hybrid Muse 
reshape the question ―Who am I?‖ as ―Who were we?‖ and there is no 
reason to disagree with his observation. But, surely, the answer to that 
question can be found only within the identity-shaping bounds of a 
specific place and people, Walcott‘s ―habitat,‖ ―origins,‖ or ―native 
place‖ in the quoted lines from Midsummer as transposed and relived 
in the ―unmoving‖ or, shall we say, identifiable, island (port) of Omeros 
to which he is bound to return after every journey.  
239 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
READING POSTCOLONIAL HISTORY AS A HISTORY OF TRAUMA  
 
Heeding Frantz Fanon‘s postulation in The Wretched of the Earth 
on the importance of the psychoanalytical procedure for an 
understanding of the (post)colonial predicament, I have in this 
dissertation adopted trauma as the rubric of my analysis. Given the 
surprising lack of specific or adequate responses to Fanon‘s call, 
despite the massive body of Fanonian criticism, especially of the text-
based variety, that has flowered in the academy, I sought to intervene 
in this lacuna by giving the outline of what, for want of a better term, I 
call a psycho-social realist mode of enquiry.  To this end, I claim that 
trauma, as a complex, even limit case, of experience refers, however 
indirectly, to the socio-historical events that produce it. And that, 
therefore, we can to varying degrees of success arrive at the meaning 
of trauma or what a traumatic experience attempts to say to us from 
the unconscious depths of the psyche with the help of a sophisticated 
or complex theory of reference. I say ―sophisticated‖ or ―complex‖ not 
in the self-indulgent and mesmerising mode of meta-theory but as 
being open to the intricacy of every social phenomenon, especially 
when expressed in language. Such a theory would, therefore, 
necessarily be conscious, even celebratory, of contradiction, paradox, 
ambiguity and other rhetorical tropes that complicate the sign-object 
relation but always with a view to historicising their origin and 
purposes, intended or unintended. In this light, I pursued my analysis 
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of the primary texts of this work within the framework of the realist 
theory of reference and meaning in Chapter Three. For quite 
remarkably, Soyinka‘s Death and the King’s Horseman, Morrison‘s 
Beloved and Walcott‘s Omeros, exhibit across their respective modes of 
representation an uncanny race-wide and trans-generational 
consciousness of the original historical trauma. While each of these 
narratives recognisably evinces the trauma caused by the encounter of 
the black world with the enslaving and colonising European world, we 
are never for a second led outside the hard reality of history. We are, 
in short, inexorably referred to the referential locus of the trauma that 
plagues the characters in their lived worlds. The narratives thereby 
speak powerfully of ―the quality of form and meaning‖ which, as 
Robert Jay Lifton reminds us, ―is central to human experience‖1—
especially, traumatic experience. This insight common to all three 
primary authors as they enact a symbolic return to the source—that 
is, to the primal referential locus, the Freudian scene of the 
catastrophic accident—informs the near-seamlessness of the 
narratives which it is even possible to imagine as a separately 
authored trilogy. At least, this is one way of justifying what I call the 
underlying logic of this project: that exactly in the order of this study, 
its argument moves from the bleak prospect of denial or repression of 
trauma (resulting in literal and social death), to acknowledgement (or 
the awakening self-consciousness and the possibility of healing) and 
on to the working-through of postcolonial trauma (hence the 
                                       
1 See Cathy Caruth, ―An Interview with Robert Jay Lifton, in Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 133. 
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reconstitution, or reconstruction, of identity, agency and self-
determination).  
In Conclusion, however, I would like to turn my thoughts to one 
or two areas where future work may heed Fanon‘s call—sites of 
critical-theoretical undertakings beyond the scope of this dissertation 
or of any single task for that matter. For a start, I would like to return 
to a question posed by Caruth in her reading of Freud‘s speculative 
history in Moses and Monotheism that seeks to explain the emergence 
of the Jews as a nation through the prism of trauma. In other words, 
the concept of history read as a trauma with the long narrative of 
Jewish captivity in Egypt and the exodus from bondage constituting, 
to Freud‘s mind, the transformation of the Hebrews from a people in 
time not confined to specific national borders into the Jews as a nation 
which must be defined with reference to space, a precise geographical 
location.  Listening to Fanon, then, meant that I also listen to Caruth 
proposing that literary theorists read history as the history of a 
trauma. Doing so means that we pay attention to the dual process of 
forgetting/repressing the painful memories of history and grappling 
with the insistent return of those same memories to haunt the present 
and define the future. This is the constant theme discussed from 
varying angles in my three primary texts. Caruth enjoins the history-
as-trauma approach, very much like Fanon,2 then, in the belief that 
this is the central issue investigated by Freud in Moses and 
                                       
2 This, of course, is my reading. Caruth does not once mention Fanon or 
(post)colonial history in the work under reference, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, 
Narrative, History, being concerned with the field of trauma studies as it has 
emerged from intellectual interrogations of the Jewish holocaust as well as the 
general uses for literary criticism and theory that this field presents. 
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Monotheism. As already pointed, however, no less a postcolonial 
subject than Edward Glissant makes a similar call when he urges a 
reconsideration of our lived history ―as a steadily advancing neurosis.‖ 
For the ensuing result of imperial subjugation was nothing short of 
trauma, a steadily advancing neurosis. To restate it once more, slavery 
and colonialism shattered the world of the colonised.  The utter chaos, 
the sense of being unmoored and cast adrift from any frame of 
reference, from a meaning-making epistemological order, is precisely 
what Caruth urges theorists of literature and culture to take seriously 
by her reformulation of Freud, so that it is not mere speculation to say 
that the ―accident‖—in the Freudian sense of the catastrophic 
historical event—of colonial intrusion not only registered the 
cataclysmic blow to the psyche of the colonised but also denotes its 
very incomprehensibility even now in the so-called post-colonial epoch. 
In this sense, the latency period which I discussed in Chapters Two 
and Three can be likened to the persisting zone of occult instability of 
which Fanon speaks. In this way, we can link the structure of 
incomprehensibility in the wake of colonialism to the effects of the 
trauma it induced and still induces. Call that traumatic history the 
nightmare of colonialism from which, as James Joyce‘s Stephen 
Dedalus tells his English headteacher, appropriately enough, he is 
―trying to awake.‖3 Or call it the trance, the half-conscious state in 
which volition is literally suspended, the dazed or bewildered 
condition, indeed the passage from life to death,4 from which Soyinka‘s 
                                       
3 James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Vintage, 1990), 34. 
4 I refer, of course, to the several dictionary senses of the word trance. 
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Elesin in Death and the King’s Horseman does not awaken, having 
failed to comprehend the extent to which his will has been determined 
by colonialism. It is a similar latency in understanding, a comparable 
incomprehensibility together with an attendant attenuation of effective 
agency, as I pointed out in Chapter One, that Okonkwo bewails to 
Obierika in Achebe‘s Things Fall Apart thus:  ―What is it that has 
happened to our people? Why have they lost the power to fight?‖ 
 For my purposes here, a rephrasing of the question would be 
something like this: What are the specific symptoms or manifestations 
of (post)colonial trauma today? And why have we lost—well, not 
shown—the theoretical will to uncover and subject them to (critical) 
analysis? This is a dissertation, and lest I be accused of merely trying 
to ―talk up‖ my project, so to speak, let me quickly appeal to the 
authority of Hortense Spillers who in a well-cited essay has also 
identified this gap in black intellectual thought. I will quote her at 
some length: 
 
[C]ulture theorists on either side of the question would rule out ... 
any meeting ground between race matters, on the one hand, and 
psychoanalytic theories, on the other. But I want to shift ground, 
mindful of this caveat: little or nothing in the intellectual history 
of African-Americans within the social and political context of the 
United States would suggest the effectiveness of a psychoanalytic 
discourse, revised or classical, in illuminating the problematic of 
―race‖ on an intersubjective field of play, nor do we yet know how 
to historicize the psychoanalytic object and objective, invade its 
hereditary premises and insulations, and open its insights, 
subsequently, to cultural and social forms that are disjunctive to 
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its originary imperatives. In short, how might psychoanalytic 
theories speak about ―race‖ as a self-consciously assertive 
reflexivity, and how might ―race‖ expose the gaps that 
psychoanalytic theories awaken? Neither from the point of view of 
African-Americans‘ relationship to the dominant culture nor, just 
as important, from that of the community‘s intramural 
engagements have we been obliged in our analytical/critical 
writings to consider the place, for example, of fantasy, desire, and 
the ―unconscious,‖ of conflict, envy, aggression, and ambivalence 
in the repertoire of elements that are perceived to fashion the 
lifeworld. ... I think it is safe to say, however, that the 
psychoanalytic object, subject, subjectivity now constitute the 
missing layer of hermeneutic/interpretive projects of an entire 
generation of black intellectuals now at work. The absence is not 
only glaring but perhaps most curious in its persistence.5 
 
Spillers writes with particular reference to African-American 
intellectual production but has in mind all of the ―black intellectuals 
now at work.‖ Which is no surprise, given her obvious echoing of 
Fanon whom she says ―offers our clearest link to psychoanalysis in the 
African/Third World field,‖6 not to mention her copious reference to 
him in this essay as in several of the others in Black, White, and in 
Color.  Spillers does not set out to do a ―sustained reading‖ of this 
problem, neither have I in this dissertation. For the truth is that much 
                                       
5 Hortense J. Spillers, ―‘All the Things You Could Be by Now, If Sigmund Freud‘s Wife 
Was your Mother‘: Psychoanalysis and Race,‖ in her Black, White, and in Color: 
Essays on American Literature and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003), 376-77; original emphasis. 
6 Hortense J. Spillers, Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature and 
Culture, 386. 
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of the groundwork for that kind of work belongs to the clinical or 
practising psychoanalyst. Unfortunately, only Fanon has ventured to 
offer anything in that regard in his case studies documented in 
―Colonial Wars and Mental Disorders,‖ the closing chapter of The 
Wretched.  Until the clinicians appear on the horizon to update or 
supplement Fanon, however, we must continue to do the best we can 
with what he bequeathed to us in his revisionary dialogue with 
psychoanalysis as a theory. Happily for the postcolonial critic willing to 
try, trauma studies have come to broaden the scope of reference, 
adding a comparativist lens to the camera.  
Yet, to attempt an answer to the first of my two questions 
above—―What are the specific symptoms or manifestations of the 
(post)colonial trauma today?‖—we need not look beyond Fanon. There 
is enough in the Fanonian oeuvre to help us illuminate some of the 
hardiest problems that define the postcolonial condition. We should 
always be reminded of what Diana Fuss points out—that Fanon‘s 
conscious decision to locate his theory of radical decolonisation at the 
intersection of anti-imperialism and psychoanalysis gave him ―a 
vocabulary and an intellectual framework in which to diagnose and 
treat not only the psychological disorders produced in individuals by 
the violence of colonial domination but also the neurotic structure of 
[post]colonialism itself.‖7 One such neurosis—a problem of gargantuan 
proportions now, in fact, with a prominent role in perpetrating the 
notion of postcolonial pessimism—is that of official corruption. How 
                                       
7 Diana Fuss, ―Interior Colonies: Frantz Fanon and the Politics of Identification,‖ 20. 
My square brackets. 
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can Fanon help us understand this problem outside the language of 
moralists, political outrage, development studies and the wails of the 
oppressed? In other words, in a vocabulary that seeks to understand 
its non-materialist dimensions by probing the role of ―fantasy, desire, 
and the ‗unconscious,‘ of conflict, envy, aggression, and ambivalence‖ 
in its rise and current career? The ―disintegrative‖ and arguably more 
harmful mode of corruption, critics point out, is characterised by 
exclusivity. Most people ―are likely to be closed out  and will not 
possess the table stakes needed to buy into the crisis corruption 
game,‖ Michael Johnston tells us in the essay, ―The Political 
Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment.‖ Moreover, the lines of 
exclusion often follow the existing divisions in society. Thus, Johnston 
adds, ―[t]he more the boundaries of a disintegrative form of corruption 
correspond with existing class, racial, ethnic, and factional cleavages 
in society, the more pervasive its political effects will be.‖ Johnston 
goes on to conclude that ―where this correspondence is close, 
corruption is likely to become yet another issue in intergroup conflict, 
perhaps serving as the ‗justification‘ for reprisals or coups.‖8 A cursory 
survey of many a postcolonial society—and I will name one in a 
moment—will confirm this finding. It is true, as Johnston is careful 
enough to point out, that corruption alone would rarely lead to the 
collapse of a complex political system, such as a nation,9 it being just 
                                       
8 See Michael Johnston, ―The Political Consequences of Corruption: A 
Reassessment,‖ Comparative Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4 (July, 1986), 459-477, at 475. 
9 Johnston‘s phrasing, in a slightly different context—that of the functionality of 
corruption, seen as value-free, neither a positive nor a negative term—is as follows: 
―In any event, whole systems will rarely stand or fall because of corruption alone‖ 
(462). 
247 
 
―another issue‖ that leads to dysfunctionality—or as is increasingly 
evident, a failed or failing nation-state.  Yet to the extent that 
corruption, when significant, constitutes an alternative regime of 
exchange to ―other processes of influence and allocation,‖ a regime, 
that is to say, ―different ... from what would otherwise have been 
observed,‖ it is useful to ―discuss its role as a process operating within 
that system as altered by corruption.‖10 Put another way, as an already 
warped nation-state political system seriously altered (―aggravated‖ 
would be a better word) by corruption. 
The moral view from Nigeria, expressed by the Catholic Church 
as recently as 2009, virtually corroborates the academic one by 
Johnston. The church began the ―Our Search for Nationhood‖ section 
of its communiqué issued at the end of a plenary meeting by noting 
that in Nigeria ―the journey to nationhood is still long,‖ that ―We are 
yet to build a nation where people dwell in security‖ and that ―Life and 
property are constantly exposed to danger.‖ The church pointed to 
several causes:  the Niger Delta crisis,11 religious conflicts in the north, 
                                       
10 Michael Johnston, ―The Political Consequences of Corruption,‖ p. 463; original 
emphasis. 
11 This refers to the struggle of the minority ethnic groups of the Niger Delta—where 
all of Nigeria‘s oil and gas resources are located—for an equitable federal system and 
control, to a fair degree, of the hydrocarbon wealth in their land, as well as for 
environment-friendly oil extracting methods by the multinational cartels, among 
them Shell, ChevronTexaco and Agip. The struggles of the Niger Delta peoples began 
in earnest in 1993 and are known to the world mostly through the activities of the 
Ogoni people and their Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), as 
led by the late Ken Saro-Wiwa. Due to the immense success of MOSOP in mobilising 
local and international support for their cause, even leading to the cessation of all 
operations in Ogoniland by Shell, Saro-Wiwa was murdered along with eight of his 
comrades in 1995 after a show trial by a military tribunal set up by the late dictator, 
General Sani Abacha. The world-wide outrage that greeted this ―judicial lynching‖— 
to say nothing of  the critical role oil plays in the global scheme of things—turned the 
attention of the world which had hitherto been indifferent to the goings-on in the 
Niger Delta. 
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and ethnic conflicts in different parts of the country. As a sign of how 
seriously it took the question of corruption, the church treated it 
separately. ―Corruption,‖ it said, ―and theft of public funds, which have 
largely remained unabated despite our call for prayers, have brought 
our country to its knees.  This is noticeable, for example, in the 
collapse of infrastructure in the land, in the lack of basic amenities, 
and in the increasing number of unemployed, in the ever-rising crime 
wave.‖ Then commenting on all the factors militating against nation-
building, with again a special mention of corruption, the Catholic 
Church said as follows:  
 
We regret lost opportunities for nation building in Nigeria. We 
are saddened by the recent riots in the cities of Jos and 
Bauchi,12 despite our emphasis on dialogue as veritable means 
of resolving crisis. Each time we witness ethnic and religious 
conflicts, each time we hold elections lacking in credibility, we 
lose opportunities to build a nation.  Each time the people of our 
richly endowed land are impoverished through acts of violation 
of fundamental human rights, each time we make or fall victims 
                                       
12 Sporadic ethnic conflicts, often with political tensions as their underlying cause, 
have been a regular occurrence in the Northern half of the country since the 
early1980s. With specific reference to Jos and Bauchi which the Catholic 
communiqué cites, there have been several catastrophic riots in either city since 
2001, attributed to simmering religious/ethnic conflicts, all of which were widely 
reported by the local and international media, as follows: September  2001, 
November 2008, January and March 2010 in Jos; February and July 2009 and 
December 2009 in Bauchi. The orgy of religion-based riots would seem to have 
begun in earnest with the Maitatsine massacres of Kano in 1980, followed by other 
sect-led riots in Kaduna and Maiduguri in 1982 and Yola in 1984. 
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of injustice, bribery and corruption, we lose opportunities to 
build a nation.13 
 
  We have seen how colonialism constitutes a traumatic event. No 
doubt violent coups, bloody religious riots, inter-ethnic conflicts that 
may lead to genocide (Rwanda), so-called rebel wars which exact 
incalculable costs in lives, bodily harm and mental suffering (Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, Sudan, etc.) also constitute traumatic events. If 
corruption, which, as Johnston and the Nigerian Catholic Church 
inform us, can have its own catastrophic effects, would it be right to 
subject it to psychoanalytic scrutiny? Indeed, corruption may not be a 
classical psychoanalytical category, and we cannot really find any 
direct illumination of its own murky processes from psychoanalysis or 
trauma studies, yet the sheer magnitude of it in a postcolonial space 
like Nigeria has led to reactions that suggest it is one discursive space 
where we ought to go in search of a fuller account of the phenomenon 
by focussing on its psychic life. Or, at any rate, plot our way to it 
analytically as a secondary effect of trauma. Take this report in a 
Nigerian newspaper on the astonishing—though ordinary as the 
average Nigerian would readily endorse the view—suggestion by the 
current chair of Nigeria‘s anti-corruption outfit; it bears quoting in full:  
 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 
has advocated psychiatric tests for public office aspirants, ahead 
of the 2011 general elections. Chairman of the EFCC, Mrs. 
                                       
13 All references to the online version of the communiqué at  
http://www.abujacatholicliaison.org/speeches/The%20Word%20of%20God%20and
%20the%20Building%20of%20the%20Nigerian%20Nation.pdf. 
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Farida Waziri, made the call yesterday while delivering a keynote 
address at a workshop on transparency and accountability in 
the public service. 
She said: ―Having dealt with many corruption cases, I am 
inclined to suggest that public officers should be subjected to 
some form of psychiatric evaluation to determine their suitability 
for public office. 
―The extent of aggrandizement and gluttonous 
accumulation of wealth that I have observed suggest to me that 
some people are mentally and psychologically unsuitable for 
public office. We have observed people amassing public wealth 
to a point suggesting ‗madness‘ or some form of obsessive- 
compulsive psychiatric disorder.‖14 
 
Farida might as well have been echoing Fanon: ―only a 
psychoanalytical interpretation of the black problem can lay bare the 
anomalies of affect that are responsible for the structure of the 
complex‖—in this case, the corruption complex. So how might we even 
begin such interpretation where, as has been noted, corruption falls 
outside the gaze of psychoanalysis? One approach, I hazard, is to 
pursue trans-contextual readings of insights developed in relation to 
other problems of the colonised. For instance, when Fanon says ―The 
colonized man is an envious man,‖ does that not promise something 
beyond the dialectics and poetics of colonial violence he propounds in 
The Wretched of the Earth? We have seen the use Barbara Goff and 
                                       
14 See, ―EFCC Wants Psychiatric Tests for Politicians,‖ Daily Champion, 29 
September 2009. Ironically, Farida herself is constantly dogged by reports of her 
corrupt enrichment by the very same lucre-crazed people she wants psychoanalysed, 
though nothing has been formally proved against her. 
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Michael Simpson make of the passage containing this phrase in their 
Crossroads in the Black Aegean: Oedipus, Antigone, and Dramas of the 
African Diaspora. For the last time here, let us revisit that famous 
passage: 
 
The look that the native turns on the settler‘s town is a look of 
lust, a look of envy; it expresses his dreams of possession—all 
manner of possession: to sit at the settler‘s table, to sleep with 
his wife if possible. The colonized man is an envious man. And 
this the settler knows very well; when their glances meet he 
ascertains bitterly, always on the defensive, ―They want to take 
our place.‖ It is true, for there is no native who does not dream 
at least once a day of setting himself up in the settler‘s place.15 
 
We have here several of the key concepts that constitute the 
psychoanalytic field of vision: lust, desire, fantasy, aggression, the 
unconscious (dream) and ambivalence. To be well on our way to 
making bricks with mere straw, let us think of corruption as the non-
violent means by which the colonised dreams of taking the place of the 
colonizer. For if the coloniser symbolised not only political power but 
also an easy and lavish lifestyle complete with the choicest colonial 
real estate, cars, leisure and recreation together with a retinue of 
domestic servants—even where, and perhaps because, this lifestyle 
was sponsored by mindless exploitation and vaulted the colonial to a 
class or social status unavailable to him back in his native Europe16—
                                       
15 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 39. 
16 In the scene where the girls, the market-women‘s daughters, mimic a conversation 
among colonial officers, Soyinka gives us an idea of the opulence, replete with golf 
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the dream of possession, ―all manner of possession‘ that Fanon speaks 
of is not extinguished by the mere possession of the coloniser‘s wife. At 
any rate, not after nominal independence and the departure of the 
coloniser. By crook or hook, those who had finally taken the place of 
the departed colonial masters had to acquire and sustain the lifestyle 
associated with power and governance in a modern nation-state such 
as has been handed to them. And the association in their mind of the 
two—power and an ostentatious lifestyle—under colonialism persists 
after ―independence‖ or ―liberation.‖  What Waziri calls madness, a 
psychiatric disorder, is to the corrupt, kleptomaniac, suzerains of the 
post-colonial nation-state, an inherent and necessary part of the 
exercise of power. It comes with the territory, so to speak! Re-reading 
Fanon this way by bringing him ―up to date‖ and applying the 
uncanny insights of psychoanalysis to the mental processes of the 
postcolonial subject today, it seems to me we would have far more to 
gain than lose. 
A clear omission from this project and a site of future work is 
what may be called, echoing Spillers, Psychoanalysis and the Post-
Colonial Nation-State. Benedict Anderson‘s brilliant conceptualisation 
of nations as ―imagined communities‖ promises much to the critic 
armed with the psychoanalytic lens.  And here we would be on firmer 
psychoanalytic grounds, especially if we pursue the insight provided 
by the notion of birth as a trauma. We have seen the boon of the 
inverse view—death as a trauma—and it seems to me that the notion 
                                                                                                              
and race courses usually maintained by Europeans Only clubs, from which these 
lowly officers would normally be excluded back in England. See Death and the King’s 
Horseman, 31. 
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of birth trauma speaks directly to the emergence of the postcolonial 
nation. If the birth of the postcolonial nation was a traumatic event, 
not only in the sense of the violence of the anti-colonial struggles but 
also of the forceful cobbling together of hitherto independent, 
autochthonous nation-peoples under radically drawn and redrawn 
maps, but which the urgent needs of decolonisation constrained the 
leaders of the anti-colonial struggle to adopt as the given nation, then 
it is time we began a discussion of the post-colonial nation-state as 
perhaps only a transferential space for working-through the lingering 
colonial trauma that haunts it. This would be the best way to view the 
―phenomenon‖ of national conferences proposed as the panacea to the 
intractable crises that plagued many African countries in the eighties, 
a phenomenon that swept through Francophone Africa more 
particularly.17 A sovereign national conference, offered as way of 
gathering the tribes for the purpose of freely determining the terms of 
union of the ―mere geographical expression‖18 often called post-
colonial nation-state, has been a major demand of the left in Nigeria 
since 1989. For that matter, the notion of truth and reconciliation 
commissions, a means South Africa sought to overcome the trauma 
and bitterness of the apartheid epoch, fits into this concept of the 
postcolonial-nation-as-transferential-space. Simply put, treating the 
                                       
17 Pearl T. Robinson discusses this phenomenon in the eponymously-titled article, 
―The Phenomenon of National Conferences in Francophone Africa,‖ Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (July, 1994), 575-610.  
18 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, one of the founding fathers of Nigeria—a name or nation 
that did not exist before the forceful merger by Lord Alfred Lugard of the existing 
ethnic nationalities, generally grouped under the Northern and Southern 
protectorates of the British empire, in 1914 —famously described the country he and 
others fought to free from colonial domination in these words. See his Path to 
Nigerian Freedom (London: Faber and Faber, 1947). 
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post-colonial nation-state as offering no more than a transferential site 
is to say that it presents us an open clinic and many couches for 
Freud‘s ―talking cure.‖ The dynamism of this space and its 
transformative potential are addressed by Spillers who likens it to the 
―clearing‖ Toni Morrison gives Sethe when she is denied a pulpit—even 
though a regular and proper pulpit would do as well in certain 
circumstances.19 Evidently, we need Fanon today more than ever and 
he is amenable to far more than just the self-regarding needs of global 
theory.  
                                       
19 Hortense J. Spillers, Black, White, and in Color, 399. See the elaboration of her use 
of this concept with specific regard to African-American communities in the second 
paragraph of footnote 39 at 522. 
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